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ABSTRACT 
Determinants of Corporate Dividend Payout Policy: Evidence from 
Emerging Economies of South Asia 
The present study analyzes the effect of firm and country level factors on corporate dividend payout in 
emerging economies of South Asia.  Existing studies mainly investigate the determinants of dividend 
payout in developed economies with little focus on country level economic, legal and cultural factors 
especially in emerging economies. The results of previous studies are mixed and inconclusive regarding 
the relationship of firm level factors and dividend payout. This study contributes to the existing literature 
by providing evidence on moderating role of country level factors in determining the relationship 
between firm level factors and dividend payout policy in South Asia. The study uses the data of listed 
non-financial companies of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, from 2006 to 2010. Firm and 
country level models are estimated using lest-square, Tobit, Logit and TSLS techniques. The analysis is 
conducted in two parts, first the effect of firm level factors with dividend payout in each of four South 
Asian countries is compared, and second the impact of country level factors on the relationship of firm 
level factors and dividend payout is investigated. At firm level estimation the results show that dividend 
payout increases with increase in managerial ownership in Bangladesh and India but decreases in 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Institutional ownership positively affects payout in Bangladesh and India but 
not in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Operating cash flow and lagged dividend are important determinants of 
payout in South Asian countries but cash flow sensitivity does not affect payouts. Regarding country 
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level factors, in high investors’ protection regime, the shareholders enforce managers to pay dividend, 
which is in line with dividend outcome model. This shows that investors’ protection does not substitute 
dividend payouts in South Asia. Furthermore, legal rights protection of creditors and employees does 
not adversely affect dividend payout.  Regarding cultural attributes, the study finds that the uncertainty 
avoidance negatively moderates the relationship between cash flow and dividend payout. 
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Dividend is used by corporate managers to signal company’s financial strength to attract potential 
investors. It is among the key return variables through which corporate value is determined. 
According to Graham and Dodd (1934), the very basic reason for which a corporation exists is the 
payment of dividend. Keeping the objective of shareholders’ wealth maximization in consideration, 
finance managers have to decide the proportion of profit to be distributed among shareholders. The 
first section of this chapter defines dividend policy. The Second section discusses the dimensions of 
research in dividend policy. Existing literature provides support to different firm and country level 
factors which determine corporate dividend policy, these factors are summarized in the fourth 
section.  
Research motivation and objectives are given in the last section.  
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1.1 Corporate Dividend Policy  
The ultimate goal of a finance manager is to ensure that every corporate decision must 
lead company to achieve its target of shareholder’s wealth maximization therefore, while 
deciding among distribution and retention rates of profit, finance manager must not only 
consider the future investment needs of the company but also take into account the 
possible impact of his decision on company’s share value. The term “Dividend Policy” 
represents three key decisions a finance manager has to take. The first one is either to pay 
dividend or not. A growing company usually do not pay dividend, even a mature 
company may decide not to announce dividend if it thinks that it can enhances its share 
value by reinvestment of earnings. The second key question underscores what should be 
the optimal level of dividend? More than optimal dividend payout may improve 
company’s image to the investors but this reduces the reinvestment rate as a result of 
which, company would not be able to meet the future investment needs. High dividend 
rates are also hard to maintain in the long run as this exerts negative pressure on 
company’s reserves. While, low dividend signals a weak financial position and 
mismanagement in financial affairs of business, which not only jeopardize company’s 
reputation in the market but also create hurdles in raising funds from capital markets (Al-
Malkawi, 2007). It is therefore, crucial for finance manager to discover the optimal level 
of dividend. The third decision is concerned with the form of dividend. Corporations can 
pay dividend either in the form of cash or alternatively in the form of stocks (called 
bonus shares) stock split or share repurchase.   
Cash dividend is by far the most common type of dividend which the companies use for 
distribution of their earnings. However, regularity of dividend payout is only possible if 
company has strong liquidity position. If a company is expected to face liquidity 
constraints then company may go for alternative forms of dividend. Bonus shares and 
stock split are the options available with company to be used if company is facing 
liquidity constraints but enjoys strong reserves. While using these options a company 
needs to consider dilution of earnings, which may be disliked by investors. In recent 
years stock repurchase has gained importance (Grullon et al., 2005). Repurchase of 
shares not only concentrates the earnings per share but also reduces the risk of hostile 
takeover. But besides being costly, the share repurchase gives a bad signal to investors 
and represents managers’ failure to capture profitable investments. Therefore, stock 
repurchase option is not feasible for managers all the times. Finally, property dividend is 
not a widely used and valued form of dividend and it is rarely used by modern 
corporations. The phenomenon of making decision regarding the amount and method of 
distribution of company’s profits among shareholder  
15  
  
 
  
  
Figure 1.1: Hierarchy of Dividend Policy Decision  
1.2 Historical Background and Dividend Policy Research   
During the early 16th century, captains of sailing ships mainly from Great Britain and Holland 
introduced financial claims to their investors. These financial claims entitled the investors to share 
the profits or loss from the voyages (Basking, 1989; Frankfurter & Wood, 1997; Al-Malkawi, 
2007). According to Frankfurter & Wood (1997) the emergence of going concern demanded the 
establishment of fundamental principles for distribution of income to the original investors, as a 
result of which need of dividend payment regulations arises. Walker (1931) reported that East 
India Company issued first joint stock share in 1613. In order to enhance investors’ confidence in 
profitability of ventures, the entrepreneurs started giving due importance to regular distribution of 
profits. By the time companies came to know about the importance given to dividend payouts by 
investors, they started using dividend to signal strong financial prospects of their companies. 
During the 19th century, payment of consistent dividend remained the most important job for 
corporate managers (Frankfurter & Wood, 1997).   
Based on the objective of research on dividend policy, existing literature can be divided in two 
categories: first, value relevance of dividend policy and second, determinants of dividend policy. 
Innumerable theories have been presented on perceived importance of dividend payouts in 
determining share value, but researchers do not seem to have any agreement on value relevance of 
dividend policy. Initially company’s management realized the significance of regular dividend 
payouts to meet investor’s expectations. It is also believed that reduction of dividend negatively 
affects the share price which gives rise to the process of dividend smoothing. Since earlier in 19th 
Century a great debate on the relationship between dividend policy and firm value started among 
the financial researchers (Al-Malkawi, 2007).   
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Figure 1.2 : Dimensions of Dividend Policy Research  
Graham & Dodd (1934) argued that investment in common stock is based upon three 
concepts; first, appropriate and established dividend; second, consistent and sufficient 
earnings record; and finally, reasonable patronage of tangible assets. If the investment in 
common stock is not attracted by the above mentioned three factors, then it would be 
called as speculation rather than investment. It is intuitive to think that investors prefer to 
receive dividend rather than capital gains, because dividends are more certain as 
compared to capital gain and the main objective of a business corporation is to pay 
dividends to shareholders (Graham & Dodd, 1934). But from management view point, 
future welfare of the company and its shareholders are more important than dividend 
payments therefore, company should follow conservative dividend policy. If 
management withholds and reinvests its profit into the business, it helps them in building 
accumulated surplus and they can claim to be acting in the best interest of shareholders. 
But Graham & Dodd (1934) strictly questioned the validity of this “conservative 
dividend policy” in the following words:  
“This is an arresting fact, and it should serve to call into question the 
traditional theory of corporate finance that the smaller the 
percentage of earnings paid out in dividends the better for the 
company and its stockholders. Although investors have been taught to 
pay lip service to this theory, their instincts—and perhaps their better 
judgment—are in revolt against it. If we try to bring a fresh and 
critical viewpoint to bear upon this subject, we shall find that weighty 
objections may be leveled against the accepted dividend policy of 
American corporations, viz., conservative dividend policy” (p 379).  
Reinvestment of earnings is beneficial for the company and its permanents shareholders, 
if time value of money is ignored. Company should save some amount out of dividends 
for the rainy days but it does not compensate the value loss to shareholders because 
holding dividend over long period of time is not beneficial for investors especially if 
interest on such amount is compounded annually.   
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The dividend theory presented by Graham & Dodd (1934) received a multifaceted 
response from the financial researchers. Existing literature reveals that financial 
researchers of latter times divided in three groups. Some supported the positive impact of 
dividends on firm’s value (See for example Gordon, 1959; Lintner, 1962), others argued 
dividend to be irrelevant (Miller & Modigliani, 1961) while some others established a 
negative relationship among dividend and firm’s value (Black & Scholes, 1974; 
Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, 1979). Latter, their views became famous as three distinct 
dividend theories namely bird-in-hand theory, dividend irrelevance theory and tax 
preference theory, respectively.   
Previously dividend was believed to enhance firm’s value but Miller & Modigliani 
(1961), in their seminal work on dividend policy, challenged the common belief that 
higher dividends results in higher firm value. Miller & Modigliani further suggested that 
investors can create homemade dividends by merely selling the proportion of their shares 
at a higher price. Their argument was based on idealistic assumptions of perfect capital 
market and investor’s rationality.   
Black & Scholes (1974) re-examined the dividend irrelevance hypothesis using an 
alternative approach. They introduced extension in capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
to test long run impact of dividend yield on share price. Based on the results of the model 
they concluded that there is no impact of dividend yield on market value of share. Many 
researchers (see for example: Walter, 1956; Gordon, 1959; Gordon, 1962; Lintner, 1962; 
Gordon, 1963; Friend & Puckett, 1964; Kalay, 1982; Asquith & Mullins, 1983; Ambrish 
et al., 1987; Baskin, 1989; Born et al., 1988 etc.) contradicted the irrelevance theory 
based on the argument of information content and signaling effect of dividend policy and 
argued that dividends may influence the return and share prices   
Gordon (1963) and Lintner (1962) claimed that Modigliani & Miller (1961) ignored the 
impact of dividend on cost of capital and came up with an alternative view on relevance 
of dividend policy to firm’s value which they called “bird in hand argument”. They 
asserted that today’s dividend is preferred by investor as compared to future dividends 
because of uncertainty. In state of imperfection dividends are not valued similar to the 
capital gains because rational investor prefers to have “bird in hand” i.e. present 
dividends rather than “two in the bush” i.e. future uncertain capital gain (De Boyrie, 
2010). Therefore, increase in dividend is associated with increase in firm’s value. 
Graham & Dodd (1934) also argued that one unit of dividend payment impacts share 
price four times greater than the unit of retained earnings (Diamond, 1967). Modigliani 
& Miller strictly rejected the bird-in-hand argument and called it bird-in-hand fallacy 
(Al-Malkawi, 2007). Bhattacharya (1979) also criticized bird in hand argument on the 
ground that it is firm risk which affects dividend policy and not the other way round, 
because the uncertainty of cash flow influences its dividend payouts but any increase in 
dividend payouts do not reduce the risk of the firm. Bird-in-hand theory was in line with 
the conventional belief that higher dividend is related with higher share price.  
One of the major objections on dividend irrelevance and bird in hand hypothesis was 
exclusion of tax effect. The tax effect theory supports low dividend payout, especially in 
situation where dividend tax rate is higher than capital gain tax or dividends are subject 
to double taxation. Moreover, dividend taxes are deductible at source while tax on capital 
gain can be deferred until the return is realized. The tax advantages of capital gain over 
dividends enforce investor to prefer those companies who plow back their profits and do 
not distribute it in the form of dividends (Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, 1989)  
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An after tax model of CAPM had been introduced by (Brennan, 1970) to examine the relationship 
between dividend yield and tax risk-adjusted returns. He argued that higher the pretax risk adjusted 
return higher will be the dividend yield, which ultimately suggests that the stock with higher tax 
adjusted returns, sells at lower price. This is due to the fact that higher tax disadvantages of 
dividend reduce investors’ preference for that share. Litzenberger & Ramaswamy (1979) 
reexamined Brennan (1970) tax preference hypothesis using monthly data on dividend yield and 
found that coefficient of dividend yield shows a significantly positive value. In short there are three 
distinct schools of thoughts on dividend policy and its impact on firms’ value. Some believe 
dividends to be irrelevant in determining firm’s value, while other believe that dividends have 
positive effects on firm’s value, still many others believe that dividend reduces firm’s value.   
The discussion on determinants of dividend policy started from the seminal work of 
Lintner (1956) who proposed the partial adjustment model to describe the dividend 
policy of companies. According to him, every company has its own targeted payout ratio 
and they also have speed of adjustment and company does not increase dividends unless 
it is able to sustain the new level of dividend in the near future. The researchers explored 
the issue in more detail. In this respect, the most prominent work has been done by 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), who propounded “Agency Cost Hypothesis”. The agency 
cost perspective has opened new vistas of demonstration in resolving issues like choice 
of capital structure, maturity structure, executive compensation and most importantly 
corporate dividend policy. The debate on determinants of dividend did not end there, the 
researchers of latter times highlighted several new dimensions of dividend policy such as 
signaling hypothesis, which states that investors infer information regarding success of 
business through dividend announcement. Increase in dividends is normally taken as a 
strong positive signal by investors while reduction in dividend or dividend omissions are 
considered as a signal of weak financial position. The existing financial literature also 
provides two competing theories of financial decision. First, the tradeoff theory which 
argued that firm considers balance between cost of paying and not paying dividends and 
second, pecking order theory presented by Myers (1984) which suggest that firms prefer 
to pay dividend out of retained earnings.   
1.3 Determinant of Corporate Dividend Payout  
Besides the above mentioned theoretical perspectives of payout policy, researchers 
investigated different firm specific factors which affect firms’ ability to pay dividends. 
These factors includes ownership structure (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Zeckhauser & 
Pound, 1990; Jensen et al., 1992; Ali et al., 1993; Agrawal & Jayaraman, 1994; Chen & 
Steiner, 1999), cash flows (Ho, 2002; Afza & Mirza, 2010; Elston et al., 2011; Mollah et. 
al, 2007), profitability (Elston et al., 2011; Short et al., 2002; Kumar, 2006; Cook & Jeon, 
2006), leverage (Jensen et al., 1992; Chen & Steiner, 1999), size (Afza & Mirza, 2010; 
Ho, 2002; Holderness & Sheehan, 2000 etc.)  which play important role in designing 
dividend payout policy. The detailed discussion on these firm specific factors are given 
in theoretical frame work i.e. Chapter 2. The studies on firm, industry and country 
specific factors affecting dividend payouts have generated a cosmic literature but still the 
issue is unresolved as the results of the existing studies are inconclusive regarding the 
nature of relationship between firm level factors and dividend policy. It is however, 
intuitively appealing to argue that there must be set of different factors which shape the 
payout policy rather than any single factor.   
During last decade, the debate on determinant of dividend policy has entered into a new 
avenue where researchers are exploring country level factors as determinates of payouts. 
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Existing literature shows that corporate dividend practices are not only time variant but 
also differs across countries. Moreover, the country specific factors like investors and 
creditors protection level (see for example; La Porta et al., 1998; Mauro, 1995; Bardhan, 
1997; Djankov et al., 2003; John & Williams, 1985; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Brockman & 
Unlu, 2008; Shao et al. 2013 etc.), economic development (Dhalla, 1980; Greer, 1984; 
Zarnowitz, 1985; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989), disclosure level in financial statements 
(Graham et al. 2005; Luo &  Plumlee, 2008), access to finance (Fazzari et al., 1988) & 
risk aversion behavior in culture (Chui, 2002; Shao et al. 2013; Fedrmuc & Jacob, 2010; 
Shefrin & Statman, 1984; Shefrin & Sharma, 1984; Yang et al., 2009) etc. also affect 
corporate dividend policy. Dividend policy of company operating in a developing 
economy is different from that in developed markets (Glen et al., 1995). Generally 
companies in emerging economies face more financial constraints due to which their 
dividend is low (Ramacharran, 2001) but it is important to investigate the role of other 
factors behind low payout, since little research is done on cross country comparison of 
dividend policy in emerging economies. Country specific legal system plays role in 
determining corporate dividend policy (La Porta et al. 2000). For instance, in common 
law country where shareholders’ rights are duly protected, companies pay more 
dividends as compared to the companies in civil law countries where corporate 
legislations do not provide enough protection of minority shareholders right and hence 
they are vulnerable to the influence of majority shareholders etc. The detailed discussion 
on country specific factors affecting corporate dividend policy will be provided in 
chapter 2.  
Empirical findings provide mixed and inconclusive results on determinants of dividend payout 
which is making the whole issue a “puzzle” whose pieces do not fit together (Black, 1976). Allen et 
al. (2000) summarized dividend problem as one of the thorniest puzzles in corporate finance. 
Likewise, Frankfurter et al. (2002) called dividend puzzle as one of the most challenging topics of 
modern financial economics, which has not been resolved despite forty years of extensive research. 
According to Brealey & Meyers (2002) dividend policy is among top ten unresolved puzzles in 
financial research. The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the discussion on dividend 
policy and its determinants by providing empirical evidence from emerging economies of South 
Asia.  
1.4 Research Motivation and Objectives   
The determinants of dividend policy is among the most complex issues faced by 
researchers. According to Brealey & Meyers (2002), dividend policy is among the most 
interesting and puzzling issues in finance which are still unresolved. The scope of 
majority of studies conducted so far is limited to a single country, where a little attention 
is given to cross country comparison of factors affecting corporate dividend policy. 
Among those who have focused cross country analysis have targeted developed countries 
only. It is important to understand that financial market structure of developed countries 
are different from developing countries in many ways, including their governance 
regulations, taxation, access to capital and ownership structure etc. and the evidence form 
developed economies has limited application for emerging economies. Many researchers 
(see for example; Baker et al., 1985; Jensen et al., 1992; Benartzi et al., 1997; Gugler, 
2003; Myers & Frank, 2004; De Angelo et al., 2004; Stacescu, 2006; Pappadopoulos & 
Dimitrios, 2007; Jakob & Johannes, 2008) provided empirical evidence on determinants 
of dividend payout policy from developed countries like USA, UK and Canada with little 
focus on developing countries of South Asia like Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri 
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Lanka. Moreover, few researchers (see for example Sentence et al., 2012; Lee et al., 
2013; Abreu & Gulamhussen, 2013; Basse et al., 2013) have highlighted the impact of 
global financial crisis on payout policy in developed countries but the impact of recent 
financial crisis on dividend policy is perhaps ignored in recent research focus.  
South Asia is a growing economic region however, during last decade the number of 
dividend paying companies is significantly reduced (Reddy & Rath, 2005). Reasons 
behind this declining trend could be the firm and country specific factors. Very few 
researchers focused this issue in emerging economies which motivated the author to 
conduct cross country analysis in South Asia. Most of the previous studies (see for 
example: Ho, 2002;  Mitton, 2004; Farinah & Foronda, 2009; Eije & Megginson, 2008; 
La porta et. al, 2000;   
Bae et. al, 2009; Denis & Osobov, 2008;  Renneboog, 2006) on cross country differences of 
dividend policy have either theoretically used country level factors to justify firm level differences 
in dividend policy or empirically investigated the direct impact of country level factors on dividend 
policy and perhaps ignored the moderating role of country level factors, especially in developing 
economies which motives the author to conduct study in South Asia.   
1.4.1 Research Objective  
 The present study attempts to meet two important objectives:    
1. The primary objective of this study is to investigate the impact of country level 
factors on relationship between firm’s specific factors and dividend payouts in 
South Asia.   
2. Second objective is to conduct cross country analysis of firm level determinants of 
payout policy in South Asia.   
1.4.2 Research Questions  
The study seeks answers of following research questions.  
1. What role firm level factors play in determining dividend payout? Do they affect dividend 
payout differently in South Asian Countries?  
2. What are the important firm level determinants of dividend payout in South Asia?  
3. How financial crisis affected the relationship of firm/country specific factors and payout 
policy?  
4. What is the importance of country specific legal, economic and cultural factors in 
determining the relationship between firm specific factors and dividend payout policy?  
1.4.3 Contribution and Significance  
This study contributes to the existing literature in two ways; first, to the best of author’s 
knowledge, this is the first cross country investigation of determinants of dividend policy 
of listed companies in South Asia. Second, the impact of country level factors on 
relationship between firm specific factors and dividend policy in South Asia is being 
studied for the first time.  This study has significance for investors, managers and 
corporate law authorities. For investors the empirical findings of this study provide 
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opportunity to understand various corporate attributes and their effect on dividend 
payouts in South Asia.  
This study suggests corporate law authorities that the dividend regulations should be 
designed in a way that it creates trustworthy relationship between managers and 
shareholders. By enhancing investors’ protection and confidence, the corporate sector 
can get better competitive position in the regional market and can attract more foreign 
investments. It also emphasizes the need that corporate sector of each country should 
design its dividend policy according to the regional corporate practices so that the foreign 
investors may be ready to get the equivalent profit opportunities as they are getting in the 
other emerging economies of South Asia.  
Earlier studies (Campello et al. 2009) analyzed the relationships between firm specific 
factors and payout policies under normal economic circumstance, while empirical 
evidence on the behavior of firms with respect to payout policy during and after financial 
crisis is very limited. A crisis affects a firm in a lot of ways like decreasing sales, 
decreasing earnings, limiting growth opportunities, credit and liquidity constraints, 
overvalued and unused assets etc. (Smith, 2012). Therefore, it is important to analyze the 
impact of financial crisis on relationship between firm specific factors and payout policy.   
The rest of thesis is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 provides theoretical framework. 
Chapter 3 covers the economic, corporate, legal and cultural environment of South Asian 
region. Chapter 4 presents the relevant literature from developed, developing and cross 
country studies. Research methodology, models, variables and estimations techniques are 
discussed in chapter 5. The analysis of firm level factors and their relationship with 
various proxies of dividend policy is given in chapter 6. Chapter 7 briefly analyzes the 
moderating role of country level factors in determining dividend policy. Summary, 
conclusion and policy recommendations are discussed in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 2  
Theoretical Background  
  
    
Existing studies on corporate payout policy highlighted two important set of factors   
which determine dividend payout. First, firm specific factors and second, country 
specific factors. This chapter provides detailed discussion on important factors which 
affect corporate payout policy in the light of theory and empirical findings. First section 
presents the theoretical perspective while second section discusses the firm level 
determinant of dividend payout. The effect of country specific factors on dividend payout 
is discussed in the last section.  
2.1 Dividend Policy Theories  
The financial researchers have been investigating the determinants of optimal dividend 
policy since early 1950s. The discussion on determinants of dividend policy started from 
the seminal work of Lintner (1956) who proposed the partial adjustment model to 
describe the dividend policy of companies. According to him every company has its own 
targeted payout ratio and they also have speed of adjustment and company does not 
increase dividends unless it is able to sustain the new level of dividend in the near future. 
In the words of Lintner:  
“Companies have a definite policy regarding the ideal or target ratio 
of dividends to current earnings …., this normal pay-out ratio was 
considered to be a target or an ideal toward which that company 
would move, but not a restrictive requirement dictating a specific 
percentage payment within each year. Moreover, most of these 
companies also had somewhat more flexible but nevertheless 
reasonably well-defined standards regarding the speed with which 
they would try to move toward a full adjustment of dividends to 
current earnings” (Lintner, 1956).  
Lintner’s dividend model is stated as under:  
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∆Dividendt = αi + ci (Dividend*it – Dividend i (t-1)) + uit----------- (2.1)  
Where: Dividend*it = riPit;  r = the target payout ratio; Pt = current year earnings after tax;  
∆Dividend = change in dividend payments; Subscript i = individual company; t = dating subscript.; 
ci = Fraction of difference between target payout and actual payout in t-1.  
In short, Lintner’s theory was based on two important ideas i.e. every company sets its 
own long term targeted dividend payout which is decided on the basis of availability of 
positive NPV projects. Secondly, managers are aware that increase in earnings may not 
be persistent; therefore, they do not increase dividends if they are not sure about the 
sustainability of new earnings. Thus dividends are smoothed which means that if earning 
patterns include transitory shocks the dividends need to be smoother relative to the 
income (Lambrecht & Mayers, 2010). Lintner (1956) interviewed corporate managers 
and reported that managers do not set dividends each year independently based on 
earnings, they only reconsider the previous year’s payout level. The decision to reduce 
payout is taken only when they left with no other choice and on the other side they 
increase dividend only when they are confident that future earnings and cash flow pattern 
would be able to support the increased level of 
dividend payouts. He also found that managers 
adjust their cash related decisions in 
accordance with the pre-decided dividend  
levels. Brave et. al (2005) found the similar Figure 2.1 
Lintner Model: Sourced from Bauer and  
Bhattacharyya (2006)  
results in a survey of financial executives of 
publically traded firms.  
The partial adjustment model suggested by 
Lintner was reexamined by Bond & Mougoue 
(1991). They argued that when earnings follow 
a linear autoregressive process, multiple 
combinations of target payouts and speed of adjustment fit in with the same earning 
stream and dividend stream. Therefore, partial adjustment model did not provide unique 
results and had limited applicability for the firm whose earnings were characterized by 
autocorrelation. Lintner Model was criticized on the grounds that if companies determine 
their target payouts and start to achieve their respective target payout ratio then some day 
they reach the target. Bauer & Bhattacharyya (2006) called it the steady state behavior of 
Lintner’s model and explained it with the help of an iterative map (cobweb diagram) 
which is presented in Figure 1. Where, X-axis shows rn, the dividend payout ratio for 
year n and Y-axis shows rn+1, the dividend payout ratio for year n+1. The linear line 
(forty five degree angle) from the origin and the upper parallel line represent the 
functional relationship between rn+1 and rn. The dividend payout is adjusted upwards by a 
constant amount c of the target payout r*. The iterative map is represented by black 
arrows which explains the change of payout ratio from r0 and in steady state payout ratio 
will become equal to r*. Bauer & Bhattacharyya (2006) argued that observed payouts in 
Lintner model are mean reverting with shifts and these shifts represents the changes in 
corporate dividend policy regarding their target dividend payout ratio.   
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Lintner’s model, besides its serious theoretical shortcomings, keeps a prominent place in 
financial literature and is considered as the starting point of dividend debate. The 
researchers of the latter times explored the issue in more detail. The seminal theoretical 
work of Jensen & Meckling (1976) who presented “Agency Theory”, opened new vistas 
of demonstration explanation in resolving issues like choice of capital structure, maturity 
structure, executive compensation and most importantly corporate dividend policy. The 
basis of agency cost hypothesis lies in the relationship between principals and agents. In 
corporate form of business where shareholders (the principals) appoint managers (the 
agents) to handle the affairs of their business. Shareholders provide all the funds to the 
company but do not participate directly in the affairs of company. The management of 
the company is authorized to work in the best interest of shareholders and ensure the 
achievement of their ultimate objective of shareholder’s wealth maximization. 
Management, which controls assets of company, can utilize company’s resources for 
different purposes which may or may not be suitable for future profitability and growth 
of company. For instance, management can use their powers on assets of the company by 
outright theft, issuance of new shares and hence diluting the earnings, buying assets of 
the company at a price lower than the market or they can also use financial assets of 
company for investment in projects which brings profit to themselves (La Porta et al., 
2000). In order to prevent manager form exploiting their authority and to work in the best 
interest of shareholders, they either have to spend money on managers by providing them 
with incentives like transport facility, accommodation facilities, perks and other benefits 
etc or have to reduce the funds under managers’ control. Dividend payout can potentially 
reduce this conflict of interest between managers and shareholders by curtailing the funds 
under managers’ control and expose them to the strict scrutiny of external capital market 
where they ultimately need to go for acquisition of funds for investment in upcoming 
investment projects (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook and Frank, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Ali, et 
al., 1993). Jensen & Meckling (1976) indicated another form of agency conflict which is 
between shareholders and bondholders. Shareholders enjoy limited liability and have 
power to access company’s cash flows more easily than bondholders therefore; any 
dividend greater than normal is observed by bondholders as expropriation of their rights 
by shareholders.  
Due to this reason bondholders like to curtail dividends in order to strengthen company’s 
financial position which ultimately ensures the security of bondholders’ claim against 
company. Conversely, because of the same reason shareholders like to receive high 
dividends (Ang, 1987). The agency explanation of dividend payout failed to fully address 
the payout behavior of firm due to differences in nature of conflicts between shareholders 
and managers versus shareholders and creditors. But still agency problem and its 
relationship with dividend payout cannot be ruled out form dividend discussion.  
Dividend irrelevance hypothesis ignored the conflict of interest between owners and 
managers which is highly questionable, because in corporate form of organization, 
management is separated from ownership and management’s interests are not necessarily 
same as shareholders. In such situation managers are imperfect agents of shareholders 
(AlMalkawi, 2007). As dividend irrelevance hypothesis ignored agency conflict therefore 
it failed to consider the information gap between managers and shareholders. Managers, 
who are responsible for company’s operations, possess more information regarding 
current and future expected performance of company than shareholders. This creates 
information gap between shareholders and managers due to which true intrinsic value of 
the company’s share may not be available to the outsiders. This gap makes the 
company’s share over or undervalued in the market. Managers try to reduce this 
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information gap so that share price reflects true intrinsic value of company, but direct 
announcement of sophisticated information to share holder regarding future policies of 
company may not be suitable in an environment where firm has to face quick rival 
reactions. Therefore, managers may need to bring the strong prospect of companies 
operations in the knowledge of shareholders using certain signals. Dividend 
announcement is among the powerful signals which managers use to reduce information 
asymmetry and to communicate future success of business. (see for example: Allen & 
Michaely, 2003; Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller & Rock, 1985; Grullon et al., 2005; Asquith 
& Mullins, 1983; Healy & Palepu, 1988; Michaely et al., 1995; Liu et al., 2008; Benartzi 
et al., 2005; Ofer & Siegel,, 1987; Officer, 2011). The signaling property of dividends is 
commonly known as information content of dividend/signaling hypothesis.   
Signaling hypothesis states that investors infer information regarding success of business 
through dividend announcement. Increase in dividend is normally taken as a strong 
positive signal by investors while reduction in dividend or dividend omission is 
considered as a signal of weak financial position (Allen & Michaely, 2003). During last 
decades of 20th century, researchers empirically tested the signaling hypothesis. For 
example, Bhattacharya (1979) modeled the transaction cost of dividend, John & William 
(1985) modeled the tax penalty on dividend as compared to capital gain while, Miller & 
Rock (1985) tried to develop financial models for empirical investigation of signaling 
process with cost of distortion in optimal investment decision. Signaling hypothesis was 
challenged by researchers (see Allen & Michaely, 2003) and argued that why company 
goes for an expensive signaling option (i.e. dividend) when less costly options like share 
repurchase are available. Existing literature on information contents of dividend provides 
inconclusive support to signaling hypothesis. The difference is mainly due to the method 
or tool used to gauge positivity or negativity of signal. Share price is the commonly used 
as indicator where increase in share price as a result of increase in dividend is considered 
as positive dividend signal and vice versa. However, the way investors respond in the 
market towards dividend depends on current status of investor. For example, tax 
exempted investors may respond differently than investors who have to pay tax on total 
income. Brennan (1970) analyzed the relation between dividends and tax risk adjusted 
return. He found that shares with higher dividend and higher tax have low market price 
as compared to the shares with dividend with low tax rates. He attributed this negative 
relationship between dividend and share prices to “investors’ tax preference”. Investors 
do not prefer to receive dividends in a situation when they have to pay higher taxes on 
their dividend income. In other words investors require secure and higher expected 
returns in the form of dividends, but the imposition of tax on dividend makes dividend 
less attractive for investors. (Frankfuter & Wood, 1997).  
In the real world, where different investors are prone to different tax treatments on their 
incomes, the preference to investors towards dividends or capital gain creates clienteles, 
which are attracted towards companies whose dividend policy best suits their investment 
objectives. Miller and Scholes (1982) found that clientele effect is responsible for not 
more than a minor change in portfolio structure. Masulis & Trueman (1988) claimed that 
investors with divergent tax obligations shall not be even in their target company payout 
policy. Dividends will be decreased with the increase in tax liability and the value 
differences are minimized by distribution of investors into different clienteles.  
Based on the clientele effect argument Baker & Wurgler (2004), BW hereafter, presented catering 
theory. BW challenged the assumption of market efficiency (the fundamental assumption of 
dividend irrelevance) and presented three reasons for relaxing efficient market assumption. First, 
investors have unacquainted time changing demand of shares with high payout. Second, limit on 
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arbitrage forces allow this demand to affect current share price. Third, managers rationally cater to 
investor demand, that is, managers pay dividends only when investors put higher premium of 
dividend paying stocks than nonpaying stocks and vice versa. They called this simple model as 
“catering theory”. BW categorized investors in two groups first, category investors and second, 
arbitrageurs. Category investors give much weightage to dividend payments and based on their 
preference towards dividend they put dividend payers in a separate investment category. Their basic 
motivation is market imperfection (transaction cost, taxes, and investment constraints) which cause 
dividend clientele.  Arbitrageurs have rational expectation over the terminal distribution. They try to 
correctly estimate liquidation distribution of firms’ share irrespective weather company pays or 
does not pay dividend. BW argued that, due to arbitrage limitations and misperception of category 
investors, differences emerged in relative prices of payers and non-payers (Baker & Wurgler, 
2004).   
Fama & French (2001) compared two competing theories of financial decision. First, the 
tradeoff theory and second, the pecking order theory of dividend. The tradeoff model 
states that firms compare the benefits of investments with value losses due to dividend 
cuts and then decides the payout. This means that which are more profitable pay high 
dividends provided they have less profitable investment opportunities. The pecking order 
theory of Myers (1984) argues that dividend is less attractive for firms with higher 
leverage and less current and future investment opportunities. If the cost of issuing new 
securities is higher than the benefits new investments firm reduces its dividend and try to 
utilize its reserves for investments. In short, dividend is to be paid out of excess funds left 
after making investments in positive NPV projects. But Mayer (1984) acknowledged that 
pecking order hypothesis does not properly explain the reason behind dividend payout.   
The above discussion briefly introduced the theories presented by earlier researchers on 
determinants of dividends. The inconclusiveness of theoretical arguments and their 
inadequacy in explaining dividend payout of company led the contemporary researchers 
to focus on firm specific factors and their role in determining corporate dividend policy.    
2.2 Firm Level Determinants of Dividend Policy  
Besides the above mentioned theories on dividend policy, researchers have highlighted 
different firm specific factors which affect the firm’s ability to pay dividends. It is argued 
that, no single factor determines the dividend policy, but there is a range of different firm 
level factors which jointly shape corporate dividend policy (Al-Malkawi, 2007). 
Claiming any one factor to be most important in dividend decision is not rational but in 
the light of existing literature, ownership structure of company is observed as an 
important determinant of dividend policy. Ownership structure can be categorized on the 
basis of identity and proportion of shareholdings. On the basis of identity different 
classes of owners are directors, executives, individuals and institution. On the basis of 
proportion of shareholdings the ownership could be dispersed or concentrated.  
Although owners (if not insiders) are not directly involved in the routine operations of 
business but they appoint managers to take decisions on behalf of owners. Owners 
provide perks, bonuses and other facilities to managers according to their demands so 
that they can work in the best interest of owners. If managers fail to fulfill the needs and 
requirements of owners, the owners have the power to fire and replace the management 
of company. As owners are not fully informed about each and every detail of transactions 
of business so there is a gap of information between managers and owners. If majority of 
company’s shares are held by managers they can easily exploit their position and 
expropriate the rights of minority shareholders by employing the funds on projects which 
are less valuable to company but more promising to managers (La Porta et al. 1999). 
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Therefore, it is argued that companies in which insiders have more shareholdings pay 
fewer dividends (See for example: Lambert et. al, 1989; Mayers & Frank, 2004; Belden 
et. al, 2005; Afza & Mirza, 2010; Rozeff, 1982; Perry & Rimbey 1995; Short & Keasey, 
2002).   
Similarly, Jensen & Meckling (1976) argued that if managers increase their ownership in 
the firm the agency cost may be reduced and in such case dividend as tool to reduce 
agency problem has a lesser role to play. Jensen (1986) provided evidence that the 
managers who are reluctant to give up control over earnings of corporation are normally 
reluctant pay high dividends. It is important to motivate the managers to disgorge excess 
cash of company rather than investing it in negative NPV or lower profit yielding 
projects. Jensen (1993) in his latter study gave the examples of several corporate 
managers, accepting negative value projects and squandering company’s resources on 
wasteful and worthless projects. He argued that if these managers had paid dividends to 
their owners, it would not have created value to their shares but also have removed the 
temptations to make poor investments decisions1.  
Contrary to this, if managers hold majority of company shares then interest of both mangers and 
shareholders will be aligned and managers will pay more dividend (Jensen, 1986; Fama and French, 
1988). The payment of high dividend not only beneficial for managers themselves but also enhance 
the repute of the company. Several researchers studied the effect of ownership structure on dividend 
policy of company (see for example: Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990; Jensen 
et al., 1992; Ali et al., 1993; Agrawal & Jayaraman, 1994; Chen & Steiner, 1999) and reported it to 
be the most prominent determinant of dividend policy. However, the result remained mostly 
inconclusive. Besides insiders, the institutional investors also play important role in determining 
dividend policy of company. Companies in which institutional shareholdings are high are more 
likely to pay high dividends (Michaely et al., 1995). The reason is that the institutions are well 
equipped with information gathering and analysis tools and they are better managers as compared to 
non-institutional investors. Increase in dividends send positive signal to the investors regarding 
future prospects of the business as a result of which demand of shares of the business increases and 
hence the price of share. As institutions cannot afford to lose the value of investments therefore, 
they do not take risk of investing in low dividend payout. However, Al-Malkawi (2007) argued that 
institutional investors cannot be related positively with dividend payout and this prophecy could be 
indistinct due to differences in types of institutions. For instance, financial institutions like banks 
require more security in terms of value of assets of client and saving of the client and might prefer 
to invest in companies who pay less dividends but grow fast; on the other hand the insurance 
companies and pension funds may like high dividends due to tax or other reasons etc. (Al-Malkawi, 
2007).  
Keeping the ownership structure constant, the companies financial and liquidity position 
is also an important factor in formulating its payout policy (How et al., 2008; Afza & 
Mirza, 2010; Elston et al., 2011; Mollah et. al, 2007). Financially constrained firms, 
facing liquidity problems are more reluctant to pay high dividends than a company 
available with excess liquidity. Jensen’s (1986) presented free cash flow hypothesis in 
which he argued that companies prefer to use its cash resources first to invest in 
profitable projects and dividend is paid out of the residual. The most important source of 
payment of cash dividend is the cash flow from operations and it directly affects the 
firms’ potential to pay cash dividends. But it is not necessary that firm with high cash 
flow pay more dividend because if firm has profitable investment opportunities then it 
                                                 
1 Cited in Belden et al, (2005)  
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will not prefer to pay dividends (Jensen, 1986) especially when firm is financially 
constraint.  
A financially constraint firm is unable to get funds from external capital market due to 
low value of its assets or due to inefficiency of capital market. It is important to note that 
financially constraint firm has to reject some profitable projects in order to save cash 
today therefore; an optimal cash management and saving policy would be inevitable it. 
Such cash management policy should be based on tradeoff between upcoming profitable 
projects and current dividend.   
Damodaran (2009) in his famous dividend matrix stated that, if firm has excess cash 
available for investment but firm is not available with good quality positive NPV projects 
than there would much pressure of management of company to pay dividend therefore, it 
should distribute the excess funds to stockholders in the form of cash dividend or stock 
repurchase. If company is not available with excess cash but have several opportunities 
of investments in positive NPV projects than distributing cash as dividends will restrict 
company’s ability to grow and compete, as a result shareholders will start losing their 
confidence on the operational success of the company, in such situation company should 
will not pay high dividend and will prefer to invest in good quality projects. If company 
has both, surplus cash and good quality projects then company will adopt a flexible 
payout policy and try to increase dividend as much as possible. Finally, in a situation of 
low cash and low quality investment projects, company will reduce the dividend but also 
try to invest in a project which is expected to provide relatively good profits. The 
dividend growth matrix is presented in Table 2.1; however, it is yet to be supported by 
strong empirical evidences.  
Table 2.1 Dividend Matrix  
  Poor Projects  Good Projects  
Surplus Cash  (No change in current dividend policy): 
Significant pressure on managers to pay 
cash out  
(Increase dividend): Flexibility in Dividend  
Policy   
Deficit Cash  Investment and Dividend problems; cut 
dividends but also check project choice  
(Decrease dividends and reevaluate projects):  
Reduce cash payout to stockholders  
Source: Damodaran (2009)  
The amount of money required by a firm depends on the quantity and quality of 
investment opportunities the firm perceives to have in future. Although according to 
Miller & Modigliani (1961) proposition of dividend irrelevance both investment and 
saving decisions are independent of each other but this proposition is based on certain 
assumptions of perfect market. In the real world, because of market imperfections the 
investment and saving decisions get linked with each other. In other words the payment 
of high dividends reduces the firm’s potential to invest in positive NPV projects. 
Consequently investment decision starts depending heavily on firms’ decision to pay 
dividends and vice versa. In the same way, the firms which are available with highly 
profitable projects are reluctant to pay a high dividend, which is in line with pecking 
order theory presented by Mayers & Majluf (1984) who argued that during the time of 
high growth opportunities firms pay low dividends.  
The quality and quantity of investment opportunities do not remain same throughout the 
life of firm but it keeps changing. Grullon. et al. (2005) showed that as the firm grows 
old its investment opportunities start decreasing which reduce its capital expenditures. It 
argued that dividend policy of the firm is one of the indicators of maturity phase from 
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which firm is currently passing. According to the maturity hypothesis, changes in 
dividend are actually the sign of changes in firm’s life cycle. As firms enters in to 
maturity phase its dividend starts increasing because in later stages of firms’ life cycle it 
is relatively more stable and has more funds available after making profitable 
investments. Grullon et al. (2005) argued that during initial stages, right after 
establishment of firm, the earning and saving potential is low and firm is not available 
with excess funds due to low sales volume and heavy  expenditure on marketing its 
products, the firm’s dividend potential is reduced significantly. Therefore, other things 
held constant, the older the firm, the higher is its dividend payouts.  
Mature and large size firms have strong reserves and they are more able to maintain its 
dividend payout. This phenomenon of maintenance of payout ratio is known as dividend 
smoothing or dividend stability. Established firms try to smooth their payout ratio to 
enhance its market value as a result their past dividend payouts provide a good estimates 
of their future dividends. Mature firms do this by maintaining a reserve called “dividend 
equalization reserve” and keep placing a specific amount of money in that reserve during 
period of high profitability. The funds from this reserve are used to pay dividends during 
period of low profitability. According to Lintner (1956) managers do not increase 
dividends during high profitability unless they are sure that they would be able to 
maintain the payout ratio in the long run. Several researchers (see for example: Rozycki, 
1997; Aivazian, et al., 2006; Leary & Michaely, 2011; Michaely & Roberts,, 2006 etc) 
argued that investors put premium on stable dividends as stable dividend has more 
information content and sends positive signal.   
Another factor which affects firms’ dividend decision is size which affects the firms’ 
potential to pay dividends. Large size firms have easy access to funds from external 
capital market; therefore, they do not need to reduce their payout ratio to finance 
investment opportunities. According to Redding (1995) large companies are more likely 
to pay high dividend then small companies. It is argued that large size firms, having high 
book value assets, pay high dividends as compared to small size firms with low value of 
assets. However, it is not only the matter of size of firm but firms existing capital 
structure is also very important in this respect. Firms with high leverage ratio are not 
much able to acquire finance from external capital market. Besides having good value of 
assets, the firms with high liabilities start losing their credit worthiness and therefore, 
face difficulty in raising more capital form capital market. The positive aspect of debt is 
its tax advantage, which levers up the profit however, the managers must try to establish 
tradeoff between the cost of insolvency and leverage benefits. According to Darling 
(1957) firms with high debt ratio requires more cash to retire their liabilities which affect 
their liquidity and regular payment of interest negatively affect cash position of the firm, 
resulting in reduced dividends. Rozef and Michael (1982) also endorsed the above 
argument and argued that highly levered firms are less likely to pay high dividends.  
Initially, the dividends were directly linked with the profitability of firm, but with the 
passage of time firms passed through different stages of financing innovation and became 
highly complex. But due to diverse ownership attributes institutionalization and complex 
strategies of mergers and take over along with complicated trading strategies of 
established stock markets across the world the importance of mere profitability started 
diminishing   (Arnott & Asness, 2003; Farsio et al. 2004; Nissim & Ziv, 2001). In the 
short run, empirical studies do not confirm the relationship of profitability and payout of 
firm. However, according to Lintner (1956) and DeAngelo et al. (1992) during long run 
highly profitable firm is in a better position to enhance its payout. According to Mayers 
& Frank (2008) the reason of management’s reluctance to increase dividend is poor level 
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of earnings of the corporation. Aivazian et al., (2001) and Al-Haddad, et al., (2011) 
supported profitability as important determinant of corporate payout policy in developed 
economies.   
2.3 Country Level Determinants of Dividend Policy  
The debate on determinants of dividend payout did not remain restricted to the discussion on firm-
level factors; the researchers of recent times also explored the role of country specific factors 
affecting dividend payouts. Several researchers (see for example; Michel & Shaket, 1986; Glen et 
al. 1995; Travlos et al., 2001; Kang & Lee, 2003 and Kang, 2004) argued that different dividend 
policies are used by companies operating in different countries based on their cultural, economic, 
institutional and legal scenarios. In different countries these factors respond differently towards the 
decisions made by management to pay dividend.   
Several studies (La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003; Chay & Jungwon, 2005; 
Denis & Osobov, 2008; Eije & Megginson, 2008) examined the issue of cross country 
differences of dividend policy. These studies argued that company designs its payout 
policy in accordance with the diverse institutional environment of its country. Cross 
country differences in dividend policy are mainly due to differences in economic and 
legal framework of every country. The issue of international differences in dividend 
policy has its roots in the study of La Porta (1997) who argued that dividend policy of 
companies working in different countries is affected by the corporate governance 
structure. La Porta et al. (2000) argued that quality of legal system in a country influence 
the dividend policy of companies. Aivazian et al. (2003) have established that potential 
of dividend policy to be used as signaling mechanism in order to reduce agency problem 
is based on factors other than legal institutional environment. In fact they argued that 
dividend policy is influenced by factors like established capital markets and credit 
facilities. The companies operating in arm’s length capital markets environment gives 
more importance to dividend payment as compared to companies operating in bank 
centered markets (cited in Bancel et al. 2005). Following is the discussion on cross 
country factor which affect corporate dividend policy  
Numbers of studies (See for example: Ho, 2002; Mitton, 2004; Farinah & Foronda, 2009; Eije & 
Megginson, 2006; Ferris et. al, 2008; La porta et. al, 2000; Bancel et. al, 2005; Denis & Osobov, 
2008; Thomas, 2013; Tor et al., 2013) highlighted the importance of governance laws in 
formulating corporate dividend policy. The purpose of corporate governance structure is to enhance 
the control of shareholders on corporate affairs. More specifically, the idea is to protect the rights of 
shareholders who do not have direct control on management of the company. At this stage it is 
important to classify different dimensions of corporate governance laws in order to understand their 
role in affecting corporate payout policy. The present study considered three dimensions of 
corporate governance laws i.e. Law governing investors/shareholder’s right protection, creditor’s 
right protection and laws pertaining corporate disclosures.  
Theories support the effect of corporate governance environment on dividend policies of 
companies based on two models i.e. outcome model and substitute model. The outcome 
model suggests that when there is an improvement in corporate governance mechanism 
with respect to shareholders’ right protection the corporate dividends tend to increase, 
because shareholders find themselves in a better position to force management to pay 
dividend. The substitute model gives a contrary view, which says that improvement in 
corporate governance mechanism negatively affect the dividend because shareholders 
feel secure and satisfied with management. La Porta et al. (2000) was the pioneers in 
analyzing the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance system and 
31  
  
shareholder right protection. They argued that better investor protection is positively 
related with higher dividend ratios and hence supported outcome model.   
The term ‘investors’ protection’ is used to describe the powers and rights which investors get after 
investing their money in the firm. For example, investors get the right to review financial statements 
and financial information, right to cast their vote in election the board of directors, right to take part 
in the proceedings and meetings of stockholders, right of subscription for new stock on those 
conditions which are same for insiders of the firm, right to go to court against directors or when the 
directors sacrifices the rights of majority of stockholders, right of calling a special meeting and 
important of all the right to receive dividends according to their proportion of stock in the firm. So, 
the protection and strong enforcement of these laws by the authorities of corporate law is important. 
In countries where investors’ rights are weakly protected, the excess cash is easily used by 
controlling shareholders to get private benefit of control (La Porta et al. 2000). Bancel et al. (2005) 
argued that corporate payout policy is determined by composite collaboration of legal and 
institutional framework of home country and companies’ ownership structure. Similarly, Licht et al. 
(2005) argued that La Porta et al. (2000) legal framework approach represents only a fraction of the 
universe of corporate governance regimes and it is more important to study the role played by 
corporate governance regime and culture of country in analyzing corporate dividend policy.  
Investors’ Rights Protection: A fundamental question to ask here is how shareholders 
expect to get high dividends from a company where the legal environment of the country 
and corporate governance structure of individual companies weakly protect the investors 
and shareholders’ rights? According to agency theory the outside shareholders prefer and 
demand high dividends over retained earnings because they fear that the insiders might 
misuse retained earnings of the firm to pursue their private benefits (see, e.g., 
Easterbrook and Frank, 1984, Jensen 1986, Myers 2000). As a result of this preference, 
high dividend is demanded in those countries where investors’ protection laws are weak. 
In case shareholders feel greater risk of expropriation of their rights to free cash flow by 
insiders they demand high dividend in such countries. La Porta et al. (2000) showed that 
on average the payments of dividends are higher in countries where minority 
shareholders’ rights are strongly protected. La Porta et al. (2000) called relationship 
between strong right protection regime and high dividends as “outcome” agency model 
of dividends. The dividend outcome model hypothesizes that the result of minority 
shareholders, using their power to extract dividends from the firm, is the dividend 
payouts. If minority shareholders are protected, it has a positive impact on dividend 
payouts; therefore, shareholder protection helps in explaining not just country-level 
differences in dividend payouts, but also firmlevel differences in dividend payouts within 
countries. It is beyond doubt that country-level investor protection is vital factor in 
preventing expropriation of minority shareholders rights. Therefore, firm-level corporate 
governance also carries equal or greater importance in determining its payout. However, 
the corporate governance practices differ widely even among firms in the same country 
operating under the same legal regime.  
Creditors’ Rights Protection: Several researchers (see for example: La Porta et al. 1997;  
Claessens et al., 1999; Schmid, 2000; Esty & Megginson, 2003; Brockman & Unlu, 2009;  
Shao et al., 2013, Thomas, 2013) argued that there is a relationship between creditors’ 
protection and dividend policy of company. Brockman & Unlu (2009) argued that if 
creditors’ rights are not protected they demand the management to reduce dividend to 
substitute weak creditors’ rights. This argument supports dividend substitution model. 
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But if creditors’ rights protected in a sense that they can approach court of law get their 
right from managers, they will not demand dividend reduction. The study of Shao et al. 
(2013) studied the moderating role of investors’ protection between creditors’ rights and 
dividend policy. It argued that positive effect of creditors’ protection on dividends only 
observed when shareholders rights are adequately protected. Evidence on effect of 
creditors’ rights on dividend policy is still limited but existing literature supports its 
relationship with corporate payout. In context of legal rights protection, it is argued that 
when legal rights of creditors are strongly protected they do not feel any need to enforce 
manager to reduce dividends. If managerial ownership is high in the country the strength 
of legal rights protection will positively moderate the owners potential to pay dividend 
on the other hand, if creditors are not protected by law they will only extend credit to the 
companies which pay low dividends and in this way they will enforce managers to pay 
less dividend, therefore, this study proposed that legal rights protection level of the 
country have a moderating effect of managers willingness to pay dividend.  
Taxation and Disclosure Laws: The argument of La Porta et al. (2000) based on outcome model 
become further complicated if taxation argument is included. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) argued that 
when dividends are taxed with higher rate, the investor loses attraction in dividends and as a result 
shareholders in poor investors’ protection countries gain from dividends only if tax on dividend is 
zero or the gain from preventing expropriation of cash by management is greater than the cost of 
paying tax on dividends. Similarly, if disclosure requirements of corporate law authorities are high 
the management would not be able to change their dividend policy to meet their private objectives. 
In the context of value relevance, the countries where disclosure laws are strict the decision to 
reduce the dividend does not have negative impact on firm’s value as compared to countries where 
corporate disclosures are not strictly required by law. With respect to corporate disclosure practices, 
it is argued that high ownership dispersion positively affect payouts. The present study proposed 
that if firm fully disclose its information and shareholder do not feel information asymmetry then 
they will not demand high dividends to reduce the agency problem arise due to information 
asymmetry. In this case voluntary high disclosure of corporate practices moderates the agency 
problem due to ownership dispersion and it, in turns has moderating impact on dividend payouts.  
Economic development of the country also affects the firms’ potential to pay dividend. 
Free cash flow hypothesis of dividend policy states that the level of dividend payout 
depends on the amount of free cash flow available with the business after making 
investments in all positive NPV projects, this situation is also known as residual dividend 
policy. However, the level of investment projects and situation of residual free cash flow 
highly depends on economic development of the country. If the economy of the country 
is growing very fast this will enhance the chance of availability of future investment 
project to a company but this will also reduce the free cash flow, which means in high 
growth economies the companies will pay less dividend as compared to the companies in 
less growth economies (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989). However, in economic boom 
companies are available with plenty of free cash as compared to economic recession 
where companies are financially constrained. Therefore, in economic boom companies 
have greater tendency to distribute free cash flow as dividends and vice versa. It is 
therefore, intuitive to argue that economic development and growth of a country affects 
the dividend decision of companies. It is perceivable that in case of free cash flow 
availability the economic growth of the country will moderate the firms’ potential to pay 
dividends. If rate of economic growth is high the firm will be having more profitable 
projects and it will not be financially constrained therefore, in high growth phase the 
firms’ potential to pay dividend will be increased. If firm is available with high growth 
opportunities this will negatively affect dividend payouts but if the economic growth is 
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rapid this will reduce financial constraints of firms and firm will not feel need to reduce 
dividend to capture the profitable investment opportunities.  
Researchers have also analyzed the impact of risk tolerance/avoidance behavior of people 
on dividend policy (see for example: Ekanayake, 2004; Johnson & Droege, 2004; 
Tabellini, 2010; Myers, 1999; Miller, 1999; Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson, 2007; Dequech, 
2009) According to cultural perspective (Hofsted’s Cultural Dimensions), the countries 
with higher degree of risk aversion exhibits lower dividend payouts. Khamabata & Liu 
(2005) analyzed the effect of culture on dividend payouts and reported that the countries 
where risk aversion is high, their companies pay low dividends. Theoretically, a country 
in which  
“uncertainty avoidance index (UAI)” is high; the corporate managers prefer to 
accumulate more cash which result in low dividend payout, but on the other side 
investors prefer to receive high dividends due to the similar reason (Kwok & Tadesse, 
2006). In such scenario the level of dividend would be determined by the balance 
between degrees of corporate governance, that is, if shareholders’ rights are duly 
protected then in high UA scenario, companies would pay more dividends because 
investors’ right would dominate over manager’s preference. Empirical studies also show 
negative relationship between  
“masculinity (MA)” and “long term orientation (LTO)” and dividend payouts. It is 
argued that masculine society focuses more on results and performance therefore, 
corporate managers in a country characterized by masculine society would have 
incentives in accumulating large value of funds so that liquidity can be used when 
opportunity arises.  
Newman & Nollen (1996) established that masculine society believes in performance 
rewards and penalties for poor performance. The magnitude of performance rewards are 
often greater than the penalties imposed for poor performance, therefore, performance 
driven managers try to maintain large cash reserves at the expense of low dividend 
payouts.  In context of dividend policy, current study argued that cultural and legal traits, 
norms and values determine the behavior of a person (both managers and owners) 
towards saving and investment which helps is shaping the dividend policy of a company. 
However, in the context of dividend payouts, both the managers and investors behavior is 
largely determined by the uncertainty avoidance. In high uncertainty avoidance, both 
managers and investor have different trends. The managers, keeping the future needs and 
ability of a company to cope with financial weaknesses, always tend to have more funds 
in company and declare smaller amounts of dividends for investors. But, when they are 
investor in other companies, they demand high returns and dividends for this very reason. 
When this is the case, stockholders protection level determines the level of dividends. If 
there is a high protection regarding stockholders rights and high uncertainty level exists, 
managers will reserve more funds than paying high dividends to investors.   
In case of low uncertainty avoidance and lower protection of investors’ rights, the 
dividend depends upon liquidity position of the business. In case of low uncertainty 
avoidance and higher protection of investor’s rights will make the investors to accept 
lower dividends taking the higher right protection as an alternative of dividends 
(Brockman & Unlu 2009).  
While, in high uncertainty avoidance and high protection of investors’ rights will make investors to 
demand higher dividends. This relationship is depicted in Figure 2.2 below.  
  
    Uncertainty Avoidance  
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High  
Investor will prefer to receive 
dividends: Dividend Outcome 
model (La Porta et al., 2000)  
Managers will expropriate the 
rights of minority  
shareholders by reducing  
dividends  
Low  
Investor will be satisfied with 
low dividends: Dividend  
Substitute model (Brockman and  
Unlu, 2009)  
Dividend will depend upon 
financial performance and 
availability of free cash flow with  
company  
  
Figure 2.2: Dividend Policy as Result of Relationship between Investor Protection and Uncertainty 
Avoidance: (Author’s compilation).  
  
It is evident from above discussion that in order to solve dividend puzzle, the country 
specific legal and cultural aspects should be considered very carefully as they are inter 
linked. Previously, researchers focused on firm level factors affecting dividend policy in 
a single country but during the last decade large number of studies (see for example; La 
Porta et al., 2000; Kang, 2004; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009 
etc.) have been conducted on cross country determinants of dividends policy in 
developed economies perhaps the evidence from emerging economies is ignored. 
Moreover, the impact of relationship between legal and cultural attributes on corporate 
dividend policy is not investigated in detail. To the best of author’s knowledge this is the 
very first study introducing this dimension of investigation in to dividend puzzles, 
especially in South Asian context.   
The above discussion attempted to present a brief introduction of corporate dividends and 
dividend theories. The main purpose of discussion was to take a holistic view of 
arguments presented by researchers to solve dividend puzzle. In context of present study, 
the above discussion tries to discuss the factors, both firm level and country level, which 
affect dividend policy of the company. The importance of ownership structure, liquidity 
position, profitability, size and capital structure in determining dividend payout is 
discussed in detail. Moreover, the above discussion also highlighted the emerging trend 
in the research on dividend policy i.e. cross country investigations. The importance of 
country level factors e.g. investors’ protection, economic growth and some behavioral 
attributes like uncertainty avoidance and long term orientation in determining dividend 
policy is also discussed. The scope of majority of the studies conducted earlier was 
limited to single country which ignored the importance of cross-country factors like 
cultural and legal differences across countries. These differences have potential to 
explain the lack of consensus among financial researchers on determinants of optimal 
dividend policy.   
Above discussion explains that cross country differences has potential to explain 
diversity in corporate dividend policies. Therefore, the present study investigated the role 
played by legal and corporate environment of countries in determining the dividend 
policy in four emerging economies South Asia i.e. Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. At this point it is important to discuss the diversity of economic and 
corporate scenario of South Asian countries. Next chapter presents a brief discussion on 
economic scenario as well as corporate governance systems of South Asia.     
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Chapter 3 Economic and Corporate Scenario of South Asia  
  
    
This chapter provides introduction of South Asian region, brief discussion on economic 
and corporate perspectives of South Asian economies and discusses the role of corporate 
governance structure, political and cultural factors in formulating firm level dividend 
policy. The first section provides historical and demographic introduction of region and 
in second section economics and corporate scenario is presented. Corporate governance 
regulations are discussed in third section while dividend regulations are presented in 
fourth section, section five discusses cultural perspective of the region.  
3.1 South Asian Region   
South Asian region holds an important place in the economy of world.  It possesses 
diverse cultural and political experiences. It is also among the complex regions of the 
world having multi ethnic society, countless linguistic divisions and sectarian lines. 
South Asia constitute one-fifth of human population, who have been prone to face the 
challenges of rapidly increasing poverty, underdevelopment, declining investment 
potential and consequent low production and high unemployment compounded by the 
pressure of high population growth and exploitation of the past adverse legacies (SAARC 
Booklet, 2010).  Due to the protectionist mentality of newly established economies 
around mid-1940s the intraregional trade declined from 19% (in 1948) to merely 2% (in 
1967).  In such situation a common platform was inevitable to bring the 3rd world 
countries of South Asia close to each other and renew their past shared trade experience, 
as a result of which a regional cooperation treaty “South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) was signed.   
South Asian region is geographically small which consists of eight countries with a 
combined population of 1.5 billion. South Asia includes India (population of 1.13 billion 
people), Bangladesh (population of 160 million people), Pakistan (population of 166 
million people), Sri Lanka (population of 20 million people), Bhutan (population of 0.7 
million) and Maldives (population of 0.3 million). The remaining two economies Nepal 
and Afghanistan are geographically undiversified and landlocked. Nepal has population 
of 28 million and Afghanistan has population of 28 million (World Bank South Asian 
Economic update, 2010). India generates nearly 80% of the regions GDP followed by  
36  
  
Pakistan and Bangladesh which contribute 10% and 7% respectively to the region’s GDP. 
Based on the geographical area, population and contribution to regional GDP growth India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are the most prominent and important countries of the 
region.  
3.2 Comparison of Economic and Corporate Scenario   
Economic development of a country is the reflection of growth of its industries and strength of its 
governance mechanism. It also affects the fundamentals of decision making of managers at 
corporate level (Zarnowitz, 1985; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989) particularly dividend payouts of 
firm.  When it comes to the changes in economic situations, companies modify their financial 
policies, including those concerning dividends and capital structure. That is why it is important to 
consider the level of economic development of a country before examining the corporate level 
financial and investment decisions.  
South Asia showed an accelerated economic growth which reached to the peak of 8.9% 
in 2007 making the region, world fastest growing, after East Asia.  The economic growth 
is mainly contributed by capital accumulation and increased efficiency of factor usage 
(Collins, 2007). Among others, the labor intensive manufacturing sector especially 
textile, played important role in enhancing exports along with other sectors like leather, 
gems & jewelry, carpets and preserved food items. South Asian region also showed vast 
expansions in telecommunication, information technology, tourism and transport sectors 
in recent years (Ghani, 2010). Mobile phone industry achieved a rapid ever penetration 
and growth in India and spread in other South Asian economies specially, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh also showed growth in ship breaking/building and 
steel industries, whereas Automobile, Pharmaceutical and light engineering sectors 
contributed to the economic development of India. Pakistan’s fertilizer and cement sector 
showed rapid growth. However, the agriculture which is considered as the backbone of 
South Asian economy did not show such rapid expansion. Given below is a detailed 
economic analysis of selected South Asian countries.   
  
  
  
Table 3.1: Economic and Financial Scenario of Bangladesh  
 Bangladesh  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  
Number of Listed Companies  
 Trade ( % of GDP)  39.63  44.22  46.48  49.09  45.98  43.00  
Stock Traded (% of GDP)  1.66  1.52  7.02  11.61  16.34  14.7  
Market Capitalization (% of GDP)  5.035  5.832  9.929  8.384  7.909  15.6  
FDI (% of GDP)  1.35  1.13  0.95  1.27  0.75  0.90  
GDP Growth (annual %)  5.96  6.63  6.43  6.19  5.74  6.10  
Inflation  CPI (% annual)  7.05  6.77  9.11  8.90  5.42  8.10  
 
Source: Data taken from www.data.worldbank.org/indicators (compiled by author) 
Bangladesh is a relatively poor and overpopulated country burdened with ineffective 
bureaucracies. Two-thirds of the total population of Bangladeshis is working in the 
agriculture. Bangladesh depends on imported food supplies, where the opportunities to 
export its domestic product, rice, is limited. Bangladesh’s economy is heavily based on 
services sector besides the fact that large proportion of population is working in 
agricultural sector. Bangladesh is in a continuous process of financial liberalization and is 
262   269   278   290   236   302   
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2005   2006   2008   2009   2010   
4763   4796   4921   4955   4987   
trying to attract direct foreign investments especially in its textile industry. Although, 
they are facing power crisis but, government seems committed to combat power shortage 
through developing new energy producing plants. Table 3.1 shows the list of selected 
economic and corporate indicators of Bangladesh. In term of number of listed companies, 
there is an increase which shows that more companies are fulfilling listing criterion, 
indicating growth in business activities. Similarly, the contribution to trade in GDP has 
also increased during last five years. The USA and Germany are the prominent export 
partners of Bangladesh. They import garments and jute products from Bangladesh, while 
Bangladesh imports majority of its products from China and India which includes 
machinery and petroleum products.   
The top exports of Bangladesh are cotton apparel and household goods, fish and 
shellfish, sporting and camping apparel, footwear and gear, wool apparel and household 
goods, abrasives, belting, boxes, glass, fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides. While 
Bangladesh imports include raw cotton , Generators and accessories , textile sewing 
machines , steelmaking materials , pulp and wood pulp , drilling and oilfield equipment, 
wheat and telecommunications equipment. Bangladesh joined South Asian Preferential 
Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and is also committed to South Asia Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA).  
Bangladesh’s government has taken strong actions against rapidly increasing inflation, 
which was recorded highest in 2007 i.e. 9.11%, but in 2007 the inflation was reduces up 
to 5.42% on annual basis. In Bangladesh the present cost of labor is comparatively low in 
skilled and semi-skilled production and due to its large population i.e. up to 155 million; 
it is potentially a huge market for foreign products. Bangladesh also exercised low import 
tariff rate in South Asian Region and it is also in process of financial liberalization due to 
which in future it is expected that Bangladesh will attract more direct foreign investment.  
  
Table 3.2: Economic and Financial Scenario of India  
 India  2007  
 Number of listed companies (BSE)  4887  
Trade ( % of GDP)  41.31  45.58  44.89  52.39  43.60  48.00  
Stock Traded (% of GDP)  52.02  67.11  89.14  86.32  79.06  61.10  
Market Capitalization (% of GDP)  66.31  86.07  146.41  53.08  85.62  94.00  
FDI (% of GDP)  0.91  2.13  2.022  3.39  2.510  1.60  
GDP Growth (annual %)  9.31  9.27  9.817  4.93  9.104  10.50  
Inflation  CPI (% annual)  4.24  5.79  6.36  8.35  10.87  12.00  
Source: Data taken from www.data.worldbank.org/indicators (compiled by the author) India 
showed the highest level of growth in the whole South Asian region with GDP rate of 
growth averaging 8% for the past five years. Stock market had risen over three times in 
as many years and had a stable foreign investment inflow. This fact can be verified by 
considering the number of trades on India’s one the largest stock exchanges, the National 
Stock Exchange, was the largest exchange in the world during 2005 and 2006 after 
NASDAQ, NYSE, and London Stock Exchange.  
In terms of international trade of merchandise and services, Indian global trade increased 
from 1.1% in 2004 to more than 2% till the end of decade. Indian major export items 
include computer software, agricultural products like coffee, textile and clothing items, 
gems jewelry items, diamond and leather goods etc. It also exports electronic products, 
transport equipment and light machinery along with chemical and engineering products. 
Global customers of Indian products include USA, China, UAE, Singapore, UK and 
Hong Kong etc. The service sector contributes around 35% of total exports of the 
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country. On the other hand, Indian companies import capital goods, fuel, edible oils, 
fertilizers, food grains, iron, steel and professional instruments. Indian’s major import 
partners include China, USA and Switzerland.  
Based on the above mentioned statistics, it is evident that India is the home of fastest 
growing industries and companies operating in India have more potential to flourish as 
compare to their counterparts working in other countries of the region. Due to its strong 
linkage with global business centers, Indian economy and also the companies working in 
the country are available with more growth and investment opportunities as compare to 
its regional counterparts. The rapid economic growth is also affecting corporate dividend 
distributions and therefore, based on the fundamental economic values of Indian 
economy it seems that Indian corporation may have more capacity to pay dividend then 
similar companies working in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The prominent economic 
indicators of India are presented in Table 3.2.  
Although during the study period of this dissertation the number of listed companies in 
India did not increase, however, market capitalization is significantly increased. A 
declining trend can be observed after 2008 which is a definite result of financial crisis, 
which has negatively affected the percentage of trade, imports and exports of the country. 
However, Indian economy successfully managed and maintained its GDP growth rate in 
all years except in 2008.   
Table 3.3: Economic and Financial Scenario of Pakistan  
 Pakistan  2005 2007  
 Number of listed companies  661 654  
Trade ( % of GDP)  35.25  38.45  35.53  36.59  32.11  33.00  
Stock Traded (% of GDP)  128.64  99.26  70.14  32.90  14.12  7.40  
Market capitalization (% of GDP)  41.91  35.7  49.06  14.22  19.95  21.83  
FDI (% of GDP)  2.008  3.351  3.90  3.29  1.43  1.10  
GDP Growth (annual %)  7.667  6.177  5.683  1.998  2.83  1.60  
Inflation  CPI (% annual)  9.06  7.92  7.59  20.28  13.64  13.90  
Source: Data taken from www.data.worldbank.org/indicators (compiled by author) Being an 
impoverished underdeveloped country, Pakistan remained the victim of internal political 
disputes which has significantly reduced its ranking in global trade as result of which 
foreign investment level of the country was badly suffered. Although form 2001 to 2007 
the Federal Government of Pakistan took measures to reduced poverty level by raised 
development spending, however, it failed to rise per capital income with a significant 
value. Despite the severe shortfall of electricity and consequent unemployment the GDP 
growth rate of the country remained very slow. The cost push inflation remained the 
major concern of the government during the recent decade, coupled with rapidly 
decreasing value of domestic currency in terms of dollar has jeopardized the 
infrastructural capability of supporting the national objectives and plans. With the help of 
IMF standby arrangement in November 2008 the country tackled the balance of payment 
crisis but in next year the country’s foreign reserves started strengthen due to decrease in 
oil prices and remittance from overseas Pakistanis. The flood of 2010 badly hit the 
economy of the country and destroyed the agricultural backbone as a result of which 
inflation became out of control.  
Textiles account for most of Pakistan's earnings, but failure to increase a practicable 
export base for other manufactures has left the country susceptible to shifts in world 
demand. (Economic Survey of Pakistan 2010)   
Regarding imports and exports by industries, over 80% of Pakistani exports to the USA 
include cotton products, while it is importing military guns, tanks & missiles for USA.  
Major export of the country includes cotton apparel and household furnishings, cotton 
2008   2009   2010   
653   629   644   
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cloth and fabrics. Pakistan’s major imports include chemical fertilizers, aircraft, 
electricity generators, telecommunications equipment, computer accessories, tanks, 
artillery, missiles, rockets, Engines & turbines for military aircraft. In the light of above 
given facts and figures the most prominent industries with growth potential includes 
textile, fertilizer, telecommunication and automobile etc.  
Table 3.3 shows that during the study period of this research the number of listed 
companies in Pakistan is not significantly increased and the trends in imports and exports 
remained almost stable but market capitalization of stock exchange was badly hurt due to 
financial crisis. Bad political conditions also negatively affected the FDI of the country 
which slow down the economic growth. Government was not very much successful in 
controlling the inflation and its bad effects on economic conditions during the study 
period. Table 3.4: Economic and Financial Scenario of Sri Lanka  
Sri Lanka  
Number of Listed Companies  
Trade ( % of GDP)  73.60  71.26  68.61  63.37  49.24  53.00  
Stock Traded (% of GDP)  4.66  3.55  2.94  2.51  2.11  6.70  
Market Capitalization (% of GDP)  23.43  27.48  23.34  10.62  19.37  40.30  
FDI (% of GDP)  1.12  1.70  1.86  1.85  0.96  1.00  
GDP Growth (annual %)  6.24  7.67  6.80  5.95  3.54  8.00  
Inflation  CPI (% annual)  11.64  10.02  15.84  22.46  3.51  5.90  
Source: Data taken from www.data.worldbank.org/indicators (compiled by author)  
Being the second largest economy of South Asia in terms of GDP growth (i.e. 8%) Sri 
Lankan government has laid much emphasis on inflation and poverty reduction by using 
a combination of state directed policies and private investment promotion to encourage 
growth in less developed areas, establishing SMEs, and promoting increased agriculture. 
Although high level of government funding was not possible because of high 
international debt burden and budgetary deficit, the government took actions to stabilize 
its economic conditions. After the financial crisis of 2008 the recession exposed the 
country’s economic weaknesses which pushed the country in balance of payment crisis.   
Major exports commodities of the Sri Lanka includes textiles and apparel, tea and spices; 
rubber manufactures; precious stones; coconut products and fish. However, in the last 
two years of decade the economic and corporate scenario of Sri Lanka seems to have 
shown improvements, in term of 
reduced inflation and increased 
level of stock trade, however, Sri 
Lankan companies were not highly 
successful in attractive foreign 
direct investments.   
 The  comparison  of  different  
2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   
239   237   235   234   231   241   
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economic and corporate indictors discussed earlier, shows that in terms of stock traded as 
a percentage of GDP, the stock traded in South Asian region as a whole has decline 
majorly contributed by Pakistani 
stock market which has shown 
rapid decline mainly due to 
collapse in commodity prices, a 
severe liquidity crunch, and loss of 
investors’ confidence. However, in 
India the stock trading is increased 
rapidly from 2005 to 2007 but 
declined latter. In Bangladesh the 
stock traded increased after 2008. 
The yearly comparison of stock 
traded as percentage of GDP is 
presented in Figure 3.1. Similarly, 
stock market capitalization in South Asian countries increases from 2005 to 2007 but 
latter declined in 2008 and then started recovering. The decline of stock market  
capitalization is mainly attributed 
towards stock market collapse of 
2008 and this decline can be 
observed in all countries of South 
Asia as presented in Figure 3.2. In 
terms of GDP growth the financial 
crisis of 2008 adversely affected 
the GDP growth of South Asian 
countries especially, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka remained 
particularly vulnerable because of 
their hard political and social 
scenario which prevented policy measures to adjust to the requirements of trade shocks. 
Moreover, their heavy reliance on external finance from other countries also contributed 
in worsening the impact of crisis. The financial crisis deteriorated their macroeconomic 
problems as sources of foreign funding contracted. India, on the other hand, was vigilant 
in responding to the food and fuel price crisis and due to its prudent macroeconomic 
policies due to which the magnitude of the financial crisis was reduced significantly. 
However, the crisis of 2008 affected India because of its strong connectivity to global 
financial markets. According to  
World Bank Report on South Asian Region (2009), “Bangladesh has held up remarkably 
well during the crisis due to its skillful economic management that helped absorb the 
pressure of the global food and oil price crisis, without jeopardizing macroeconomic 
stability. Although stock prices have fallen, domestic liquidity seems adequate. Domestic 
interest rates, both long-term and short-term, are stable”.  
The above discussion is meant to understand the economic and corporate structure of 
South Asian countries. This will help in analyzing strengths and weaknesses of 
companies and also the environment in which they are operating. It is evident from the 
discussion that South Asian countries are not only suffering from current account deficit 
but also affected by adverse balance of trade which is continuously devaluing their 
currencies. The role of foreign direct investments and its need in emerging economies of 
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South Asia serve as a life blood for their economies. However, it is not easy task to 
attract foreign investors in the given situation of political instability, electricity and 
power crisis, ongoing wave of terrorism and un-attracted investment opportunities. The 
foreign investors will only attract if corporate sector of South Asian countries promises 
high average returns both in the form of dividends and capital gains. Besides all these 
problems the South Asian countries are exporting a good value of goods and services to 
develop world, need is to analyze and revise weaknesses in governance structures of 
companies to make them more attracted for foreign investors. Given below is the brief 
discussion of governance attributes of South Asian countries.  
3.3 Corporate Governance   
The family ownership and control is the dominant character of corporate sector of 
developing world. Hossain (2005) reported that like most of developing economies the 
corporate sector of Bangladesh is dominated by large concentrated family ownership, 
state ownership and foreign ownership and disperse ownership is an exceptional case. 
This unique nature of ownership structure gives rise to different case of agency problem, 
which is totally different from the agency problem faced by USA and UK corporations. 
In developed economies like USA the conflict of interest is between managers and 
shareholders as ownership is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of few families, 
however in case of Bangladesh where family members keep majority shares of the 
company and they control all the affairs of company, the conflict of interest is among 
minority and controlling shareholders (Oman et al., 2003).This is the situation where 
directors (controlling shareholders) are in conflict with the minority shareholders of their 
own company, minorities have virtually no solid ground to take action against the 
majority shareholder if they do not pay dividends or less dividends and having the 
knowledge of this weakness of minority shareholders, the controlling shareholders 
expropriate the rights of minorities. This not only reduces the dividend payouts of the 
company but also keep potential investors at a distance, especially foreign investors.    
In case of Bangladesh the Security and Exchange Act of Bangladesh, 1993 has provided 
several provisions in order to ensure better protection of interest of minority 
shareholders. The shareholders having at least 10% interest in the company can seek the 
help of court of law in case they feel that the management is discriminating different 
categories of stakeholders and are not observing the standard operating procedures 
defined by law. In order to ensure the timely communication of corporate policies and 
also to give shareholders proper opportunity to participate in decision making process, 
the SEC has forced listed companies to hold annual general meeting regularly and also 
declare dividends along with dissemination of price sensitive information. Besides all 
this, it is observed that standard corporate governance practices are quite absent in 
several companies operating in Bangladesh. Gillibrand (2004) has reported that as 
compared to its neighbor countries, Bangladesh is lagged far behind in corporate 
governance practices, which could be due to the fact that most of the joint stock 
companies are family owned and controlled. In addition to this, most of the corporate 
managers feel it worthless to disclose information and improve governance as their no 
value implication of such practices and no consequences of its non-observance.     
India is the biggest economy of the South Asian region. During early 2000 Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) approved Indian code of corporate governance. The 
code is then gradually implemented in corporate sectors of India is subsequent two years.  
Although on papers, but India has one of the highest investors’ protection level i.e. 5 out of 
6 in the world as calculated by La Porta et al. (1988). Based on English Common Law,  
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India’s legal system in terms of investor’s right protection is as strong as of USA, UK, 
Canada, Hong Kong and South Africa.  Most of listed companies of India have large 
controlling shareholders, typically families. Corporate promoters have much autonomy 
of actions in taking decision and they are subject to very limited regulation. For instance, 
promoters are allowed to issue preferential warrants to themselves at an effective rate of 
discount.   
In Pakistan the corporate sector is attributed by concentrated family ownership. The 
concept of separation of ownership and control in its real sense is rare in corporate sector, 
where majority of owners also manage the company’s affairs. Due to its common law 
background, the country’s law resembles Anglo American model but its ownership 
structure is complete opposite to it. According to Companies Ordinance (1984) 
shareholders want remedy from court of law; they should have at least 20% ownership 
rights in the company. But if don’t have 20% ownership but have 10% ownership then 
they have the right to contact SECP to appoint an independent inspector but below 10% 
level shareholders cannot approach court of law against misapplication by the 
management in company’s affairs. Because of the fact that family owners do not share 
the control of corporation with external investors therefore, the external or minority 
investors face lack of effective means to control private benefits enjoyed by family 
owners.   
Many corporations in Pakistan use not only cross-shareholdings and interlocking directorships to 
fulfill the objective of retaining majority control but also by using pyramid structures2. As discussed 
earlier the ownership concentration is the main attribute of corporate sectors of Pakistan. The 
outcomes of such ownership structure can be seen in opaqueness in use of public money by 
corporate managers which may lead to excessive private benefits or non-availability of traceable 
shares of company in stock market which significantly affect the development of capital market. It 
is evident form the studies that more than 50% of the companies in Pakistan do not declare 
dividends by taking the benefits of opaqueness in fund managements.  
In 1997 after the development of Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance 
(CBPCG) in Sri Lanka the focus on governance of corporate affairs became in limelight. 
The country set up Accounting and Auditing Standard Board in 1995 with the help of 
Security and Exchange Commission and Colombo Stock Exchange in order to develop 
the financial accounting and reporting standards. Like many other developing countries, 
Sri Lankan companies also seem not very much committed in implementing corporate 
governance practices. It is revealed from a survey that companies do not actually do what 
they say in relation to corporate governance. This might be due to lack of awareness with 
in business community. Due to lack of awareness of standard corporate governance 
practices the corporate sector is facing many problems like greed and impatience of 
shareholder for maximization of their wealth by whatever means which is deriving 
aggressive managers towards attempting value enhancement through risky and dubious 
means. Although the four emerging economies of South Asia share the similar legal and 
economic constraints but they are much different in application of corporate governance 
laws that is why it is important to consider these differences in to consideration while 
analyzing determinants of payout policy in the region.  
                                                 
2 Berle and Means (1932) define pyramid structures as “owning a majority of the stock of one 
corporation which in turn holds a majority stock of another - a process that can be repeated a number 
of times.”   
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3.4 Dividend Trends and Regulations  
Dividend Trends: The seminal work on “disappearing dividends”, Fama and French (2001) 
explained the phenomenon of decline in dividend paying companies from 1978 to 1988 in US. They 
attributed this decline to dramatic shift in dividend practices because of declining propensity to pay 
dividends and also by reduction in demand for dividends by investors.  
They emphasized that it is an arresting empirical and financial irregularity which 
demands clarification. Phenomenon of disappearing dividend is also observed in South 
Asian countries (Reddy & Rath, 2005). Regarding the trends of dividends in Indian 
companies, Reddy and Rath (2005) examined the dividend behavior of Indian companies 
classified in to dividend payers and non-payers from 1991 to 2001. The trends in 
dividend payout of stocks traded in Indian market showed a decline from 57% to 32% of 
dividend payers during the study period. The argued that due to reduced transaction cost, 
Indian investors now prefer capital gain rather than dividend. In India decline in dividend 
payers is attributed to three factors i.e. reduced agency problem, lower transaction costs, 
and an increased tendency to hold stocks via open-end mutual funds.  
Reddy and Rath, (2005) investigated the phenomenon of disappearing dividends in India. 
However, there was no such study found in Pakistan therefore, author conducted a 
separate pilot study in which the trends of dividend payments of 361 Pakistani joint stock 
companies was analyzed. The study classified the companies into different categories 
based on their dividend behaviors. The results from comparison between dividend payers 
and non-payers showed that from 1995 to 2000 percentage of dividend payers increased 
but after 2000 percentage of dividend paying companies declined again. The descriptive 
study on dividend payers showed the disappearing dividend phenomenon in Pakistan. In 
emerging markets where ownership is concentrated corporate dividend policy is greatly 
affected by Govt. fiscal and monetary policies (Glen et al. 1995; Adaoglu, 2000). 
Mahmood and Shahnaz (2008) found decline in GDP and public expenditure in 2005-
2007 which adversely affected the growth potential of corporate sectors of Pakistan. The 
declining growth opportunities along with relaxation in listing regulations to pay 
mandatory dividends could be the main reason behind disappearing dividends in 
Pakistan. (Detailed results are given in Appendix-B).  
Dividend Regulations: In Bangladesh, dividends are decided by the shareholders in every 
annual general meeting but it cannot exceed the amount suggested or recommended by 
the directors. Sometimes annual general meetings of high profile companies are disrupted 
due to the high demand of increased dividends by the shareholders, which was in excess 
to the level recommended by the directors. Later on management was enforced to 
increase the dividends according to the wish of shareholders. According to Bangladesh 
Security and Exchange Commission (BSEC) regulations, “no dividend can be paid 
otherwise than out of profits of the year or any other undistributed profits”. Once the 
dividend is declared it must be paid within two months of declaration. Using the powers 
vested under Security and Exchange Ordinance (1969); BSEC instituted a categorization 
of companies on the basis of their regularity in holding annual meetings and the 
regularity and amount of dividends. Companies that hold their annual meeting in last 
year and paid dividend above 10% were categorized as A class stocks. The companies 
who held annual general meeting but declared divided lest then 10% were classified as B 
category. And companies who either did not hold annual general meeting or did not 
declared dividends were considered as Z category. The use of dividend payout ratio to 
regulate companies is an example of the SEC using performance as a proxy for 
compliance.  
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According to Institute of Company’s Secretaries of India (ICSI), dividend must be paid 
out of net earnings of the current business year or out of the earnings of last financial 
years and such earnings should not have transferred to reserves. However, it is allowed 
that before declaring dividends a company can set off any loss for the previous years or 
the amount of depreciation for the previous years whichever is less.  Payout must not be 
announced out of the “Securities Premium Account” or the “Capital Redemption Reserve 
Account” or “Revaluation Reserve” or “Amalgamation Reserve” or out of profit on re-
issue of forfeited shares or out of profit earned prior to the incorporation of the company. 
No Dividend should be declared unless the prescribed percentage of profit is transferred 
to reserves in accordance with the Companies Rules, 1975. Where a company has issued 
equity shares with differential rights as to dividend, interim dividend may, at the option 
of the board, be declared on all or any one or more of the classes of such shares in 
accordance with the terms of issue. In case profit is not declared due to lack of profits or 
no profit at all, the company can pay dividends out of free reserves created for this 
purpose.   
In Pakistan neither the companies ordinance (1984) nor recently amended listing 
regulation of one of its major stock exchange, the Karachi Stock Exchange mandate any 
compulsory payment of dividends (Listing Regulations of KSE, amended 2012). In case 
of declaration of dividend, the amount of such dividend cannot exceed the level 
recommended by management. The ordinance places a time limit of 45 days of 
declaration of dividend after which it must be paid. In case any company does not 
comply with this regulation, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the company could be 
punished with 2 years of imprisonment or fine up to a million rupees or both. In Pakistan 
the board of directors is the main forum of decision regarding payment of dividends. 
Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) made it mandatory that if the 
listed company has not declared dividend it must give proper reason of it. (SE Ord. 
1969). Although payment of regular dividends is important for shareholders and 
investors, however, it is important to note that listing regulations of Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) previously required a company to pay dividend at least once in every 
five years. (Delisting, Suspension and Default Counter, Sec 30 (1) b) and also to give 
reason of not paying dividend/bonus in the year in which dividend is not declared 
(Corporate and Financial Reporting Framework (xix) d) but latter in 2012 this section has 
been withdrawn from listing regulations.  
In Sri Lanka a tax of 15% is charged on the gross dividend paid by the company. Where 
a dividend is paid by a resident company to non-resident company and a deduction has 
been made under Section 38 of the Act in respect of that dividend, first inform the 
company; that dividend does not form part of the assessable income of the non-resident 
company. While the dividends received by the shareholders are taxable in their hands. 
Right after authorization of dividend the entity must make an announcement to the 
exchange which includes dividend per share, approval or no approval of shareholders, 
date of dispatch, book closure date, financial year of dividend. In case of scrip dividend 
the number of shares to be issued, proportion or rate of share allotment, the current stated 
capital of the firm and the value of reserves to be capitalized for the issue of shares 
should be declared.  
A close insight in to the dividend regulations of selected South Asian countries reveals 
that the security and exchange commission of each country has defined clear set of rules, 
regulations and strategies. Every company is bound to follow the rules and regulations 
defined by the corporate law authorities. If corporate disclosure law are strict and 
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investors right are highly protected then management would not have much influence on 
excess cash flow of the company.   
3.5 Cultural Scenario  
By using cultural attributes the present study captured the risk avoidance attitude and 
its impact on tendency to demand dividend by shareholders and willingness to pay 
dividend by managers. To capture risk tolerance level of investors and managers, 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have been widely used in finance literature (see for 
example: Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Gleason et al., 2000; Sekely & Collins, 1988 Datta & 
Puia, 1995; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Kirkman et al., 2006).   
Culture plays an important role in development and modification of human 
behavior. Hofsted (1980) has defined five major dimensions/characters of culture. 
Power and inequality are the most fundamental facts of modern society. In terms of 
power distribution, all societies are unequal, but some are more power discriminate 
than others. Power Distance Index (PDI) determines the extent to which the less 
powerful member of society believes that power is not equally distributed. For example, 
if weak members of a family do not possess the power or right to take decisions and they 
are required to live according to the decisions of powerful member. In a corporate 
scenario, high PDI of country represents the prevalence of weak state of minority right 
protection (Kirkman et al., 2006). In such a situation the majority shareholder (which is 
mostly represented by family owners in South Asian corporations) may have a tendency 
to expropriate the rights of minority shareholders, and a common example of which can 
be reduction in dividend payouts. The second cultural dimension is Individualism 
(IDV) which determines the degree to which individuals are incorporated in to groups. 
The societies in which group ties between members of the society is loose, people are not 
supposed to look after others. They feel responsibility only up to their own. Similar to the 
high PDI, the country with high IDV value may produce low corporate dividend payout 
patterns. Among South Asian countries, Sri Lanka has the highest value of IDV followed 
by Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.  
Masculinity (MAS), the third cultural dimension, refers to the degree of distribution of roles 
between males and females of the society. Studies on gender discrimination show that women’s 
values do not highly variable in different societies but men’s values are highly variable between 
very assertive to highly competitive. India has the highest value of MAS followed by Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. How MAS affects corporate financial decision depends on female 
participation in managerial affairs of business. Different studies have been conducting on 
determining the effect of female participation in board of directors and firm’s performance (see for 
example: Kochen et al., 2003; Smith et. a. 2006; etc.) but no study has yet explored the impact of 
female participation on payout decision.  
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) represents level of society tolerance form uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict 
laws and rules, safety and security measures, and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief 
in absolute Truth; 'there can only be one Truth and we have it'.  Theoretically, a country in which 
“uncertainty avoidance index (UAI)” is high; the corporate manager will prefer to accumulate more 
cash which will result in low dividend payout, but on the other side investor will prefer to receive 
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high dividends due to the similar reason (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). In such scenario the level of 
dividend would be determined by the balance between degrees of corporate governance, that is, if 
shareholders’ rights are duly protected then in high UA scenario, companies would pay more 
dividends because investors’ right would dominate over managers’ preference. Pakistan has the 
highest degree of UAI followed by Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India.  
Finally, Long-Term Orientation (LTO): Values associated with Long Term Orientation are thrift 
and perseverance; values associated with Short Term Orientation are respect for tradition, fulfilling 
social obligations, and protecting one's 'face'. It is often emphasized that LTO in corporate context 
is depicted by the amount of money spend by company on R&D and innovation. Sri Lanka has the 
highest LTO value followed by India, Bangladesh and Pakistan (Hofstede, 2014).  
This chapter discussed the economic and corporate scenario of South Asian Region. It 
observed that India is the rapidly expanding economy of the region not only in terms of 
GDP growth but also in terms of market capitalization and number of listed stocks and 
trades. This shows that Indian economy has greater growth potential sponsored by 
established stock markets with huge capitalization and large FDIs. Financial 
liberalization has also fueled the growth in corporate sector of India, making it the most 
promising and suitable investment opportunity as compared to its regional counterparts. 
However, due to the large family ownership the real benefits of all the economic and 
governance advantages are not transferred to the shareholders. This can be seen from the 
fact that during last decade the numbers of cash dividend payers have reduced 
significantly (Reddy & Rath, 2005). The study has also considered the cultural factors of 
India and found that India is a high power distant country with high long term orientation 
in the region (Hofstede, 2014).  Pakistan is the second important country of the region 
with high number of listed companies and percentage of market capitalization. However, 
the economic indicators of Pakistan indicate the weak state of economic development 
and high inflation. The rate of GDP growth in Pakistan remained very slow which was 
lowest in the region in 2010. The corporate governance laws weakly protect minority 
investors rights due to which dividend payouts are adversely affected. In recent years the 
number of dividend payers is declined significantly. Pakistan has high uncertainty 
avoidance in her culture which is expected to cause dividend reductions by corporate 
managers.   
Bangladesh in the third emerging economy of South Asia with good economic indicators 
and developing stock markets followed by Sri Lanka. The number of listed companies in 
Bangladesh is low but increasing with the passage of time. Although both countries were 
badly affected by high inflation, unemployment and poverty but in recent year the 
governments of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have taken strong measure to reduce inflation 
rate and enhance to the quality of governance practices. The financial liberalization in 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka help the economies to grow with the pace of their regional 
counterparts.  
Before discussing the existing literature on the subject under study, one can understand the 
importance of country specific factors in shaping corporate dividend policy. Based on the above 
discussion it is perceivable that corporate dividend policy is not only affected by firm specific 
factors but it is also affected by country specific factors like economic development, strength of 
corporate laws and culture. The next chapter will provide a brief discussion on the relevant 
literature related with the importance of firm and country specific variables in designing optimal 
dividend payout policy.   
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Chapter 4  
Literature Review  
  
    
Existing Financial literature provides both theoretical justifications and empirical findings on 
corporate payout policy. For more than six decades researchers are putting efforts to explore the 
issue related to determinants of payouts but yet there is no consensus on the results. Current chapter 
is intended to take a holistic view of existing studies conducted in different parts of the world, 
pertaining to the determinants of dividend policy. This chapter is classified into four sections; first 
section presents the empirical investigations regarding the classical theoretical models of dividend 
policy, while second section covers the empirical investigation on the determinants of dividend 
policy from developed countries. Nest section consists of dividend policy studies in emerging 
economies. Finally, empirical evidence on cross country studies on determinants of dividend policy 
is presented in the last section.  
4.1 Empirical Investigations of Classical Dividend Models  
During the last five decades, the discussion and debate on the issue of dividend policy has turned 
into gigantic literature. A detailed scrutiny of existing literature on dividend policy reveals three 
distinct schools of thoughts regarding the effect of dividend payout on firm value. Some researchers 
argue that dividend has a positive effect on firm value, while some other argued a negative affect 
and still many others believe that dividend policy does not matter at all.  Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) presented the world famous irrelevance proposition of dividend. Assuming a situation of 
perfect capital market they proved that it is irrelevant for the value of firm whether it pays the 
dividend or not. Black & Scholes (1974) studied the relationship between dividend yield and share 
price volatility by analyzing 25 portfolios of common stocks of NYSE for the time period 1936 to 
1966. The results of their study showed that the coefficient of dividend yield is insignificant which 
simply imply no relationship of dividend yield with share value. In addition to the value relevance 
of dividend policy, several researchers have presented theories explaining factors determining the 
behavior of dividend payout. The most important theory in this regards is agency theory presented 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
The issue of agency cost was raised by Jensen & Meckling (1976) who argued that 
dividend restricts funds under the control of management, which puts them under strict 
scrutiny of capital market. This reduces the responsibility of owners to manage 
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investment quality and managerial expenses on perquisites, as very less cash flows left 
under the control of management.  It is common to note that the outside investors have 
better position to assess the company’s performance; therefore, dividend payout can be 
used as a source to keep the company in under scrutiny of capital market for acquisition 
of funds. According to Easterbrook and Frank (1984) dividends keep the cost of 
monitoring the management of company, in capital market, at a minimum level and help 
in decreasing the level of risk, managers are prone to. Lang & Litzenberger (1989) 
highlighted the issue of reaction of share price in response to changing dividends and 
argued that increase in dividend payments ultimately results in high share value as a 
reaction only for companies with less value of Tobin’s Q and low investment 
opportunities.   
The agency hypothesis in the context of dividend policy supports the idea that dividends 
help in reducing conflict of interest between management and shareholders because 
payment of dividends reduces the funds under the control of management therefore, 
reduces the chances of miss utilization of company’s resources for personal benefits of 
insiders. Baker & Wurgler (1985) presented another view of conflict interest in their 
catering hypothesis. They argued that management is only reluctant to pay dividends 
when shareholders do not put premium on dividend paying stocks. If shareholders prefer 
to receive dividend they usually raise the price to the company’s shares and management 
of other companies starts paying high dividends.   
Bhattacharya (1979) presented dividend signaling argument and showed that dividend 
reduces the intensity of asymmetric information between shareholders and management 
by increasing the flow of information about firm’s future performance. Signaling 
hypothesis explained reasons behind the increase in stock prices after the declaration of 
increase in dividend payouts.. Several researchers (see for example Penman, 1983; 
Grullon et al., 2005; De Angelo et al., 1996; Nissim & Ziv, 2001 etc) have investigated 
the signaling hypothesis; however, each investigation gives inconclusive results. Penman 
(1983) established that investors try to judge the managements’ expectation about future 
of company and profitability based on the information they acquire from level of 
dividend payouts and earnings forecasts by financial analyst of company. Yoon & Starks 
(1995) reported that dividend changes are related with revisions in forecasted current 
profitability by the analyst. According to Nissim & Ziv (2001) changes in dividends are 
important in forecasting future earnings however; their results are highly criticized by 
Grullon et al. (2005). He argued that changes in payouts are not a sign or indication of 
improve forecasted performance even at different speed of adjustment. DeAngelo et al. 
(1996) analyzed the case of companies that faced the first time decline in earrings after 9 
years of smooth growth in earnings and showed that more than sixty percent of managers 
do not hesitate to increase dividends in the year in which profitability is decreased. 
However, changes in dividend in year of the reduced earnings are not linked to future 
surprising changes in earnings.  
Pecking order hypothesis was presented by Myers & Majluf (1984) and argued that there 
is a particular sequence of fund utilization a company adopts. This sequence is based on 
the cost of funds i.e. less costly source of fund should be utilized first and then the costly 
source of finance is used, if need arises. In the same vein, the pecking order theory 
suggests that company uses the retain earnings as the primary source of funds because 
this is the part of company’s previous incomes which company has saved for the purpose 
of utilization in latter times.   
Myers (2001) established that if company chose to supply the funds to its investment projects by 
issuance of new shares, the share value of subsequent issue would be less because of information 
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asymmetry. Managers therefore, will prefer to use internal funds of the company for investment 
projects because this will not cause any problem related to asymmetric information and utilized 
external resource latter on. Fama & French (2002) investigated pecking order and trade-off theories 
at the same time and reported that firms with high profitability have higher dividends payouts, 
while firms with high investment opportunities have lower payouts however, the found a negative 
relationship between leverage and dividend payout.  
The most intuitive theory of dividend was presented by Gordon & Walter (1985) who 
established that investors prefer to have something (i.e. cash in hand in the form of 
dividend) than nothing (i.e. uncertain future expected capital gain). Their argument came 
to known as bird in the hand argument or sometimes dividend relevance theory. This 
theory relates to the effect of payout on companies and investors in person. Bird in the 
hand argument established that there is a link between firm’s value and its payouts (De 
Boyrie, 2010). According to Gordon, (1959) dividends in the form of cash received today 
by investors are more valuable than future dividends in time value perspective. Future 
dividends are uncertain as compared to current dividends. Higher uncertainty forces 
investors to attach a higher risk premium to the share of company which reduces the 
value of company’s share, thereby increasing a firms cost of capital (Hewitt, 2002). 
Mirza (2010) also supported the dividend irrelevance argument based on the idea that 
investors can create homemade dividends if they find current and future dividends more 
risky. Many researchers believe that stockholders prefer current dividends which cause a 
positive relationship between payouts and company’s share price.  
Lang & Litzenberger (1989) showed in their free cash flow argument that there is a 
strong market reaction for the firm having low growth opportunities resulting from 
decrease in dividends. According to the bird in the hand argument, something (dividend) 
is better than nothing (no dividend at all) but this argument is criticized on the ground 
that risk of the firm is not determined on the grounds of distribution of its income but it is 
centered on the level of uncertainty attached with its cash flow. In addition to the 
dividends, the interest payment also reduces the free cash flow available to managers. As 
a result of which, the power of managers to use money for their prerequisites, reduces  
Besides empirical evidences on validity of theories of dividends, many researchers have 
presented research works on factors determining the payout policy of a company. Given 
below is the brief detail of existing literature on determinants of dividend policy from 
different parts of the world.  
4.2 Dividend Policy in Developed Economies  
Researchers have investigated the determinants of dividend policy in developed 
economies. For instance, Baker et al. (1985) used a questionnaire based survey 
methodology, and sent questionnaires to 562 companies which were listed at New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), resulting in the findings which were noticeably similar to  
Lintner’s behavioral model. This model concludes that the share value is always affected 
by the dividend policy, and investors usually prefer the dividend which they receive in 
continuation. They suggested that, for studying the dividend policy, researcher should 
isolate the regulated firms from unregulated ones.  
Ownership is among the widely investigated determinants of dividend policy in developed 
economies. Several researchers have highlighted its importance (see for example: Jensen et al., 
1992; Rozeff (1982; Bradford et al., 2013; Dhanani, 2005; Elston et al., 2004; Grinstein and Roni, 
2005; Gugler, 2003; Han et al., 1999; Jensen et al.,1992; Khan, 2006, Mancinelli and Aydin, 2006; 
Smit and Henk, 2009; Stacescu, 2006; Yordying, 2014; Wen and Jia, 2010) A detailed review of 
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these studies are given in Appendix A. Jensen et al. (1992) conducted a study to investigate the 
determinants of cross-sectional differences of ownership structure, dividend payout debt, and used a 
three stage least square regression on a sample of 565 companies for the year 1982 and 632 
companies for the year 1987, which demonstrated a significantly negative relationship of insider 
ownership variable with dividends. Work done by Jensen et al.(1992) and Rozeff (1982) showed 
quite similar results.  
The data of 483 firms as a sample from Multex Investors Database was analyzed by 
Myers & Frank (2004). It empirically tested the impact of selected financial variables 
decision to pay dividends. The estimated results proved that higher P/E ratio is attached 
with higher dividend payments, for the reason that lower risk and superior insiders and 
institution ownership leads to low dividend payout. Main cause behind this issue is that 
the managers have benefits to lessen the dividends for the sake of boosting the 
anticipated worth of their stock options, taken as executive compensation. But, it was 
quite shocking to see that debt to equity ratio was positively linked with dividend payout. 
They have given the reason that the firms are interested to raise debt to finance, mounting 
the dividends to show positive signs to the institutional owners, to enhance the repute and 
standing and maintaining their access to capital.  
Gugler (2003) examined a panel of 214 non-financial Australian firms from 1991 to 1999 
and applied OLS technique to find out the association between dividend and ownership 
control structure. He got the results that the firms, which are owned by state, are more 
involved in smoothness of dividends, but in case of family owned firms, results were 
conflicting to that. In addition to this, state owned firms were most hesitant to cut the 
dividends but family owned firms were least hesitant. He also concluded that the firms, 
which are having less growth opportunities, expel cash no matter who is controlling the 
firm.   
Halim et al. (2013) analyzed the relationship between corporate governance mechanism 
and dividend policy in non-financial companies for the period 2004 to 2008. They argued 
that emerging markets are characterized by week law enforcement and ineffective 
corporate governance system. The estimated results showed that ownership of block 
holders is negatively related with dividend payouts which means that large shareholders 
expropriate the rights of minority shareholders  
Recently, Yordying (2014) studies the relationship between ownership structure and 
dividend policy in listed companies of Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) China for the 
period 2007 to 2011. The estimated results showed that companies with high ownership 
concentration and state ownership are more likely to pay high dividends. However, with 
the increase of institutional shareholdings the payment of dividend became less probable. 
They found that ownership concentration and state ownership is positively related with 
dividend payout, while institutional ownership and foreign ownership is negatively 
related with dividend payouts.  
The relationship between concentrated ownership and dividend policy is investigated by 
Lacave et al. (2014). They observed that companies with high concentration of 
ownership are less likely to pay high dividends. They argued that due to legal rules 
governing distribution of cash to shareholders, which allows insiders to decide dividends 
and does not strictly monitor controlling shareholder, the power of controlling 
shareholder to expropriate the rights of minority shareholders increases. Several other 
researchers (see for example: Blackwell, & Megginson, 1991; Lasfer, 1997; Bell & Tim, 
2002; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2005; Goergen, et al., 2005 etc) examined corporate 
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ownership structure and found ownership structure to be an important determinant of 
dividend policy in developed countries.  
One of the important outcomes of dispersed ownership is agency problem. Several 
researchers investigated role of agency problem designing payout policy. De Angelo et 
al. (2004) investigated the reasons of dividend payments by the firms, while studying the 
dividend policy, agency cost, and earned equity. They concluded that withholding the 
earnings gives managers control over extra money without any special supervision. They 
also suggested that dividend expenses reduced the significant agency dilemma. With the 
help of these findings, they have proposed that the companies with elevated level of 
retained earnings, more specifically, will offer dividends. Alternatively, it could be stated 
that the firms will give more amount as dividends when their earned equity to total equity 
level is towered. In contradiction, firms give lesser dividend amount when this projected 
ratio drops down or turned down to zero level or so. Results also showed a well 
significant association among the choice of dividend payment and the fraction of earned 
equity to total equity, after taking size, growth, leverage, cash balance, profitability and 
historical dividends as controlling variables.  
Recently, Chinmoy & Sun (2014) analyzed the agency cost and dividend policy in Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) of US and argued that payment of dividend reduces 
information asymmetry and hence mitigate agency problem by minimizing managers’ 
power to use free cash. The reduced cash put managers under strict scrutiny by external 
capital market at the time of raising external funds, which enforces managers to maintain 
good financial position of the company. Due to goof financial performance the share 
value of REITs increases. The growth of REITs depends on availability of external funds 
at competitive rates. Based on estimated results they argued that in REITs of US, a 
significantly positive relationship exist between dividend and external finance growth. 
This means that dividend enhances growth by reducing agency cost and facilitates the 
process of raising external capital.  
Existing literature also highlights the importance of future earnings growth and liquidity 
of firm in determining dividend payout (See For example: Bradley et al., 1998; Kato et 
al., 2002; Mayers and Frank, 2004; Pappadopoulos and Dimitrio, 2007; Zhou and 
William, 2006 etc) . Using a sample of 1025 firms which were listed on the American 
Stock Exchange and on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Benartzi et al. (1997) 
took the data from the year 1979 to the year 1991, and tried to find out the existence of 
any relationship between firm’s future earnings and dividend changes. This study 
provided the results which were similar to the findings of Watts’ study, that the changes 
in dividend payments have no relation with the changes in future earnings. Instead, 
dividend changes are actually associated with the current and historical changes in 
earnings, which were showed by Benartzi et al. (1997) findings.  
Dhanani (2005) analyzed financial and non-financial data of 800 peak level firms which were 
listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) and surveyed, in order to empirically test the 
significance and association of different concepts of dividend in companies in United 
Kingdom, and to determine that how much these concepts are affected by corporate properties 
of size and industry sections. It was also demonstrated by the findings that UK managers 
support the general dividend relevance hypothesis. Companies usually oppose the residual 
dividend policy for investing purposes. Along with this, these companies also suppose that 
dividend decisions permit restricted variations with which to control capital structure 
determination. This study has supported signaling hypothesis, in general. Stacescu (2006), 
studied the determinants of dividend policy and took a sample of 175 nonfinancial firms over 
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the period of 1974 to 2004 in Switzerland. He used correlation and regression, volatility in 
price can be stated as the major determinant of dividend payout. Decision to pay dividends 
was more dependent on past and recent incomes and less linked with future net income 
expansion. Study also concluded a clear association between losses and reduction in dividends. 
According to the results of this study, managers feel hesitation to decrease the dividends which 
provides the informational stuff to the variations in the amount of dividends.  
On cash flow aspect of dividend, a study was conducted by Pappadopoulos & Dimitrios 
(2007), who analyzed the effect of firm’s related properties on payment of dividend 
amount. They took a sample of almost 72 companies which were listed at Athens Stock 
Exchange. Time span, from which the data was taken, was from 1995 to 2002. They 
segregated the complete sample into two categories, retail firms and industrial firms. 
They found that there is no significant difference in dividend payments of both of the 
categories. According to this study, cash flow is the most significant determinant of 
dividend payments and it is positively linked with the fraction of earnings being given as 
dividends. They also finalized that size, capital structure, leverage, liquidity, and 
profitability were still stayed as undetermined on the basis of their signs. Many 
researchers (see for example: Atrill & McLaney, 2002; Bradley, 1998; Kato et al. 2002; 
Mehar, 2002; Myers & Frank, 2004;  
Rozef, 1982; Pappadopoulos and Dimitrio, 2007; Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Besley 
& Brigham, 2008; Ajmi & Hussain, 2011; Hang, et al., 2011, Zhou and William, 2006 
etc.) have investigated cash flow and earnings aspect of dividend.  
Investment and growth opportunities as determinant of payout policy gained importance in 
last decades. Statistics of individual firms from Compustat and CRPS were analyzed by 
Fama & French (2001). They got the findings that bigger size, higher earnings, and lesser 
investment opportunities are the major aspects of those companies which usually offer 
dividends. They reported that the fraction of dividend paying firms is declined from 67% to 
21% from the year 1978 to the year 2000, and the reason behind this decline is the variations 
in the properties of these firms. Benito & Young (2003) studied the same case. After 
including individual income tax in addition with the size and opportunities, this was 
concluded that there is some sort of association of new individual taxes and corporate 
dividend assessment.  
Khosroshahi et al. (2013) studied the relationship of stock market liquidity and various 
firm characteristics in Tehran. They argued that firm is available with two choices with 
respect to utilization of earnings, first it can pay dividend or reinvest the earnings in firms 
in the form of retained earnings. In a frictionless market a rational investor who is in need 
of liquidity can either wait for dividend or sell the stock. The estimated results based on 
OLS regression showed that share turnover, size of the firm and growth opportunities 
does not explain dividend payout while profitability of firm is positively related with 
dividend payouts in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). Other researchers (like; Chang & 
Rhee, 1990; Naceur et al., 2006; Kowalewski et al., 2008; Murhadi 2008; Ayub, 2005;  
etc.) found a negative relationship of growth opportunities and dividend policy.  
Dividend smoothing phenomenon was also addressed in several studies (see for example: 
Benzinho, 2004; Eriotis, 2011; Jeong, 2001). Baker et al (1985) analyzed management 
perception on dividend payments by investigating 291 firms listed at Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) and found that most important factors considered as determinants of 
dividend are pattern of past dividends, current earnings level, stable earnings and 
expected future earnings. It is also found that managers of companies that are studied 
make dividend decisions that are consistent with Lintner model and results obtained. 
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After comparing results of these surveys, it is concluded that determinants of dividend 
policy found by American and Canadian managers are similar to great extent but 
different from determinants ranking given by managers of companies listed at New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and TSE. On the basis of surveys conducted on Canadian firms’ 
manager, researchers described that TSE listed firms showed more support for dividend 
clienteles, signaling, catering explanations and tax preferences. Canadian dividend 
paying firms produce significantly larger profits and generate greater cash flows as 
compared to nondividend paying firms.  
Jeong (2008) took the financial data of Korean companies and analyzed that what are the 
determinants in case of dividend policy. He concluded that these companies make their 
dividend policies in different institutional scenarios. He also compared their strategies 
with United States market which is quite developed one. On priority basis, he wanted to 
check the behavior of Korean firms that whether these firms carry stable policies just like 
developed countries or there is any sort of contradiction? According to the findings, 
Korean firms offer dividend amount by reason of the face value of their stocks which are 
firmly integrated with the one year rate of interest on deposits. He also stated that 
although majority of the companies in Korea offer dividends with lesser variations, but 
the pace, with which these dividends are adjusted to the target payout fraction, is much 
speedy than the developed countries like USA.  
Jakob & Johannes (2008) studied the same issue in Denmark. They took 3948 firm-year 
statistics from almost 356 firms during the time span of 1988 to 2004. They attained the 
results that the dividend payers in Denmark are characterized by high earnings level, high 
return on equity level, less variation in return on equity, greater level of earnings being 
retained by the firms, higher size and magnitude, and payment of dividend in the 
precedent year. They have found nothing between MV/BV, leverage ownership 
configuration, and dividend settlement Denmark.  
Dzidic (2014) investigated dividend policy of publically listed companies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. They did not find any evidence of dividend smoothing however, they 
observed that companies tend to pay high volume of dividend. The reason behind the 
absence of dividend smoothing phenomena reported to be the low investors’ protection 
level, concentrated ownership structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Bradley et al. (1998) took a sample of 75 REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) firms, 
examined their data from the year 1985 to the year 1992, and explored the role of 
expected cash flow volatility, both empirically as well as theoretically, for determining 
the dividend policy. His results depicted that the firms which have higher expected cash 
flow volatility, are having lower payout ratio, controlling for leverage, size and property 
level diversification. Results, given by this study, were similar to the information based 
explanation of dividend policy but differ when explaining the agency cost issue. Studies 
on cultural aspect remained mostly neglected in developed economies. Recently, the 
impact of local US culture on dividend payout is examined by Erdem (2013). He used 
local religious affiliations as a proxy of local culture and found that companies having 
high ownership by Protestants are more likely to pay dividends and have higher dividend 
yield ration as compared to firms with high ownership by Catholics. He suggested that 
religion induce clientele effect of dividend which consistent with earlier studies on 
different cultural groups  
Some researchers also focused on legal perspective of dividend policy in developed 
countries. Ferris et al. (2008b) attempted to sort out the basis of decreasing dividends 
trends in 3551 UK firms from the year 1988 to the year 2002. The study gave the results 
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that the intensity of this turn down in UK is still less than this decline in USA. They also 
countermand that the growing share repurchasing exercises are responsible for this 
declining dividend trend. They also suggested that, during the span of time when this 
study was conducted, dividend decision wasn’t significantly influenced by variation in 
tax laws.  More recently Ganguli (2014) studied listed companies of Singapore and 
argued that minority shareholders are protected by law and they get dividend which 
mitigates the problems of expropriation of rights by insiders. This shows that the scenario 
in which investors rights are duly protected the companies will pay more and stable 
dividends to investors. Few researchers have discussed various other dimensions of 
dividend determinants. For instance, Blankley et al. (2007) discusses the issue of 
taxation, Desai et al. (2007) analyzed the role of capital expenditure, Elston et al. (2011) 
applied propensity score matching technique to analyze dividend policy, it investigated 
the role of profitability in banks, Ferris et al. (2006) conducted a time series analysis of 
dividend payouts, Floyd et al. (2014) and Smits (2012) analyzed the role of financial 
crisis in determining payouts, Kowalewski (2012) analyzed the role of performance, Liu 
and Shan (2007) studied the dividend premium, Baker et al. (2005) adopted survey 
methodology to analyze the opinion of corporate managers. The above mentioned studies 
are briefly presented in Appendix A. From above discussion it is evident that ownership 
is widely investigated determinants of dividend policy followed by cash flow, liquidity, 
future earnings, growth opportunities and smoothing effect. However, few researchers 
have studied the legal and cultural factors and their role in determining dividend policy in 
developed countries. Researcher of emerging economies also focused on various aspects 
of dividend policy which are discussed in next section.   
4.3 Dividend Policy in Emerging Economies  
Several researchers (See for example: Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Ahmed and Attiya, 2009; 
Kumar, 2006; Al-Malkawi, 2007; Afza & Mirza, 2010; Ayub, 2005; Trang, 2012; 
Ariyoto and Triasesiarta, 2013; Alagathurai, 2013; Dzidic, 2014; Gunathilaka & 
Gunaratne, 2009; Huda and Mohammad, 2013; Kumar, 2006; Al-Malkawi, 2007; Manos, 
2003; Sharma and Ritu, 2013; Thanatewee, 2013; Vol & Van, 2014; Warrad et al.,  2012 
ect. A brief review of these studies is given in Appendix A) from developing economies 
focused on importance of ownership structure in demining dividend payout. Kumar 
(2006) investigated the relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout 
by using panel data of Indian firms from the period of 1994 to 2000 and described the 
variations in the behavior of dividend by considering different factors including 
investment opportunities, earning trends, firm financial structure, dividend history and 
ownership structure of firm. It was found that dividend is positively related with 
investment opportunities and earnings trends while negatively related with debt-equity 
ratio relationship. Dividend decisions were also positively related with ownership by 
corporations but negatively related with squared corporate ownership. No relationship 
was found between dividend payout and foreign ownership.   
Al-Malkawi (2007) investigated determinants of dividend policy in Jordan. Panel data ranging from 
1989 to 2000 of publically traded firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange was used. For competing 
hypothesis general to specific approach was applied. Results obtained from Tobit specification 
provided that payout is significantly affected by state ownership and proportion of stock held by 
insiders. In Jordan, age, profitability and size were found as determinants of dividend policy. 
Results were in strong favor of agency hypothesis and strongly supporting the Pecking order 
hypothesis but were against the signaling hypothesis.  
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Trang (2012) investigate the determinants of dividend policy of 116 listed companies of 
Hchiminh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), Viet Nam. Using 
cross sectional data of 2009, he identified that in listed companies of Viet Nam, 
profitability is positively and business risk is negatively related with dividend payout. 
However, no relationship of ownership concentration, debt level, type of industry and 
growth opportunities with dividend policy was observed from estimated results.  
Ariyoto (2013) argued that the firm’s payout policy is the result of several factors which 
may vary from time to time and industry to industry. He investigated the agency problem 
measured by family ownership, cash funds and the level of diversification, and its role in 
deciding dividend policy of companies in Indonesia during 2002-2010. He found that 
growth, size, profitability along with macroeconomics variables determine the dividend 
policy of Indonesian companies.  
Alagathurai (2013) analyzed the corporate governance and dividend policy in listed hotel 
and restaurant companies of Sri Lanka. Based on the data of 17 companies listed on 
Colombo Stock Exchange during 2008-2012 the estimated results showed that CEO 
duality has a negative relationship with dividend policy while the board size and 
independence, debt and profitability do not have significant relation with dividend policy. 
Ajanthan (2013) also investigated the role of profitability in determining dividend 
payouts in listed companies of Sri Lanka and found a positive relationship.  
Gunathilaka & Gunaratne (2009) investigated the impact of ownership structure on 
dividend policy using the data of 101 companies listed at Colombo Stock Exchange 
during 2001-2005. They divide ownership structure in institutional, other corporate and 
managerial ownership. By applying full adjustment model and earning trend model on 
panel data they argued that managerial and institutional ownership has a significant 
positive relationship with dividend policy, while profitability is negatively related to the 
probability of paying dividends. A significant relationship of past dividends with current 
dividends was also observed in Sri Lanka.  
Thanatewee (2013) investigated the relationship between ownership structure and dividend policy 
in Thailand. He collected the data comprising 1,927 firm year observations for the period 2002 to 
2010. The estimated results showed concentrated ownership is significantly and positively related 
with dividend policy. The study argued that companies having large block holders are expected to 
pay high dividends. Moreover, institutional ownership is positively while individuals’ ownership is 
negatively related with the likelihood of dividend payouts.  
Besides ownership structure researchers have also investigated the role of earnings, 
liquidity and smoothing in developing economies (See for example: Anil and Sujjata, 
2008; Khosroshahi et al., 2013; Purnanadam & Hanumanta, 1965;  Mitton, 2004; Zaman, 
2013 etc. Literature review chart is presented in Appendix A). For instance in India, 
Purnanadam & Hanumanta (1965) examine the long term desired dividend payout ratio 
of cotton textile industry of India by using Lintner’s Dividend Model. The sample was 
comprised of 50 companies from period of 1946 to 1963. In analysis only those 
companies were included which have more than 1 million paid up capital.  Regression 
results revealed that there was an inverse relation between long run targeted dividend 
payout ratio and reaction coefficient. According to them, factors which represent the 
desired dividend payout are net income variance, level of managerial conservatism and 
value given to dividend stability.  In recent study, Ahmed & Attiya (2009) examined the 
factors affecting dividend policy in emerging economy of Pakistan. It investigated 320 
firms of Pakistan listed at Karachi Stock Exchange from the period of 2001 to 2006. In 
first part of analysis they used panel regression on model proposed by Lintner, Fama & 
Babiak, which is actually the expansion of partial adjustment model. The estimated 
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results showed that companies in Pakistan use past dividends and current earnings more 
for paying their dividend. In second part of analysis, factors which determined dividend 
payout were investigated and it is found that profitability and stable net earnings are 
contributing factors for large available free cash flows and hence firms pay large 
dividends. It was also revealed that dividend payout ratio is positively related with 
market liquidity and ownership concentration. There was no significant impact of growth 
opportunities was found on dividend payment but there is significant negative 
relationship between firm size and payouts.   
Zaman (2013) investigated determinants of dividend policy in 30 listed banking 
companies of Dhaka Stock Exchange during 2006-2012. He analyzed the impact of 
profitability, size and growth on dividend payout of banking companies using multiple 
regression and correlations. He found that only profitability is the most powerful 
determinants of dividend policy in Bangladesh. The result of this study was in line with 
the previous study conducted by Sheikh (2012) on banking companies of Bangladesh.  
From growing Indian economy, Redy & Rath (2005) investigated all listed companies of 
NSE and BSE from 1991 and 2001. Sample was divided into two segments of dividend 
payers and dividend non payers.  Further classifications of payers were made into new 
listed, regular payers and initiators and non-payers were categorized as former paid, 
newly listed and never paid. Results showed that number of firms those pay dividend 
declined from 57 % (1991) to 32 % (2001) and regular dividend paying companies are 
few in number. As compared to nonpaying dividend companies, paying companies are 
found as large and more profitable. It is found that there is no significant relationship 
between dividend and growth opportunities.    
Ayub (2005) investigated 180 listed companies of KSE Pakistan and employed ordinary least 
square regression technique for estimation of results. The estimated results showed that companies 
use only 23 % of incremental earnings for payment of dividends while rest of the profits is invested 
by the companies in profitable projects. The results confirm the notion that companies pay dividend 
only when do not find any positive NPV project for investment. During early stages companies 
focus is more on retained earnings that is why in starting phase companies pay less dividends. It 
was revealed that low reserve funds and high dividend results due to large numbers of shares held 
by directors. It was also observed that there is a negative relation between dividends and liquidity.  
Few researchers have also focused on dividend smoothing (see for example: Appannan and Sim, 
2011; Gunathil and Aka, 2013; Naceur et al., 2006 etc. Appendix A gives the brief details on these 
studies.). Besides the above mentioned studies in developing economies, researchers have also 
focused diverse determinants of payouts. For instance, Alagathurai (2013) studied the determinants 
of dividend policy in hotel industry, Kamat (2008) studied industry effect, Parua (2009) conducted 
a time series analysis, Reddy and Subhrendu (2005) conducted trend analysis etc. Appendix A 
presents brief details on the above mentioned studies. In the light existing literature it is evident that 
most of the studies from emerging economies focused more on ownership structure, cash flow, 
profitability and smoothing. However, few researchers have studied the impact of growth 
opportunities, cash flow sensitivity and leverage. While the legal and cultural studied in emerging 
economies remained mostly neglected. This seems a deficiency of existing literature from 
developing countries. However, the role of legal and cultural factors is more pronounce in cross 
country investigations of dividend policy. Next section covers the studies conducted in cross 
country context of determinants of dividend policy.  
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4.4. Cross Country Comparison of Dividend Policy  
During last decade the researchers have focused on cross country difference in firm level 
determinants of dividend policy. For instance, Ho (2002) conducted a comparative study 
of corporate payout policy of Japan and Australia. He constructed and analyzed the panel 
data of Nikkei 225 and ASX 200 indices in Japan and Australia. He found that dividend 
policy is positively related with size of company in Australia but not in Japan and with 
liquidity of company in Japan but the relationship between liquidity and payout was 
negative in Japan. The data also showed a negative relationship between dividend payout 
and company’s risk only in Japan. In both countries industry level fixed effect was 
observed.  
Eije & Megginson (2006) analyzed the development of dividend policy in fifteen 
countries of EU. They used a unique data consisting 3400 listed companies from the 
period 1989 to 2003. They found a decline in number of dividend paying companies, 
however, they observed a significant increase in total amount of dividends payouts 
during the same period. Based on the estimated results they concluded that dividend and 
earnings are concentrating among mature companies. Whereas, insignificant impact of 
retained earnings total equity ratio has been observed. Similarly, Ferris et. al (2008) 
reinforced life cycle theory and catering theory of dividends after studying the dividend 
payments in 30 diverse countries. Denis & Osobov (2008) have demonstrated that 
companies which have large size, are profitable and have high retained earnings have 
more tendencies to give dividend.  
More recently, Tor et al. (2013) conducted a survey of listed companies of Nordic to investigate the 
role of capital structure. They found that more than 60 percent of the companies have rather or 
relatively flexible debt target, whereas a strict target or no target at all is approximately equally 
common. They also studied link between capital structure policy and dividend policy, and found 
that dividend paying firms having a defined dividend payout mechanism are more likely to have a 
stricter debt target.  
The role of country specific economic legal and cultural difference was also studied by 
few researchers. For instance Wang et al. (1999) has examined the connection between 
economic variations and corporate dividend payouts in China. They reported that both 
dividend payouts and dividend likelihood changes with economic circumstances. They 
stated that when economic growth declines, dividend payouts and dividend likelihood 
rises with a lesser rate, which is a sign of impact of economic growth of country on 
corporate dividends.  
From legal perspective, in their study on the life cycle theory of dividend, La porta et. al 
(2000) matched up dividend payout of civil and common law countries and outlined the 
companies which work in countries having high level of shareholder protection is 
expected to pay higher dividend. The agency cost hypothesis was supported by these 
results.  Bancel et. al (2005) chooses survey methodology and examined the decisive 
elements of dividend policy by surveying European corporate managers. They 
established that the quality of a legal system in which a company is working impacts 
dividend policy and the complicated interplay of the firm’s ownership structure along 
with home country’s legal and institutional structures decide firm’s dividend policy. 
Ferris (2009) studied over 25000 firm year observation across 30 different countries to 
investigate the demand theory of dividend. They established major cross sectional 
variations to clarify the decision of dividend payments. They reported that when legal 
protection to investors is high, managers are compelled by investors to pay high 
dividend. Denis & Igor (2007) examined payout policy in US, Canada, UK, Germany, 
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France and Japan from 1994 to 2002 in order to find the tendency to pay dividends by 
corporations. They stated that large and more profitable firms have greater tendency to 
pay dividend and also those which have more portion of retained earnings in their entire 
equity.  
Using as sample from 19 different countries Mitton (2004) analyzed the data of 365 firms 
and reported that firms with strong corporate governance structure pays more dividends 
which is consistent with agency model. However, negative relationship was observed 
between firm’s future growth opportunities and dividend payouts and strength of 
negative relationship increases with strength in corporate governance mechanism. His 
results also showed that firms with higher level of governance are more profitable but the 
relationship between profitability and dividend payout was not much strong. The 
companies in the countries with strong investor protection showed significantly positive 
relationship between corporate governance and dividend payouts, which suggest that 
firm-level corporate governance and country-level investor protection are complements 
rather than substitutes  
Farinah & Foronda (2009) investigated the relationship between insider’s ownership and 
payout policy in the countries with different legal systems. The countries were classified 
on the basis of Anglo Saxon tradition and civil law system. They argued that due to 
differences in attributes of legal system and nature of agency conflict between firms of 
different countries the relationship between insiders’ ownership and dividend payout 
policy affect differently. They found a nonlinear relationship for the companies from 
Anglo Saxon tradition and reported a negative-positive-negative (cubic) relationship 
between ownership structure and dividend payouts however exact opposite sequence in 
relationship was observed for companies from civil law countries.   
Furthermore, Renneboog & Peter (2006) examined the relationship between dividends 
and shareholders control by analyzing a sample of 150 Dutch firms listed on Euro next 
Amsterdam and NMAX (comprising 962 firm years observations). They established that 
dividend payouts are usually less and insensitive to the variations in earnings and also 
demonstrate fragile connection with firms’ size, capital structure. They did not find any 
proof of dividend relaxation policy in high shareholders protection which clarifies that 
dividend payouts are the supplements and not act as alternative to shareholders’ attempts 
to lessen agency problem.  
La Porta et al. (2000) analyzed listed companies of various countries to search for the 
causes of regular variations among countries ownership concentration. They found that 
the level of shareholders, investors and creditors security decides that how broad and 
deep capital markets are in their dividend policies. They argued that legal approach is the 
most suitable method to comprehend corporate governance and its development despite 
the traditional way of making difference between banks centered and market centered 
financial systems.   
Thomas (2013) investigated the impact of strength of creditor’s rights protection and 
legal enforcement on corporate dividend policy in 281 firms from emerging economies. 
He argued that in emerging market the dividend outcome model is more applicable as 
compared to dividend substitute model but only in case of strong creditors protection. 
The country where legal enforcement is weak, the shareholders of better-governed firms 
are not able to extract high dividends.   
However, the study on cultural aspect of dividend policy remained mostly neglected during last 
decade. The author found only four studies (i.e. Bae et al., 2009; Fidrmuc & Jacob, 2010; Shao et 
al., 2013; & Zeheng & Ashraf, 2014) who considered the role of national culture in determining 
dividend policy. In recent times Bae et al. (2009) explored cultural facets covering different 
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countries, and brought into being two Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Uncertainty avoidance and 
long term orientation were reported to be the major decisive elements of dividend policy when 
governance and firm specific factors were kept constant. It was demonstrated by the results that 
more dividend is paid when there is more uncertainty avoidance, the firms working in the country 
with more investor security. On the other hand, when there is more long term orientation in society 
there is a probability that firms will pay fewer dividends.  
Fidrmuc & Jacob (2010) examined culturally rooted agency problem for difference in 
dividend policy. They collected data of 5700 firms from 40 advanced and emerging 
countries from 2001-2006 and used Hofstede cultural dimensions to gauge behavior of 
people in country. On the basis of comprehensive set of robust test they found that 
culture is a relevant factor when analyzing dividend distribution. They also used share 
repurchase, corporate leverage, size and ownership as controls.  
Shao et al. (2013) used Schwartz’s (1994) culture values and investigated the impact of 
culture on dividend policy in 22 advanced countries from 1994-1996.and concluded that 
imply that culture may influence corporate dividend policies through agency and 
signaling considerations.  
More recently, Zeheng & Ashraf (2014) investigated the relations of uncertainty 
avoidance, long term orientation and masculinity and dividend policy. They used a 
sample of banking companies of 51 countries over the period 1998–2007. The results 
showed that banks in high uncertainty avoidance, high long-term orientation and low 
masculinity countries pay lower amount of dividends and, are less likely to pay 
dividends. For robustness of results they also used three dimensions of national culture of 
House et al. (2004) but the results remained unchanged.  
Although financial crisis has tendency to affect corporate payout decision but literature 
on impact of financial crisis on dividend policy is very limited. Few researchers have 
highlighted the reasons and consequences of the financial crisis and their impact on 
corporate financial policies (See for example; Jacob and Johannes, 2008; Krugman, 
2009).  
According to Campello et al. (2009) financial crises greatly affect firm’s financial policy 
of latter years, including dividend and investment policy. Abreu & Gulamhussen (2013) 
examined payouts for US bank holding companies before and during the years of crisis 
i.e. 2008. It found that dividends are adversely affected after financial crisis. Floyed et al. 
(2014) also compared the payout policies of US banks over a period of 30 years and 
found that large banks resist dividend omissions in the beginning of crisis but latter they 
aggressively cut dividends. They also found that in pre-crisis firms heavily repurchase 
shares but after the crisis they quickly reduce share repurchases. The author did not find 
any study comparing determinants of dividend policy in pre and post financial crisis 
period except masters’ level thesis of Smith (2012). It examined the determinants of 
dividend payout ratio using a sample of 155 UK firms listed at London Stock Exchange 
from 2005 to 2010. The estimated result showed no significant change in relationship 
between growth and insider’s ownership in pre and post crisis period. Smith (2012) also 
reported that both firm size and clientele influence the impact of a crisis on dividend 
policy. Dividends increase during the crisis for large size firms and firms with higher 
percentage of institutional ownership in Netherland.  
  
Most of the above mentioned cross country investigations of economic and legal 
perspective of dividend policy considered advanced countries. Few researchers 
considered India in their sample however; remaining emerging economies of South Asian 
region were mostly ignored by researchers. Previous researchers legal and cultural 
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attribute to classify the sample but very few investigated the statistical relationship 
between these factors and dividend policy. The author did not find any study 
investigating the role of economic, legal and cultural factors in determining dividend 
policy in emerging economies. More importantly, the existing studies theoretically 
indicated the moderating role of legal and cultural factors in dividend policy but the 
empirical examination of moderating effect of country level factors in relationship 
between firm-level factors and dividend policy is not yet conducted. Moreover, the 
impact of financial crisis of 2008 on determinants of dividend policy also remained 
ignored. A comprehensive literature review chart is provided in Appendix A at the end of 
thesis.  
The present study attempts to fill this gap by providing empirical evidence on role of 
country level factors in moderating the relationship between firm-specific factors and 
dividend payout from emerging economics of South Asia, a region perhaps ignored in 
previous research focus. Secondly, it is the first cross country analysis of firm specific 
determinants of dividend policy in South Asia.  
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Chapter 5  
Research Methodology  
  
    
Current chapter presents the research methodology used in this study to investigate cross 
country and firm level determinants of dividend policy in selected South Asian countries. 
This chapter is divided in four parts. First section provides data and sample descriptions, 
second section discuss research models, variables of study are discussed in third part, 
while fourth part explains statistical techniques.  
5.1: Sample Description  
Financial data of non-financial companies listed at Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh; 
Bombay Stock Exchange, India, Karachi Stock Exchange, Pakistan; and Colombo Stock 
Exchange, Sri Lanka is collected from published annual reports. Due to under developed 
and newly established stock exchanges, no company was selected from Maldives Stock 
Exchange, Maldives; Royal Security Exchange, Bhutan; Nepal Stock Exchange, Nepal 
and Afghanistan Stock Exchange, Afghanistan. The purpose of the study is to investigate 
the effect of firm/country level factors on dividend payouts in listed non-financial 
companies of South Asia. The target population includes non-financial listed companies 
of South Asia, which are observing normal course of business. In order to determine the 
relevant target population, following are the selection criteria3 which are designed in the 
light of existing literature. (See for example: Manos, 2003; Khan, 2006; Kumar, 2006; 
Papadopoulos and Dmitrios, 2007 etc.). First, company should be in business for the 
whole study period i.e. 2006 to 2010 and should remain listed during the whole study 
period. This is due to the reason that determinants of dividend policy in listed company 
are different from unlisted company (See for example: Gugler, 2003; Servaes and Peter, 
2006; Pindado et al., 2011). Second, company should not get merged, due to any reason. 
It is to ensure that firm remained in its current business during the study period with 
similar financial attributes which are important in determining dividend policy of 
company e.g. capital structure, production capacity etc. (Nnadi & Tanna, 2011). Third, 
                                                 
3 It is important to clarify here that selection criteria have been designed to determine the target population. Sample 
is then randomly selected out of the population.  
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the company should not be in loss for the all years under study (Manos, 2003). It is 
perceivable that companies suffering from continuous loss have no other option but to cut 
dividend and companies which do not pay dividend at all, are not relevant3. Fourth, 
following Kumar (2006) State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are also not the part of target 
population. The dynamics and determinants of state owned companies are different from 
other companies therefore; companies, in which more than 50% shares are held by 
government. Fifth4, it should not have missed dividend in more than 3 years. It is 
observed that most of the companies in South Asian countries do not pay cash dividends 
(Reddy and Rath, 2005). In order to analyze the effect of changes in different 
firm/country level factors on amount of dividend, it is necessary that firm should be a 
dividend payer, at least in 2 years. Table 5.1 shows that total 956 companies (i.e. 4780 
firm year observations) are identified as fit for the target population. A random sample is 
selected out the population and those companies are dropped whose financial information 
is not available for all years of study. Finally a sample of 305 companies (i.e. 1525 
firmyear observations) is selected for analysis. The present study also analyzed the 
impact of financial crisis on determinants of payout policy, for this purpose the sample is 
also characterized as pre-crisis period i.e. 2006-2007 and post-crisis period i.e. 2008-
2010. Table 5.1 is distributed in two panels, where panel A represents the countries 
included in the study while panel B shows the South Asian countries which are excluded 
from the study due to insufficient number of listed companies and missing annual reports 
of companies. Finally, companies from four major countries i.e. Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka are included in the study. The data for the present study is 
collected from annual reports of listed companies for the period from 2006 to 2010. 
Financial data of listed non-financial companies of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 
Pakistan, Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) India, Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
Bangladesh and Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) Sri Lanka are selected. Primarily, 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression technique is used for estimation of results and 
secondly censored regression model (Tobit) and binary logistic regression (Logit) models 
are applied. Corporate attributes are classified into six categories i.e. Dependent variable 
(dividend payout and dividend intensity), independent variables include ownership 
structure (ownership by managers and institutions), cash flows (operating cash flow, cash 
flow sensitivity), growth opportunities (market to book ratio), information asymmetry 
(ownership dispersion) and finally control variables (size, leverage and profitability). 
Control variables of size, leverage and profitability are suggested by Fama & French 
(2001) and Li & Zhao (2007).  
  
Table 5.1: Sample Description  
   Panel A    Panel B   
                                                 
4 The objective of the study is to relate the change in firm/country level factors with change in dividend 
payout however, it is important to note that majority of the South Asian companies did not pay dividend at 
all during the study period therefore, it is important to select sample from companies which are at least 
dividend payers, either regular or irregular. Listing regulations of some countries, like Pakistan, require 
companies to pay a mandatory dividend. It is not necessary that the company which paid dividend once in 
the study period (to meet listing requirements) has a defined dividend Policy therefore, the benchmark of at 
least 2 years of dividend payment is used.  
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  Bangladesh  
Dhaka Stock 
Exchange  
India  
Bombay  
Stock  
Exchange  
Pakistan  
Karachi  
Stock  
Exchange  
Sri  
Lanka  
Colombo 
Stock  
Exchange  
Maldives  
Maldives 
Stock  
Exchange  
Bhutan  
Royal 
Security  
Exchange  
Nepal  
Nepal  
Stock  
Exchange  
Afghanist 
an  
Afghanistan  
Stock  
Exchange  
Establishment  1954  19575  1947  1904  2002  1993  1983  2009  
Listed Companies  471  5085  639  239  5  20  301  0  
Non-financial 
Companies  
190  12666  475  174  0  0  22  0  
Dividend Payers7  110  5707  200  76  0  0  0  0  
Firms Included in 
Sample  
45  130  95  35  0  0  0  0  
Firm-Year  
Observations (N)  
225   650  475  175          
  
5.2 Research Models   
Two types of models are employed by the study; first for estimation of relationship 
between firm specific factor and dividend policy second, for estimation of impact of 
country specific factors on dividend payout policy. Among firm specific factors, most 
important is the ownership structure of the company. By ownership structure the present 
study means the categories of different shareholder e.g. mangers and institutions etc. It is 
argued that managers have a tendency to use funds to get private benefit of control and 
they have power to expropriate minority shareholders rights by significantly reducing 
dividend payout of the company. It is argued that the reason behind management’s 
reluctance to pay dividend is that they are reluctant to lose their control over corporate 
funds (Jensen & Mechling, 1986).  In their agency hypothesis Jensen & Mechling (1986) 
argued that in modern corporate there is a separation of ownership and control. In order 
to enforce management to work in the best interest of shareholders, owners need to incur 
agency cost in the form of incentives, housing facility, medical, education of children etc. 
In addition to agency cost, owners use dividend as a tool to mitigate agency problem. If 
they demand more dividends than this leaves no extra funds or free cash in the hands of 
management and management is not in position to misuse funds to get private benefit of 
control. Moreover, agency cost reduces if insiders increase their shareholdings. In such 
situation dividend as a measure to mitigate agency problem has a limited role (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). If ownership is concentrated in the hands of managers then this aligns 
the interest of management and shareholders, which means no conflict of interest and no 
agency problem consequently no need of dividends to mitigate the agency cost. This 
argument suggests a negative relationship of managerial ownership with dividend 
payouts which is in line with the results of Lambert et al. (1989); Mayers & Frank 
(2004); Belden et al. (2005) and Afza & Mirza (2010). The present study hypothesized a 
negative relationship between managerial ownership and payout policy.  
                                                 
5 The Native Share & Stock Broker's Association formed in 1875  
6 Total Non-Financial Listed Companies at BSE India are 3100 approximately, out of which following sectors are 
excluded from analysis; i) 29 companies from Aviation, 156- ITES, 109- media & advertising; 13 Infrastructural 
Facilities; 27- nonferrous metals; 34- Real Estate; 298 -other sectors; 45- health care hospitals; 40- Tourism; 5 -Aviation; 
1012- Unclassified. (Source: http://stocktrendsindia.appspot.com/bse-sector-wise-todays-hot-stocks.html) 7 This 
constitue the target population of current study.  
7 Actual number of dividend payers is 1214. After excluding companies from sector mentioned in foot note 4 remaining 
dividend payers equal to 570.  
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In order to test the hypothesized relationship between managerial ownership and payout policy the 
present study designed the model in the light of studies conducted by Afza & Mirza (2010) and 
Mancinelli & Ozkan (2006). The latter study used size, leverage and market to book ratio as control 
variable however the present study has amended the model by employing size, leverage and 
profitability as control variable due to the reason that they are suggested by Fama & French (2001) 
and Li & Zhao (2007) for studies on determinants of dividend policy. The model is presented 
below:  
DIVit=α+β1 (MNG) it+ Cꞌitγt+ εit ------------ (5.1a)  
Where:   
Div = Proxies of dividend policy (dividend payout; dividend intensity)  
MNG= Managerial Ownership  
Cꞌ=Vector of Control Variables – [SZ, LVG, PRFT]  
SZ= Size of Firm8  
LVG = Leverage9  
PRFT = Profitability10  
The second model is used to estimate the relationship between institutional ownership 
and payout policy. Institutional investors are attracted towards high dividend. 
Companies, in which institutional shareholdings are high, are more likely to pay high 
dividends (Michaely & Shaw, 1994). Another reason to believe this is, institutions are 
well equipped with information gathering and analysis tools and they are better managers 
as compared to noninstitutional investors (see Gillan & Starks, 2000; Hartzell & Starks, 
2002; Carleton et al., 1998). Increase in dividends send positive signal to the investors 
regarding future prospects of the business as a result of which demand of shares of the 
business increases and hence the price of share. Michaely & Shaw (1994) argued that 
institutions cannot afford to lose the value of investments therefore; they do not take risk 
of low dividend payout. Institutional investors are among the main stakeholders of capital 
market as they are more capable to judge the performance of any company based on their 
information gathering and analysis skills and tool which are far superior to individuals. 
Institutional investors can be attracted towards high dividend due to many reasons 
including tax and fiduciary reasons. In the light of above argument the present study 
hypothesized a positive relationship between institutional ownership and dividend policy. 
To estimate this relationship the study used a model which considers ownership by 
institutions as dependent variables along with three control variables i.e. size, leverage 
and profitability.   
                                                 
8 Large firms have better access to credit market therefore; large size firms are less in need of reducing 
dividend payments to financial reasons. (Deshmukh, 2003)  
9 Firms with high financial leverage tend to have low payouts ratios (Rozeff, 1982) due to regular payments of 
interests i.e cost of debt.  
10 Firm’s net earnings are the critical determinant of dividend changes (Lintner, 1956)Highly profitable firms pay higher 
dividends (Fama and French, 2001)  
  
65  
  
DIVit=α+β1 (INST)it+  Cꞌitγt +εit ----------------------- (5.1b)  
Where:  
INST= Institutional Ownership  
Cꞌ=Vector of Control Variables – [SZ, LVG, PRFT]  
  
Operating cash is the main source of cash dividends. If firms’ source of operating cash is 
strong and managers are confident to maintain the given level of increased cash flows 
from operations in the future then they would not be reluctant to pay high dividends. On 
the other side, if firms are unable to generate sufficient cash flow from operations then 
management would not be able to increase cash dividend. It is important to note the firm 
is available with two more sources of cash i.e. cash flow from investing activities and 
cash flow from financing activities but firm available with excess cash flow from 
operations is in better position to pay high dividends even after capturing positive NPV 
projects, because it is not feasible to finance cash dividend by selling asset or shares of 
company. According to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis and theory of residual 
dividend policy, companies usually like to use their cash resources for investment in 
profitable projects and the dividend is paid out of remaining value. From view point of 
company, the cash generated from operations is an important source of payment of 
dividends, among all three sources of cash flows i.e. operating activities, investing and 
financing activities. From the companies view point, cash generated from operations is 
considered as most desirable source for payment of cash dividends. According to Anil & 
Sujjata (2008), cash flow from operations is the most significant determinant of dividend 
policy in Indian IT industry. This relationship between cash flow and dividend payout is 
estimated using the equation given below:  
  
DIVit=α+β1(OCF)it+ Cꞌitγt +εit --------------------------- (5.1c)  
Where:  
OCF= Operating Cash Flow  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.1 a.  
  
Regarding sensitivity of cash flow point of view, the existing literature shows that 
financially constrained firms try to hoard more cash today, which means that liquidity is 
getting more important for firms. Many researchers take it as a sign of financial 
constraints faced by the firm (Khurana et al. 2006). A firm facing future financial 
constraints responds to those constraints by hoarding cash today, which make company 
more cash sensitive as a result of which company’s dividend payout reduces. (Almeida et 
al. 2004). Based on this intuition a negative relationship between cash flow sensitivity 
and dividend payout is hypothesized. The equation for estimation of results is as under:   
DIVit=α+β1(CFS)it+ Cꞌitγt +εit --------------------------- (5.1d)  
Where:  
CFS= Cash flow Sensitivity.  
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Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.1 a.  
  
Similar to the sensitivity of cash, a firm in its growth phase also behaves in same way. It 
is argued that a growing firm is more in need of funds and is usually financially 
constrained; therefore, a firm with growth opportunities is less likely to pay high 
dividends (Mayers & Majluf, 1984). Many other researchers have also supported 
negative relationship between firms’ available growth opportunities and dividend 
payouts, for instance Deshmukh, (2003); and Aivazian et al., (2003) noted that the firms 
growth opportunities as captured by market to book ratio is negatively related with 
corporate payouts. Therefore, the present study hypothesized a negative relationship 
between growth opportunities and dividend payouts. To estimate the relationship 
between growth opportunities and payouts following model is estimated using ordinary 
least square regression:  
DIVit=α+β1(GRTH)it+ Cꞌitγt +εit ------------------------- (5.1e)  
Where:  
GRTH= Growth Opportunities  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.1 a.  
  
The issue becomes technical while relating agency problems and payouts. Some 
researchers have argued that in order to alleviate the agency costs associated with an 
increasing number of shareholders firms should pay more dividends, other things being 
equal (Rozeff, 1982; Deshmukh, 2003). Given the presence of information asymmetries 
between shareholders and managers, dividends may be used to signal future prospects of 
the firm (Frankfurter et al. 2002). Intuitively, large number of shareholders means less 
concentration of ownership, consequently, less chance of expropriation of minority 
shareholders right by controlling shareholders by reduction in dividends.  Following 
model is used to estimate the relationship between ownership dispersion and dividend 
payouts.  
  
DIVit=α+β1(ODIS)it+ Cꞌitγt +εit --------------------------- (5.1f)  
Where:  
ODIS= Ownership Dispersion  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.1 a.  
  
As Lintner (1956) suggested that managers do not increase dividends with the increase in earnings 
until and unless they believe the current increase in earnings to be persistent in future. This suggests 
that managers try to smooth dividends and current dividends are determined keeping in view the 
historic dividends. Dividend policy is influenced by the dividend payment of previous years as 
managers of a firm are reluctant to change the current dividend from past years dividend payment, 
unless they are unable to maintain it.  
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(Kumar, 2006). Base on Lintner’s argument, this study hypothesized a positive impact of last 
year dividends on current dividend.  
DIVit=α+β1(DIV)i( t-1)+ Cꞌitγt +εit ----------------------- (5.1g)  
Where:  
DIV t-1= Last year dividend  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.1 a.  
In order to estimate the country level fixed effect, present study adopted Least Square 
Dummy (LSD) method to capture the country level fixed effect. Following equation is 
used for estimation of fixed effect regression with least square dummy method.  
DIVit=α+β1(X)it+λ2(DUMBNG)it+λ3(DUMPAK)it+λ4(DUMSRI)it+γ5(DUMBNG*X)it+γ6(DUMP 
AK*X)it+ γ7(DUMSRI*X)it+ Cꞌitγt +εit ------------------------------------------------------- (5.1h)  
Where:  
X= Respective independent variable for ownership/cash flow/growth/dispersion.  
DUMBNG= 1 if particular firm-year observation belongs to Bangladesh and 0 otherwise  
DUMPAK= 1 if particular firm-year observation belongs to Pakistan and 0 otherwise DUMSRI= 1 if 
particular firm-year observation belongs to Sri Lanka and 0 otherwise Second part of analysis is 
based on investigating the moderating effect of country specific factors on dividend policy 
determinants. This study has identified seven country specific factors i.e. legal rights protection, 
investors’ right protection, economic development, corporate disclosure, long term orientation, 
uncertainty avoidance and access to credit information as moderators. It is suggested that country 
specific factors besides impacting dividend behavior of the firm also moderates the relationship 
between firms specific determinants and dividend policy. For instance, Ronny (2002) explained that 
without taking politics into consideration it is not possible to get the full story on corporate 
governance systems and its impact of corporate policies. A country’s position on the ideological 
spectrum helps to dictate how companies are governed and how their policies are designed (see Roe, 
2001, Roe, 2003; Gourevitch & Shinn, 2005). Left-wing governments depress dividends (Leftwing 
countries, favor employees over investors) whereas right-wing governments put in place policies 
that encourage higher dividend payments (Roe, 2003). In first moderated multiple regression 
equation 5.2a, the managerial ownership is assumed to have positive relationship with dividend 
payout (explained in equation 5.1a), however, theory on legal right protection also supports its effect 
on dividend payouts. In this study the legal right represents rights of both employees and creditors, 
due to the fact that both are prone to information asymmetry and consequently agency problem 
between managers, creditors and employees therefore, if their rights are not strongly protected they 
will react in the same manner.   
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One of the most common action taken by both creditors and employees in an unsecured 
environment (where creditors feel that managers are using cash for their own benefits) 
they demand management to reduce dividend payouts so that financial position of the 
company gets stronger as a result of which it will be able to safeguard the interest of 
employees and creditors. In addition to the above reasons, employees can also protect 
themselves by means of organizing unions, negotiating managers for better terms, or 
striking with in the firm. Employees can seek regulations, complain to the media, or file 
lawsuits to pursue protection from outside the firm. The said measures provide security 
and protection to  employees directly. However, the implementation of those procedures 
differs country by country, and constrained by a country’s political and legal systems. 
(Botero et al., 2004).   
To reduce the agency costs of debt, creditors require and managers agree to pay lower dividends to 
substitute for weak creditor rights, consistent with the “substitute model” (Brockman & Unlu, 
2008). If this statement is true then higher the protection given to creditors by law of a country, 
greater will be the tendency of managers to reduce dividends distributed to shareholders. In short, in 
weak creditors’ protection regime, creditors will either enforce management to reduce dividends or, 
if country law provides employees and creditors with sufficient rights then employees and creditors 
would not enforce management to reduce dividend payouts. In other words, if legal rights of both 
employees and creditors are protected then this will support management’s decision to pay 
dividends as result of which management tendency to pay dividend will be increased. This is what, 
the present study calls as moderating effect of legal rights protection on relationship between 
managerial ownership and dividend payout. Legal Right Protection (LGL) also moderates the 
relationship between institutional ownership and dividend policy. To estimate the effect of legal 
right protection on payout and also as moderator two models have been estimated.  
  
  
DIVit=α+β1 (MNG)it+λ2(LGL)it+γ3(MNG*LGL)it+ Cꞌitγt +εit -------------------------- (5.2a)  
DIVit=α+β1 (INST)it+λ2(LGL)it+γ3(INST*LGL)it + Cꞌitγt +εit -------------------------- (5.2b)  
Where:  
DIV = Dividend Policy  
MNG = Managerial Ownership  
INST = Institutional Ownership  
LGL= legal right protection level in which firm i operates at time t.  
Cꞌ=Vector of Control – [SZ, LVG]  
Besides legal rights protection pertaining to employees and creditors, it is also 
noteworthy that management decision to pay dividend is influenced by level of 
shareholder/investor right protection. One of the primary determinants of dividend policy 
according to some prior studies is the level of investor’s protection in the country (La 
Porta et al. 2000). Investors in a strong protection regime are better able to use and 
exercise their power to make manager to use funds in investor’s best interest. However, 
in countries with poor investor protection, the excess cash is easily used by managers or 
controlling shareholders for the projects of their private benefits (La Porta et al., 2000a) 
at the expense of lower dividend payments. It is argued that investors get cash, only 
69  
  
because they have power, which could be the power to replace directors, to force 
management to increase dividend payments, to stop a project or a scheme that benefits 
the insiders at the expense of outside investors, to bring directors in the court of law and 
get damages, or to liquidate the firm and receive the proceeds (Hart, 1995). There is 
empirical confirmation that strong shareholders actively track specific payout outcomes 
(Allen et al., 2000), and to some extent make dividends superfluous as a managerial 
monitoring device (La Porta et al., 2000; Goergen et al., 2005) therefore firms operating 
in countries with greater investor protection tend to pay higher dividends.  
Intuitively, if investor rights are duly protected, it is normally assumed that it substitutes 
dividend payout of the company because investor feel secure and do not feel agency 
conflict between managers and themselves hence do not demand high dividend. This 
argument is in line with Brockman & Unlu (2009) dividend “substitute model”. 
However, La Porta et al. (2000) analyzed the relation among the agency costs of equity, 
minority shareholder protection, and dividend policy. They found support for the 
‘outcome model’ of dividends. According to “outcome model”, dividend is an outcome 
of an effective legal protection system of shareholders. This model suggests that reason 
of dividend payments is minority shareholders pressure on corporate insiders to use cash. 
As a result, minority shareholder rights establish the country-level balance of power in 
the relationship between insiders and outside shareholders by empowering minority 
shareholders to extract more dividends out of reluctant firm insiders. Therefore, present 
study argues that with the increase in investors’ protection laws the demand for cash 
dividend will increase and management will pay more dividends. Similar to the impact of 
legal right protection, present study also estimates the moderating role of investors’ 
protection on institutional ownership and dividend smoothing. Regarding dividend 
smoothing it is believed that if investors rights are protect, company will try to maintain 
the track of dividends smooth, so that investor may not get negative signal from frequent 
changes in payout ratio. To estimate the above mentioned impact of investors’ rights, 
three equations are as under:  
DIVit=α+β1(MNG)it+λ2(INVST)it+γ3(MNG*INVST)it + Cꞌitγt +εit ------------------- (5.2c)  
DIVit=α+β1(INST)it+λ2(INVST)it+γ3(INST*INVST)it + Cꞌitγt +εit ------------------- (5.2d)  
DIVit=α+β1(LAG)it+λ2(INVST)it+γ3(LAG*INVST)it + Cꞌitγt +εit ------------------- (5.2e)  
Where:  
INVST= Investor Right Protection  
LAG= Last Year Dividend  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.2 a.  
  
Culture plays a vital role in modeling the behavior of corporate managers and investors. 
It is therefore, important to consider the cultural attributes of society in which managers 
are taking corporate decisions. According to Hofstede (1980) long term orientation 
(LTO) means “fostering of virtues oriented toward future rewards–in particular, 
perseverance and thrift”. On the other hand, short-term orientation represents promotion 
of virtues related to the previous and current particular, respect for tradition, preservation 
of face, and fulfilling social obligations”. Interesting to note here that, the cultural aspect 
has been investigated in many different ways in finance literature. For instance, Grinblatt 
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and Keloharju (2001) argued that investors like or prefer to invest in the shares of 
companies whose management belongs to same cultural background as they are. 
Grinblatt & Keloharju (2001) explained that culture is nothing more than a gesture that 
firms use to communication to shareholders the true meaning of terms used by chief 
executives. On the other hand, Stulz & Williamson (2003) used religion and language as 
measures for culture. They showed that these proxies are helpful in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in creditor rights and how investor rights are enforced across 
countries. Furthermore, Chui et al. (2002) used six dimensions of culture, as proposed by 
Schwartz’s (1994) to investigate the effect of culture on capital structures of companies. 
It is evident form the above discussion that cultural factors remained under discussion as 
important factors which shape the behavior of financial managers and therefore, 
considered as worthy of investigation during last decade’s financial research. A brief 
study of the recent literature of finance showed that majority of the existing studies have 
employed the cultural aspect in explaining different corporate attributes and actions, but 
limited number of researchers have considered the impact of culture on corporate 
payouts. Khambata & Liu (2005) and Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) are the only published 
studies on effect of country’s culture on dividend policy of the firm. The former showed 
that firms in countries with higher risk aversion exhibit lower dividend ratios and lower 
tendency to pay dividends while the latter argued that high individualism, low power 
distance, and low uncertainty avoidance are significantly associated with higher dividend 
payouts. In the light of the existing studies, present study considers long term orientation 
and uncertainty avoidance as determinants of dividend policy.   
It is hypothesized that if a country’s LTO is high, management would like to hold high 
cash and pay lower payout to evade a financial difficulty, as Khambata & Liu (2005) 
pointed out, but investors would prefer the opposite as the bird-in-the-hand theory and 
the catering theory suggest. Nonetheless, if the ownership of the company is concentrated 
in the hands of management/family and investors are not duly protected then 
management would prefer to save cash by reducing dividends. On the other hand, if 
investors are strongly protected and dividend outcome model prevails, then management 
would have to pay dividends to satisfy investors and restraining them from approaching 
corporate law authority of remedial actions. In order to evaluate, how long term 
orientation affects managers and institutions’ dividend decisions, following regression 
models are estimated.  
  
DIVit=α + β1 (MNG)it+λ2(LTO)it+γ3(MNG*LTO)it+ Cꞌitγt +εit ----------------------- (5.2f)  
DIVit=α + β1 (INST)it+λ2(LTO)it+γ3(INVST*LTO)it + Cꞌitγt +εit ----------------------- (5.2g)  
Where:  
LTO= Long Term Orientation  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.2 a.  
Moreover, economic growth of the country cannot be ignored, while considering country 
level determinants of dividend policy. It is argued that agency conflict over the use of 
excess free cash flow may be less severe during economic recession, when firms have 
much less free cash flow to abuse or expropriate the rights of minor shareholders. The 
recession itself increases the risk of bankruptcy and makes it less likely for the firm to 
overinvest its free cash flow (Ho, 2002) therefore, in economic recession the dividend as 
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a tool to reduce agency conflict would have a lesser role to play. On the other side, 
during economic boom, firms are available with free cash flows and are not considered 
as financially constrained therefore, the GDP growth increases the firms’ ability to pay 
high dividends during economic prosperity rather than economic recession. If GDP is 
increasing the positive relationship of OCF with dividend payout would be strengthens 
and negative impact of CFS and growth opportunities would be moderated. Based on the 
above arguments following models are estimated by the study:  
DIVit=α+β1(OCF)it+λ2(GDP)it+γ3(OCF*GDP)it + Cꞌitγt +εit ----------------------- (5.2h)  
DIVit=α+β1(CFS)it+λ2(GDP)it+γ3(CFS*GDP)it + Cꞌitγt +εit ------------------------- (5.2i)  
DIVit=α+β1(GRTH)it+λ2(GDP)it+γ3(GRTH*GDP)it + Cꞌitγt + εit------------------- (5.2j)  
Where:  
GDP= Growth in Gross Domestic Product  
OCF=Operating Cash Flows  
CFS= Sensitivity of Cash Flows GRTH= 
Growth Opportunities.  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.2 a.  
  
Similar to the impact of long term orientation the impact of uncertainty avoidance in 
culture on dividend policy is also investigated. The study of Hofstede (1980) referred to 
uncertainty avoidance as the extent that people of a culture feel threatened by uncertain 
or unknown situations and the extent that people try to minimize such uncertainty. 
Psychology studies showed that investors from high uncertainty-avoiding regions are less 
likely to be risk tolerant. If a country’s uncertainty avoidance is high, managers would 
like to carry large amount of cash and pay lesser payouts to avoid a financial difficulty 
(Bae et al. 2010). Uncertainty avoidance in culture moderates the relationship between 
cash flow from operation, sensitivity of cash and dividend policy.  
  
DIVit=α+β1(OCF)it+λ2(UNCER)it+γ3(OCF*UNCER)it + Cꞌitγt +εit ---------------- (5.2k)  
DIVit=α+β1(CFS)it+λ2(UNCER)it+γ3(CFS*UNCER)it + Cꞌitγt +εit ---------------- (5.2l) Where:  
UNCER= Uncertainty Avoidance  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.2 a.  
  
Access to credit and credit information is a critical factor in bank centered economies of 
South Asia. As payment of cash dividend is related with availability of funds, that is why 
is firm does not have easy access to credit, it would be reluctant to pay high dividend. 
This could be a strategy by firm to build up more reserves for future needs. It is argued 
that firms are unlikely to stop dividend payments completely, as long as the option of 
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accessing capital markets remains available (Bulow & Rogoff, 1989). It is therefore 
intuitive to hypothesize that availability of easy credit, reduces firms’ sensitivity of cash 
flow and its negative impact on dividend payouts. Similarly, if credit is easily available 
firm would not feel need to reduce dividend during the phase of high growth. Base on 
this, present study has developed two regression model to estimate the impact of credit 
access on dividend decision as affected by cash flow sensitivity, and growth 
opportunities of the firm.  
  
DIVit=α+β1(CFS)it+λ2(CRDIT)it+γ3(CFS*CRDIT)it + Cꞌitγt +εit ------------------- (5.2m)  
DIVt=α+β1(GRTH)it+λ2(CRDIT)it+γ3(GRTH*CRDIT)it + Cꞌitγt +εit -------------- (5.2n)  
Where:  
CRDIT= Access to credit  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.2 a.  
The two dominant dividend theories, signaling theory and agency costs, suggest market 
frictions, information asymmetry and agency problems, as the major determinants of 
dividend regularities in the real world. In the words of Healy & Palepu, (1988) “What 
can managers do to ease frictions in the capital market? Firms can voluntarily disclose 
information to market participants. In annual and quarterly reports, managers may choose 
to disclose far beyond the contents required by SEC and FASB. Voluntary disclosure 
helps alleviate information asymmetry by providing shareholders with better knowledge 
about firms’ operation, ownership structure and governance system etc. Such knowledge 
facilitates equity evaluation by allowing investors to create more precise forecast of 
future cash flows and firms’ risk profile. Consequently, high disclosure firms should face 
lower information asymmetry and be less likely undervalued. Voluntary disclosure 
quality should be negatively associated with dividend payment level, either because 
communication reduces information asymmetry and makes dividend signaling less 
necessary, or because communication alleviates free cash flow problems and hence 
reduces the need for discipline of dividends. However, if better disclosure improves 
monitoring and reduces the expected agency costs, shareholders of high disclosure firms 
should be more willing to accept dividend cuts”.  
  
DIVit=α+β1(ODIS)it+λ2(CRPDIS)it+γ3(ODIS*CRPDIS)it + Cꞌitγt +εit -------------- (5.2o)  
Where:  
ODIS= Ownership Dispersion  
CRPDIS= Corporate Disclosure  
Rest of the variables have been explained in equation 5.2 a.  
  
5.3 Variables of the Study  
The variables used in above mentioned regression equations are hereby explained in 
detail with reference to the existing literature. This section is divided in two parts; first 
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part will explain firm level variables and second part will discuss the measurement of 
country level variables used in the study:  
5.3.1 Firm Level Variables:  
The very first proxy of dividend policy, which is the dependent variable of the study, is 
dividend payout of the company in a given year. Many researchers used this proxy of 
dividend payouts (See for example Gugler, 2003; Reddy & Rath, 2005; Papadopoulos 
and Dmitrios, 2007; Al-Malkawi, 2007; Ahmed &Attiya, 2009 etc.). The present study 
has calculated dividend payout by dividing end of the year cash dividend to net profit 
after tax. Dividend Intensity: The study has also used dividend intensity as alternate way 
to capture corporate dividend policy. In the light of study of Kumar (2006) the present 
study has calculated dividend intensity by dividing total cash dividend paid by company 
to book value of assets of that company, Fama & French (2002), and Aivazian et al. 
(2003) have used dividend intensity as a proxy of dividend policy.   
Managerial Ownership: Ownership structure represents the proportion of share held by 
investors of different categories. The present study considered two categories of 
shareholders i.e. managers and institutions. In the light of several studies like Rozeff, 
(1982), Jensen et al., (1992), Holder et al., (1998) Afza & Mirza (2010) and many others, 
the present study has measured the extent of managerial ownership  by considering the  
proportion of shares held by the board of directors (BOD) and executive officers. 
Managerial ownership is calculated by taking the proportion of shares held by directors 
and executive officer. Similarly, Institutional ownership is calculated by considering the 
proportion of shares held by institutions.  
Cash Flow: The liquidity aspect of the company is captured by considering the level of cash flow 
from operating activities and a strong positive relationship of operating cash flow and dividend 
payments is expected. Based on existing literature the study expects a positive relationship between 
operating cash flow dividend payouts. Cash flow ratio is calculated by dividing total cash flow from 
operating activities to book value of total assets. Sensitivity of Cash: Another important factor 
which affects the payout of the company is cash flow sensitivity of the company. Present study has 
captured the firm’s level of cash flow sensitivity, in the light of study conducted by Khurana et al. 
(2006) where they have applied annual change in cash holdings divided by total assets as a proxy of 
cash sensitivity of firm. Based on the argument that firms which are facing difficulty in raising 
finance from capital markets, try to accumulate more cash to invest in future investment 
opportunities, the cash flow sensitivity is perceivable to have negative relationship with  
Firm’s potential to pay dividend. The sensitivity of cash is calculated by dividing change 
in net cash flow to total assets. Growth opportunities (GRTH) are captured by market to 
book ratio as suggested by (Al-Malkawi, 2007). Growth opportunities are expected to 
have negative relationship with dividend payout.  
Ownership Dispersion: Rozef (1982) argues that if the number of shareholders is large, 
this shows that ownership of the corporation is highly dispersed. In such dispersed 
ownership structure there is very less chance that majority shares are held by insiders, 
which ultimately means less agency cost and less need of payment of dividends. A 
widely used measure of ownership dispersion number of shareholder after taking natural 
log (see for example; Rozeff, 1982, Dempsey & Laber, 1992, Schooley & Barney, 1994, 
and Deshmukh, 2003).  Present study has also used the same measure of ownership 
dispersion. Dividend Smoothing: Stability in the dividend payout is an important feature 
enforcing the management to sustain the previous level of payouts. The meaning of 
stability in the present study is the way of maintaining the level of dividend payments in 
relation to an upward increasing tendency (Mirza, 2010). According to Kumar (2006) the 
current payouts of the company are affected by the dividend payment of last year(s) 
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because management is reluctant to change the current dividend payout level, unless they 
are sure that they would be able to maintain that level of earnings. Smoothing effect is 
captured by considering last year dividend as determinant of current year dividend.  
Control Variables: At the firm level analysis three control variables have been suggested 
by several researchers to be used in the model i.e. size, profitability and leverage (see for 
example; Titman & Wessels 1988; Rajan & Zingales 1995; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003; 
Kumar ,2006 etc.)  It is argued that large size companies have trouble-free access to debt 
market and can borrow on easy terms and conditions, however due to limited resources 
the agency problem between creditors and shareholders is more severe in smaller firms 
than larger ones. (Ferri & Jones 1979; Titman & Wessels 1988; Rajan & Zingales 1995). 
Size is calculated by taking natural log of total assets of company. In order to measure 
capital structure of the firm the ratio of liabilities to asset is used as a proxy of Leverage. 
It is argued that leverage affects firms potential to pay dividend negatively because, when 
firm receives debt financing it actually commits itself to a fixed charge of interest, and 
return of principal value, failing to which can lead firm in to bankruptcy. Therefore, firms 
with high debt ratio are reluctant to commit their funds to pay high dividend 
continuously. (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003; Aivazian et al., 2004).  Profitability is 
expected to have a positive relationship with dividend as it represents firm’s primary 
source of fund generation, firms suffering from losses are less likely to pay dividend. 
Present study has considered firm’s earning per share (EPS) as a proxy of firm’s 
profitability.  
5.3.2. Country Level Variables  
Seven country specific factors are used as country level factors affecting dividend payout 
policy. Given below is the detailed discussion on methodology adopted to collect the data 
and measurement of indices.  
Legal Right Protection: By legal right, the present study means the rights of employees 
and creditors, because both are directly or indirectly affected by dividend decisions. If 
creditors and employees feel unprotected by law they may demand reduction in 
dividends. In order to measure the level of legal right protection level this study has 
adopted a creditor right index by Djankov et al. (2007), employees right index by Botero 
et al. (2003) and legal right protection index by World Bank.   
Investor Right Protection: The strength of investor protection index is the weighted 
average of two types of indices calculated in two different studies. First, based on the 
study of Djankove et al. (2008) the average of the extent of disclosure index; the extent 
of director liability index and the ease of shareholder suits index are calculated. The data 
is collected from World Bank data base. Second, following La Porta et al. (1998) the 
average of Antidirectors right index, proxy by mail, Shareholders not blocked before 
meeting, cumulative voting, oppressed minority and preemptive right to new issue.   
Corporate Disclosure Index: Disclosure index measures the extent to which investors are 
protected through disclosure of ownership and financial information. The index ranges 
from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more disclosure. The data is collected from 
World Bank database.  
Long Term Orientation: Values associated with long term orientation represent thrift and 
perseverance; values associated with short term orientation represent respect for tradition, 
fulfilling social obligations, and protecting one's 'face'. A short-term view of results 
occurs when one knows what result one wants, therefore one plans only for short run. 
The data of long term orientation is taken from Geert-Hofstede data base.   
Uncertainty Avoidance: Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of 
such situations by strict laws and rules, safety and security measures, and on the 
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philosophical and religious level. Uncertainty avoidance represents risk aversion level of 
any society. The data of long term orientation is taken from Geert-Hofstede data base.  
Access to Credit: In order to measure country level access to credit information the depth 
of credit information index, developed by World Bank is used. According to World Bank 
“Credit depth of information index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and 
quality of credit information available through public or private credit registries. The 
index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit 
information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending 
decisions”.   
Economic Development: To measure the economic growth level of countries growth in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used. The data of GDP growth is taken from World 
Bank database. According to World Bank “GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
Table 5.2 presents symbols and description of all variables of study”.  
  
Table 5.2: Variables of Study  
Symbol  Proxy Variable  Proxy variable  
Dependent Variable (Dividend Policy)  
DPO  Dividend Payout  Dividend  per share / Net Earnings per share  
DINT  Dividend Intensity  Total Dividend Paid/ Total Assets  
Firm Level  
MNG  
Determinants  
Managerial Ownership  
Proportion of shares held by Directors and Executives  
INST  Institutional Ownership  Proportion of shares held by Institutions  
OCF  Operating Cash Flow  Operating Cash Flow / Total Assets  
CFS  Cash Flow Sensitivity  ∆ Cash Balance / Total Assets  
GRTH  Growth Opportunities  Market Price per share / Book Value per Share  
ODIS  Ownership Dispersion  Natural log of number of  share holders  
SZ  Size  Log of Assets  
LVG  Leverage  Total Liabilities / Total Assets  
PRFT  Profitability  Earnings Per Share  
Country Le 
LGL  
vel Factors  
Legal Right Protection  
As measured by Djankove (2008) and La Porta et al. (1998)  
INVST  Investor Right Protection  As measured by La porta et al. (2000)   
CRPDIS  Corporate Disclosure  As defined by World Bank   
LTO  Long Term Orientation  As defined by Hofested   
UNCRT  Uncertainty Avoidance  As measured by Hofested   
CRDIT  Credit Access  As defined by World Bank  
GDP  Economic Development  GDP growth rate  
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5.4. Estimation Techniques  
5.4.1. Ordinary Least Square Regression  
Among the widely used method of analyzing dependence of payout policy variables on 
variuos firms and country specific factors is the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression 
Several researcher  (see for example; Ayub, 2005; Kumar, 2006; Al-Malkawi, 2007; Anil 
and Sujjata, 2008; Ahmed and Attiya, 2009 etc.) have used OLS as the primary technique 
of analysis of determinants of dividend policy. Based on exisiting literature the present 
study also used ordinary least square regression as the basic estimation tool for 
measuring the impact of firm specific factors on payout policy in South Asia.  Given 
below is the basic regression equation  
  
 
  
Where Yi represents dependent variable which proxied dividend policy in present study, 
β0 is the intercept, β1 is the coefficient of Xi which represent a particular  firm, industry 
or country specific factors and ε is the residual.  
5.4.2. Tobit Regression  
Although, least square regression is the most important but primary level technique of analysing 
dependence of a variable on any one or several different variables but it also has several limitations. 
In the context of present study, the nature of dependent variable is not very much similar to most of 
other variables.  It is the case where actual or calculated value of the variable is ignored and 
replaced with an exteme value initially set for that variable. In such situation least square give a 
bised result and cannot interpret the true relationship among variables. To control this biasness 
James Tobin (1958) introduced censored regression model, which latter came to know as Tobit 
regression model. According to AlMalkawi (2007) the nature of dividend payout variable is critical 
as it can have a negative value, which is the case where firm is in loss, but technically the negative 
dividend payout ratio does not have any economic interpretation. The firm can only pay a dividend 
or does not pay a dividend at all but a firm cannot pay a negative dividend. According to Afza and 
Mirza (2010) tobit regression is a unique case of censored regression model where the latent 
variable  cannot always be the observed value, while independent variable is always an observed 
value. The latent variable linearly depends on Xi  just like in least square model. The observable 
variable yi is defined to be equal to the latent variable whenever the latent variable is above zero 
and zero otherwise11. The dependent variable that present study has used is dividend payout, whose 
value is censored form bottom, which simply means the actual value of dividend payout is set to 
zero whenever its actual value is below zero. The Tobit specification is presented below:  
  
As earlier discussed that censoring observation creates biasness in the estimated results 
but if one ignores or excludes such observation this would be simply wasting valuable 
data. Therefore, the solution to this problem lies in Tobit model with maximum 
likelihood estimation technique which is an alternative to least square. The likelihood or 
commonly maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is based on the assumption that each 
observation is independent of other observations and hence uses the probability of 
                                                 
11 (“Although the dependent variable can be censored either from below or above or from both below and 
above but the most commont sencoring technique  in the studies related with dividend policy is to fillter the 
dependent variable from below i.e censoring negative payouts”)  
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obtaining each observation. The probability expression of each non limit observation is 
just equal to the height of appropriate density function which shows the probability of 
getting that particular observation. In other word the method of likelihood function is 
closer to the idea of probability, but it is important to consider the difference between 
both. In probability functions the probability of getting an outcome is calculated, where 
the value of P is known but outcome is not known. For example, in coin tossing where 
the probability of head or tail is known, which is equal to 0.50 but one does not know the 
actual outcome. On the other hand likelihood function is used to estimate what P will be, 
after the experiment is performed which means that one knows the actual outcome but 
one does not know its probability. The present study has implied the complex 
econometric technique of Tobit Regression statistical software i.e STATA12 and 
EasyReg. International (Easy Regression International)13.  
  
5.4.3. Binary Logistic Regression  
In order to analyze the firms’ decision to pay or not to pay dividend the present study has used 
binary logistic regression which is commonly known as Logit model estimation or simply 
Logit. The main purpose of using Logit specification is to identify the factors which affect 
firm’s decision to pay or not to pay dividends. Logit model is based on the prediction of the 
probability of occurrence and nonoccurrence of an event by fitting the date in a logistic curve. 
It is a sort of generalized linear model which uses several predictor variables that are either 
numerical or categorical. A positive regression coefficient ( or coefficient value greater than 1) 
means that the probability of a numeric outcome is very high, while a negative coefficient 
(coefficient value less than 1) means that the risk factor strongly influences the probability of 
that outcome.   
When the dependent variable has binary structure, the more suitable technique is Logit regression. 
For Logit regression, the dependent variable is a function of the probability that a particular subject 
will be in one of the categories. In order to estimate Logit model following linear regression 
equation is employed:  
 Y* 0 1xi1 2xi2 ... k xik 
The logistic specification of dependent variable (for example DPO) is:  
  
  
Where Y, shows the value of DPO, equals to 1 if the company pays dividend and 0 if 
company does not pay dividend. Y is the binary dependent variable in this case the 
probability the company will pay dividend i.e. P(Y=1) is given as under:  
P(Y 1) P(Y* 0) P(Xi 0) P( Xi ) P( Xi )  
Simply,Y=1 if random part is less than or equal to the symmetric part. If one assumes error 
follows a standard logistic distribution then:  
P
 
(Y 1) [e( 0 1xi1 2xi2 ... kxik) /1 e( 0 1xi1 2xi2 ... kxik)] 
                                                 
12 STATA Version 12  
13 Easy Regression International Software Package is designed by Herman J. B of Pennsylvania State  
University, Version Released in October 1, 2009. (Visit for more details http://econ.la.psu.edu/~hbierens/)  
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Similarly the probability that the firm will not pay dividend 1-P(Y=1) will be;  
P (Y 0) 1 (Y* 0) 1 [e( 0 1xi1 2xi2 ... kxik) /1 e( 0 1xi1 2xi2 ... kxik)] 
 
  
1/1 e( 0 1xi1 2xi2 ... kxik) 
The odds ratio i.e.  ,                        1 PP(Y(Y 1)1)  which states the ratio of the probability of 
payment of  
 
dividend  to the probability of nonpayment of dividend by the company would be equal to:  
  
 1 PP(Y(Y 1)1) e( 0 1xi1 2xi2 ... kxik ) /1 e( 0 1xi1 2xi2 ... kxik )  
 Now by taking the Lo g of odds ratio;1/1  e( 0 1xi1 2
xi2 ... kxik ) e( 0 1xi1 2xi2 ... kxik ) 
log 1 PP(Y(Y 1)1) 0 1xi1 
2xi2 ... k xik  
The left hand side in the above equation is known as Logit model14 and expression in the 
parenthesis is the odds ratio. Just like the tobit regression, Logit also uses MLE technique 
to calculate parameters of the regression model. The Logit is estimated with the help of 
statistical package i.e. SPSS15.  Another important technique of analyzing decision to pay 
or not to pay dividend is implication of Probit regression which is not used in the current 
study and hence not discussed here. Using the statistical techniques and models discussed 
above, the present study has estimated the relationship between firm level factors and 
corporate dividend payouts. For this purpose the data from each of selected South Asian 
countries is analyzed separately. Then to analyze the impact of country level factors on 
relationship between firm specific variables and dividend policy, a moderated multiple 
regression in employed on the combined data of selected South Asian countries. Due to 
nature of econometric techniques used in the study, a special consideration is given to the 
nature of sample and data with respect to normality, homoscedasticity and nonexistence 
of serial correlation. The statistical results from the above mentioned models are 
discussed in the next chapter.  
5.4.4. Endogeneity Control and Instrumental Variable Methodology  
Endogeneity is one of the major issues faced by social scientists while performing 
econometric analysis in management. Social sciences are about understanding the 
behavior of people. In such studies it is impossible to establish a laboratory controlled 
environment like in natural sciences.  Consequently, much of the work done in social 
sciences is biased as it is suffered from endogeneity. The possible effect of endogeneity 
is bias in estimation as a result researcher may commit of Type-I or Type-II error. One of 
the major causes of endogeneity is self-selection bias or simultaneity. It occurs when the 
                                                 
14 The econometric methodology involved in LOGIT Model Approach, its assumptions and justification is 
beyond the scope of this study. For more details please refer to “Introduction to Econometrics by James H. 
S. and Mark W. Watson” and “A guide to Econometrics by Peter Kennedy, 6th Edition, Blackwell 
Publishing”  
15 SPSS version 20 is used for analysis.  
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outcome of any explanatory variable is self-selected, not random. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the factors behind self-selection before analyzing the effect of 
that choice on dependent variable. Second important source of endogeneity is omitted 
variable or may be due to measurement error. The solution of these problems requires 
finding an instrumental variable, and performing what one calls an Instrumental Variable 
(IV) Regression, a Two Stage Least Squares Regression (2SLS), or a Generalized 
Method of Moments regression (GMM) as appropriate. Explanation of equations, 
assumptions and algorithms involved in above mentioned estimation techniques is 
beyond the scope of this study and can be studied from any standard text of 
econometrics16.  
Present study has used ownership structure as one of the important firm level factor 
which determines dividend policy. Several researchers have considered ownership 
structure as endogenous variable.  (See for example: Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Loderer and 
Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Bohren and Odegaard, 2001; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; 
Desai and Jin, 2011; Bena and Hanousek, 2005). However, few other studies 
contradicted with the findings of above mentioned researchers and argued that 
endogeneity does not exist in the relationship between ownership structure and dividend 
policy (see for example: Short et al., 2002; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Thanatawee, 
2013). Before assuming ownership structure to be exogenous or endogenous, the present 
study has performed Durbin-WuHausman (DWH)17 augmented regression test of 
endogeneity. DWH is a two-step regression to test the moment assumption of regression 
model. Before estimating the simultaneous equations, it is important to analyze the need 
of instrument. This is actually to test that whether OLS estimates are consistent or not.  
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝜀---------------------- (1)  
Let the X1 be endogenous variable, then  
  
𝑋1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑍1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝜀---------------------- (2)  
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest in augmented regression test, the residual of each 
endogenous right-hand side variable is included, as a function of all exogenous variables, in a 
regression of the original model. Therefore, equation 2 will be estimated first and residual will be 
considered as exogenous variable is equation 1.  
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑍_𝑅𝑒𝑠3 + 𝜀---------------------- (3)  
If B3 is significantly different from zero, then OLS is not consistent and estimation needs 
to consider instrumental variables using either Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) or 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). The present study has used both estimation 
techniques to resolve the problems of endogeneity, if suspected, in research models. To 
understand the need to apply advanced statistical techniques, it is important to understand 
moment assumptions of OLS i.e.   
    
                                                 
16 Wooldridge (2002), Chapters 5; 6; 8 and 14  
17 The test was first proposed by Durbin (1954) and separately by Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978).  
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Where S is endogenous and C is vector of controls. The endogeneity of S implies that   
  
The solution to this problem is to introduce Z i.e.  
  
A more general approach to address the problem due to violation of moment conditions is 
to apply GMM. According to Wooldridge (2000)   
“[….] Rather than satisfy one moment condition and violate another, the 
GMM strategy chooses an estimator that balances each population 
moment condition against the others, seeking residuals that trade off 
violations of one moment restriction against violations of the other 
moment restrictions. A GMM estimator may satisfy no one moment 
condition, but it may come close to satisfying them all”.  
Another approach is used while applying IV regression is TSLS which is a two-step 
application of IV methodology. In first step the suspected variable is estimated using 
exogenous determinants and in second step the estimated values are used to instrument 
the suspected endogenous explanatory variable. TSLS is a special case of GMM. The 
estimated results in the light of existing literature are discussed in following chapter.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Chapter 6  
Statistical Analysis: Firm Level Factors  
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In the light of existing literature on corporate payout policy this study used standard 
analytical tools and techniques to investigate the role played by firm and country level 
factors in determining dividend payouts in listed companies of South Asia. This chapter 
starts from descriptive analysis of variables of the study, which is important to 
understand the nature and underlying dimensions of the data collected for analysis. The 
empirical results by applying econometric techniques of correlation and regression are 
presented in following sections. The estimation techniques including OLS, Tobit, Logit, 
TSLS and GMM are used for analysis and results are discussed in light of existing 
literature.  
6.1. Descriptive Analysis.  
This section presents descriptive statistics of data from sample companies of Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka from 2006 to 2010.  The data of firm level factors was 
collected from companies’ annual reports.  To capture the payout policy, two proxy 
variables are used i.e. dividend payout (DPO) and dividend intensity (DINT).  There are 
certain limitations of using DPO as proxies as dividend policy for example, it is subject 
to the manipulation of earnings by management and can also assume negative value 
which does not have an appropriate economic interpretation. Therefore, an alternate 
proxy of payout policy i.e. dividend intensity (DINT) is used in the analysis.  
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive analysis of firms level variables used for estimation of the 
determinants of dividend payout policy. The Table is divided in 4 parts i.e. upper right (for India), 
upper left (for Bangladesh), lower right (for Sri Lanka) and lower left part (for Pakistan). In the 
extreme left column all the firm level variables are recorded. In Bangladesh the average DPO is 
22% of earnings in sample companies which is closer to the average payout reported by Farooque et 
al. (2007) in their study on dividends payouts in 660 Bangladeshi companies. Maximum payout 
equals to 105% which seems quite high for the sample.  According to study conducted by Hamid 
(2003) Bangladeshi Fuel and  
Power sector has the highest dividend of 133%. This is the situation where companies’ 
earnings per share are very low as compared to its dividend payment. Many of the 
companies having excessively high dividends were trimmed from the data, for instance 
Meghna Cement Company had a DPO equal 112.108% of earnings. After trimming such 
extreme value are excluded and very few companies left in the sample having payout 
more than the profit.  
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics  
  Bangladesh (Firm-year observations = 221)
18  India (Firm-year observations = 650)  
 Mean  Median  Max  Min  St.Dev  Mean  Median  Max  Min  St.Dev  
DPO  0.220  0.058  1.057  0.000  0.286  0.211  0.165  1.665  0.000  0.222  
DINT  0.128  0.162  0.245  0.000  0.087  0.022  0.010  0.289  0.000  0.038  
MNG  0.218  0.005  0.910  0.000  0.290  0.515  0.493  0.849  0.000  0.139  
INST  0.102  0.088  0.341  0.000  0.083  0.136  0.092  0.478  0.000  0.121  
CFO  0.128  0.107  0.403  -0.144  0.107  0.100  0.081  0.356  -0.786  0.232  
CFS  0.015  0.005  0.683  -0.646  0.122  0.014  0.004  0.484  -0.389  0.104  
GRTH  14.306  3.353  206.370  0.362  31.655  3.176  1.189  303.571  -90.000  19.794  
ODIS  9.026  9.102  11.521  5.659  1.309  13.120  13.440  19.543  3.045  2.856  
SZ  21.876  21.829  24.868  18.756  1.459  15.722  15.848  19.326  10.916  1.681  
LVRG  0.468  0.447  0.965  0.057  0.211  0.481  0.505  0.980  0.010  0.284  
PRFT  43.24  88.79  15.28  6.98  122.35  -103.76  21.58  
                                                 
18 In case of Bangladesh, the descriptive results are subject of 1% trimming from both ends as a result 4 
extreme observations have been excluded in total. The mean (standard deviation) of DPO and GRTH were 
0.361 (1.099) and 68.27(223.45) before 1% trimming of data. The detail of trimming is discussed on page 
106 and110.  
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tions = 450)  
 Sri Lanka (Firm year observations = 175)  
 Mean  Median  Max  Min  St.Dev  Mean  Median  Max  Min  St.Dev  
DPO  0.224  0.048  2.520  0.000  0.340  0.272  0.195  1.342  0.000  0.331  
DINT  0.024  0.000  0.243  0.000  0.038  0.021  0.015  0.106  0.000  0.028  
MNG  0.280  0.190  0.930  0.000  0.273  0.038  0.000  0.420  0.000  0.101  
INST  0.183  0.146  0.864  0.000  0.181  0.456  0.690  0.951  0.000  0.384  
CFO  0.063  0.038  0.576  -0.651  0.181  0.051  0.057  0.278  -0.253  0.102  
CFS  0.005  0.000  0.410  -0.711  0.162  0.023  0.008  0.278  -0.193  0.089  
GRTH  3.168  0.963  786.207  -78.900  34.507  138.523  98.001  532.731  6.765  119.152  
ODIS  3.217  3.220  4.423  1.563  0.526  7.362  7.145  9.448  4.736  1.380  
SZ  13.550  13.543  14.971  12.304  0.572  20.938  20.881  23.749  17.006  1.691  
LVRG  0.586  0.625  0.994  0.031  0.192  0.403  0.404  0.975  0.039  0.234  
PRFT  9.46  4.50  203.50  -287.20  29.53  10.26  5.87  105  -129  24.75  
Dividend payout (DPO); dividend intensity (DINT); managerial ownership (MNG); institutional ownership 
(INST); cash flow from operations (CFO); cash flow sensitivity (CFS); market to book ratio (GRTH); 
ownership dispersion (ODIS); size of firm (SZ); leverage (LVRG); profitability (PRFT). In case of 
Bangladesh DPO and GRTH variable showed extreme outliers for which 1% trimming is performed (see 
foot note 16 & 18)  
The median dividend payout in Bangladesh is 5.8% which is quite moderate. As the 
sample contains firm year observations with zero dividend that is why minimum payout 
is zero. Maximum average dividend payout is observed in sample of Sri Lankan 
companies.  As discussed earlier DPO in case of negative earnings become negative and 
in this case the actual dividend payment analysis can be misleading therefore, while 
using payout negative values are ignored as suggested by Al-Malkawi (2007). The 
negative value of dividend payouts is not justifiable as company can either pay or not pay 
dividend at all, but company cannot pay a negative dividend. A possible interpretation of 
negative dividend could be a situation where due to bad performance the share price of 
the company declines, commonly known as capital loss, due to this decline in share price 
shareholders receives a negative dividend (capital loss). But this situation is totally 
different from a situation of negative payout ratio. An alternate proxy of dividend policy 
is included to handle this problem.  As compared to dividend payout ratio, dividend 
intensity is less affected by earning management and it does not assume negative value in 
any case.   
In terms of dividend intensity, the highest average value of DINT is observed in 
Bangladeshi sample companies, followed by Pakistan and India. As compared to 
dividend payout the dividend intensity is less used proxy of payout policy. Very few 
researchers (see for example; Kumar, 2006; Fama and French, 2002; and Aivazian et al., 
2003) used dividend intensity of the firm in empirical analysis of payout policy of 
companies but due to its simplicity and comparability dividend intensity, as a measure of 
payout policy is used in recent investigations of payout policy (Afza and Mirza, 2010).   
Regarding ownership variables, in India, the maximum value of shareholdings by managers is 51% 
followed by Pakistan and Bangladesh. Jiraporn et al (2011) in their current study conducted on the 
topic of ownership structure has stated that an average of 47.10% of the entire shares is owned by 
directors of firms in India. South Asian countries and Anglo Saxon countries like US and UK are 
very different in their respective ownership structures. Holders of sizeable shares, which mainly 
include directors and institutions, have great opportunity and capability to control the business 
concerns. From descriptive data given in Table 6.1 it is clear that in South Asian firms directors 
have major shareholdings than other individuals/public and institution, therefore, it is expected that 
management have more control on the funds than any other shareholder of the firm. Descriptive 
analysis showed that directors and managers have control of corporation in South Asian countries 
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followed by institutions, except in Sri Lanka where average institutional shareholdings are observed 
greater than shareholdings of directors and managers.   
Second important factor which affect corporate dividend decision is the availability of 
free cash flow for dividend payment. Out of three major sources of cash generation i.e. 
operations, investments and financing, cash flow from operations is the most important 
source as any distribution of cash in terms of dividend is done from operating cash. 
Present study used cash flow from operations (CFO) as a proxy of free cash flow which 
is calculated by dividing operating cash flow to total assets of the company. From the 
data it is evident that Bangladeshi and Indian companies have highest average value of 
CFO as compared to Pakistan and Sri Lanka and similar situation is also observed in case 
of cash flow sensitivity (CFS) which is the proxy of sensitivity of cash flow.  By 
sensitivity of cash flow the study means, that if company is financially constrained it will 
try to increase the amount of net cash generated from all sources, in other words if the 
change in closing cash balance is increasing every year, this indicate that company is 
cash flow sensitive and such company will not pay dividend with high value.   
To measure the growth opportunities the ratio between market price and book value per 
share is considered as proxy. The average market to book ratio (represented as GRTH) of 
Bangladesh is excessively high. To handle this problem the data is trimmed to exclude 
extreme values and they are not expected to cause much problem in result estimation19. 
In terms of median GRTH, both Bangladesh and India seems to have higher values. If 
growth opportunities were rightly captured, they are expected to affect dividend payouts 
of the company negatively.  On the other hand ownership dispersion is a signal of high 
agency problem.  To capture agency problem caused by dispersed ownership, the present 
study used natural log of number of shareholders. Large number of shareholders 
represents a situation where no single investor/shareholder large enough to control the 
organization and get private benefits of control. The descriptive analysis of agency 
problem (ODIS) shows that Indian companies have highest number of ownership 
dispersion followed by Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. By comparing mean and median 
values the ODIS seems balanced with no potential outliers in all selected countries.  Rest 
of the three variables i.e. size (SZ), leverage (LVG) and profitability (PRFT) are control 
variables.  In terms of LVG, the Pakistani companies are highly levered as compared to 
India and Bangladesh  the average LVG in sample of Pakistani companies is 58% 
followed by India which is 48% and Bangladesh with 46% approximately. The highly 
levered firms are not in a good position to pay high dividend as a large number of their 
free cash flow is reserved for the retirement of regular interest payments. Empirically, 
leverage is a negative determinant of dividend payout in majority of the studies 
conducted on dividend payouts and its determinants (Afza and Mirza, 2010).  
The main purpose of this section is to understand and analyze the nature and underlying 
dimensions of data collected for analysis and also to investigate the presence of any 
potential outlier/extreme values in the data. It is important to scrutinize the data before 
putting it to final analysis. In Table 6.1, the descriptive statistics of all the variables of the 
study were presented. Except in Bangladesh, no evidence of extreme value/outlier was 
found. However, 1% data trimming is conducted to exclude outliers from the data21; 
therefore, there are very few extreme values present in the data.  
                                                 
19 The observed changes due to 1% data trimming are provided in discussion under each table of estimated results.  
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6.2. Correlation Analysis  
The correlation analysis shows the linear association among variables and is helpful in 
detecting multicolinearity among independent variables. Table 6.2 represents the 
correlation analysis of firm’s level variable of the study for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. The Table 6.2 is divided in two panels i.e. A and B. Panel A shows the 
correlation between dependent variables and independent variables while panel B 
presents the correlation among independent variables. In panel A of Table 6.2, the 
correlation between dependent and independent variables is presented. MNG is 
negatively correlation with dividend payout and dividend intensity in Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka, but in Bangladesh and India they are positively correlated. The negative 
correlation between MNG and dividend proxy in Pakistan is in line with the existing 
empirical evidences reported by Afza and Mirza (2010). In Sri Lanka MNG is negatively 
correlated with the proxies of dividend payouts policy. Countries where majority of the 
shares of a company is held by insiders and families, the corporate managers do not pay 
high dividends so that they can maintain their controlling rights on funds of corporation. 
Other proxies of dividend payout policy i.e. DINT also show the negative correlation of 
shares held by managers with dividends in Pakistan and Sri Lanka but positive in 
Bangladesh and India.  
However, institutional ownership has positive correlation with payout proxies in 
Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. This might be due to prudent man rule which restrict 
institutional investors to invest in companies which pay less or no dividends at all. Many 
researchers have argued that corporate investors have been attracted towards higher 
dividend (Han et al., 1999; Dhaliwal et al., 1999; Short et al., 2002; Allen et al., 2000).  
Table 6.2: Correlation Analysis  
   Panel A  Panel B  
 Bangladesh (Firm-year observations = 221)  
                                                  
21 1% Data trimming excluded only 4 extreme firm-year observations, in Bangladesh. It is a fairly standard 
technique used by several researchers. For detail review of literature on data trimming and outlier 
treatment, consult Osborne and Amy (2004). Dividend policy literature also provide evidence of data 
trimming, used by researchers (see for example; Fagerland and  Kristoffer (2012); Parua (2009); Barclay et 
al (2008); and Adelegan (2009) etc  
   DPO  DINT  MNG  INST  CFO  CFS  GRTH  ODIS  SZ  LVRG    
MNG  0.389  0.303  1.000  
                
INST  0.499  0.482  -0.039  1.000  
              
CFO  0.229  0.413  0.570  0.149  1.000  
            
CFS  -0.074  0.062  0.015  -0.036  0.259  1.000  
          
GRTH  0.369  0.257  0.464  0.340  0.393  0.114  1.000  
        
ODIS  -0.110  -0.124  -0.058  -0.508  -0.283  -0.067  -0.084  1.000  
      
SZ  -0.377  -0.127  -0.516  -0.202  -0.329  -0.255  -0.366  0.512  1.000  
    
LVG  -0.175  -0.128  -0.131  -0.105  0.037  0.547  -0.076  -0.133  -0.262  1.000    
PRFT  0.054  0.054  0.011  0.182  0.102  -0.019  -0.102  -0.317  0.147  -0.059    
    India(Firm-year observations = 650)     
   DPO  DINT  MNG  INST  CFO  CFS  GRTH  ODIS  SZ  LVRG    
 
MNG  0.019  0.329  1.000  
                
INST  0.018  0.136  -0.434  1.000  
              
CFO  0.287  0.641  0.232  0.088  1.000  
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CFS  -0.121  0.152  0.005  0.038  0.024  1.000  
          
GRTH  -0.081  0.075  -0.037  -0.096  0.039  -0.017  1.000  
        
ODIS  0.181  0.270  -0.220  0.233  0.322  0.106  0.188  1.000  
      
SZ  0.123  -0.001  -0.191  0.447  0.204  0.069  -0.454  0.449  1.000  
    
LVG  -0.317  -0.281  0.186  -0.018  -0.293  -0.089  -0.068  -0.198  0.066  1.000    
PRFT  0.093  0.335  -0.083  0.032  0.067  0.037  -0.072  0.000  0.303  -0.222    
   Pakistan  (Firm-year observations = 450)     
  
MNG  
DPO  DINT  MNG  INST  CFO  CFS  GRTH  ODIS  SZ  LVRG    
-0.102  -0.173  1.000  
                
INST  0.005  0.122  -0.405  1.000  
              
CFO  0.139  0.132  -0.028  0.018  1.000  
            
CFS  -0.013  -0.075  0.038  -0.070  0.282  1.000  
          
GRTH  -0.473  -0.061  -0.058  -0.012  0.095  0.076  1.000  
        
ODIS  0.081  0.038  -0.232  0.462  0.041  -0.047  0.047  1.000  
      
SZ  -0.012  0.069  -0.313  0.239  -0.075  0.077  -0.060  0.566  1.000  
    
LVG  -0.108  -0.125  0.043  -0.254  -0.191  -0.062  0.064  -0.238  -0.054  1.000    
PRFT  0.138  0.256  -0.115  -0.015  0.080  -0.038  0.069  0.006  0.176  -0.190    
   Sri Lanka(Firm-year observations = 175)     
   DPO  DINT  MNG  INST  CFO  CFS  GRTH  ODIS  SZ  LVRG    
 
MNG  -0.042  -0.173  1.000  
                
INST  0.010  0.104  -0.048  1.000  
              
CFO  0.188  0.104  0.060  0.129  1.000  
            
CFS  -0.076  -0.146  -0.097  0.157  0.515  1.000  
          
GRTH  -0.445  -0.702  -0.175  0.309  -0.021  -0.050  1.000  
        
ODIS  0.122  -0.041  -0.247  -0.115  0.085  0.111  -0.145  1.000  
      
SZ  0.220  0.376  -0.231  -0.020  0.111  -0.059  0.362  0.698  1.000  
    
LVG  -0.371  -0.558  0.380  -0.374  0.040  0.039  -0.574  0.149  -0.294  1.000    
PRFT  0.058  0.141  0.134  0.130  0.365  0.267  -0.041  -0.222  -0.120  -0.031    
Dividend payout (DPO); dividend intensity (DINT); managerial ownership (MNG); institutional ownership  
(INST); cash flow from operations (CFO); cash flow sensitivity (CFS); market to book ratio (GRTH); 
ownership dispersion (ODIS); size of firm (SZ); leverage (LVRG); profitability (PRFT). In case of 
Bangladesh DPO and GRTH data is trimmed at 1%. (See foot note 19 for details)  
CFO showed a positive correlation with dividend payout proxies, which is in line with 
research hypothesis of this study. Intuitively, free cash flow is the main source of 
dividend payments and dividend increases with increase of cash flow from operations. 
However,  
CFS which is the proxy of firm’s sensitivity of cash flow has a negative correlation with 
dividends in all countries. Almeida et al. (2004) showed that firms which are financially 
constrained try to accumulate more funds today to finance future expected investment 
projects. It is understandable that the increased potential of saving cash out of cash flows 
is a sign of availability of profitable investment opportunities or financial constraints 
faced by the firms therefore, such firm reduces the payout ratio, provided that firms’ 
access to external finance is limited to a certain level.  
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Similarly, growth opportunities (GRTH) have a negative correlation with dividend 
proxies in all countries except Bangladesh20. Firms with growth opportunities needs 
liquidity to avail the most profitable investment opportunity with cheapest source of 
finance (i.e. retained earnings) therefore, during high growth phase firms would be 
hesitant to distribute its earnings in terms of cash dividends. (Mayers and Majluf, 1984). 
On the other side, La Porta et al., (2000) argued that, growing firms are more in need of 
external financing, therefore, in order to insure access to external capital market the firm 
might be motivated to institute a good standing with stockholders through higher 
dividend payouts (Afza and Mirza, 2010)  
To measure the agency problem natural log of number of shareholders is used as proxy, 
which measures ownership dispersion. In highly dispersed ownership structure the 
agency problem is more severe. In such situation, if shareholders believe that their rights 
are not duly protected, consequently thy put more pressure on management to pay high 
dividends as argued by dividend outcome model. But under circumstances e.g. when 
certain ownership is concentrated in few hands, managers feel themselves in much power 
to get private benefits of control therefore; they do not pay high dividends. The positive 
correlation between ODIS and dividend payout supports outcome model.  
Panel B of Table 6.2 presents the correlation among independent variables. In 
Bangladesh, the correlation is 57% between ownership by directors and cash flow of 
company. Although this correlation is a bit higher than 50% but still it is moderate and 
therefore, it is not expected to cause multicolinearity among independent variables. 
Similarly, the highest correlation in Indian and Pakistani samples is between growth and 
size i.e. 45% and 56% respectively. However, in Sri Lankan data the correlation between 
ownership dispersion and size is very high which might be an indication of presence of 
multicolinearity in the data. But final decision regarding multicolinearity depends on 
variance inflation factor (VIF) value in regression model. If VIF value of either 
ownership dispersion variable or size found to be greater than 10 then this is an 
indication of biasness in result attributed to multicolinearity among two independent 
variables (Belsley et al., 1980).  
6.3. Regression Analysis  
The presents study proposed seven models based on firm specific variables i.e. managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, cash flow, cash flow sensitivity, growth opportunities, 
ownership dispersion and smoothing affect. These models are estimated using least square, Tobit 
and Logit estimation techniques. Endogeneity test is also applied for variables suspected for 
endogeneity in existing literature and to handle endogeneity issues GMM and TSLS estimation 
techniques are used. The detailed analysis and estimated results are discussed below.  
6.3.1. Impact of Managers’ Ownership on Dividend Policy  
Several researchers (see for instance: Jakob and Johannes, 2008; Wiberg, 2008; Afza and 
Mirza, 2010; Huda and Muhammad, 2013) emphasized the importance of ownership 
structure in determining dividend payout of company. Table 6.3 presented the estimated 
results of regression analysis using dividend payout and dividend intensity as dependent 
variable and ownership by managers as independent variables. Each model is estimated 
with and without control variables i.e. size, leverage and profitability. The relationship of 
                                                 
20 The correlation analysis in case of Bangladesh in performed after 1% data trimming from both ends 
which excluded 4 extreme observations in total form the data. The correlation of DPO with other variables 
shows a bit improvement after 1% trimming for outliers.  
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managerial ownership is significantly positive in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, but 
significantly negative in Pakistan.  
The estimated results of ownership model in Bangladesh21 shows that a unit increases in 
managerial ownership significantly (p-value < 1%) increase the dividend payout and 
dividend intensity of listed companies. The explanatory power of the model with control 
variables is around 18% and significant F value shows the model fitness. Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) is calculated for each variable in the model and ensured that it 
should not be greater than 5 (for testing multicolinearity). The DW test value is a bit low 
but within the acceptable range of 1.5-2.5 (for serial correlation). In most of the listed 
companies of Bangladesh, majority shares are held by families. For example, Faroque et 
al. (2007) argued that Bangladeshi companies mainly comprise of small and medium size 
firms and ownership is concentrated. Huda and Muhammad (2013) argued that due to 
effective monitoring of institutional owners the managers’ ability to expropriate the right 
of minority shareholders has been significantly reduced in Bangladesh. This is the main 
reason due to which companies where managerial ownership is high, pay more 
dividends.  
The estimated results of ownership model for India suggest a significantly positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and dividend policy. The relationship is significant (P-value <1%) 
with both dividend payout and dividend intensity when estimated with control variables. The 
explanatory power of the model is 18% for DPO and 22% in case of DINT. The DW test values are 
also within acceptable range and F value is significant which shows the fitness of model. The 
positive relationship of MNG is in line with Kumar (2006) who argued that the companies where 
insiders have more ownership pay more dividends. Manos (2003) reported significantly positive 
relationship between directors’ ownership and dividend payout which confirms the results of 
present study. Kumar (2006) reported that Indian corporations are characterized by large 
shareholders. These large shareholders have incentives to control key decisions especially like 
dividend payouts. However, insiders do not reduce dividend because the Indian companies have 
substantial ownership by institutions and foreign investors and to attract their investments and 
dividend cuts adversely affect the investors’ willingness to invest in companies. The estimated 
result of ownership in Pakistan shows a significantly negative relationship with dividend policy. 
The coefficient of MNG is significant at the level 5% using DPO and 1% using DINT as dependent 
variable. The explanatory power of the model using size, leverage and profitability is also low i.e. 
4% in case of DPO and 14% in case of DINT. The DW test and F-stat are in acceptable range and 
show the fitness of the model. The negative relationship shows that the companies in which 
manager’s ownership is high, pay less dividend as compared to other companies. An academic 
argument to support this negative relationship is that, the companies where ownership is 
concentrated face less agency problem therefore, dividend as tool to mitigate agency problem has 
lesser role to play.  
However, in context of Pakistan the negative relationship of manager’s ownership with payout is 
the reason of comparatively weak corporate governance system, where minority shareholders rights 
are not strongly protected. For example in corporate board of directors, there is no representation of 
minorities. Pakistani companies are characterized by low proportion of shares held by institutions 
(non-business group affiliates) due to which strong monitoring on corporate affairs is not possible. 
In this case, minority investors face the risk of expropriation of their rights by controlling 
shareholders (Javaid and Robina, 2010; Afza and Mirza, 2010; Ullah et al., 2012). Majority of 
                                                 
21 The ownership model for Bangladesh is re-estimated after 1% data trimming from both ends. This 
improved the significance of the ownership variable and also increased R2 value of model. However, no 
change in the direction of relationship is observed.  
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Pakistani companies have concentrated family ownership, this type of ownership provides an 
opportunity for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders, 
especially in weak investors’ protection regime. Due to the above mentioned reasons the family 
owned and controlled companies have tendency to increase the funds under their control by 
reducing dividends.  
Last section of Table 6.3 presents estimated results of ownership model in Sri Lanka. The 
relationship of MNG with dividend policy is significantly negative. The coefficients are 
significant at the level 5% when estimated with control variables. The explanatory power 
of the models is 30% and 54% using DPO and DINT as dependent variables, 
respectively. The results are not affected by serial correlation as depicted by DW test and 
the significance of F-stat shows the model fitness. Based on the estimated results the 
study argues that in Sri Lanka the managerial ownership has a negative relationship with 
dividend payouts and corporate managers try to control funds by reducing dividends. The 
author found Gunathilaka and Gunaratne (2009) and Srinaratne (2010) the only studies 
on the relationship of ownership structure and dividend policy in Sri Lanka. The 
estimated results of Table 6.3 contradicts with Gunathilaka and Gunaratne (2009) who 
showed that managerial ownership is significantly positively related with dividend 
payouts. However, Srinaratne (2010) argued that most of Sri Lankan companies have 
high degree of ownership concentration with the presence of a controlling shareholder 
which have tendency to expropriate rights of minority shareholders (Samarakoon, 1999; 
Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2007). The nature of the agency problems faced by Sri Lankan 
companies not only due to conflict of interest between owners and managers but between 
controlling owners and minority owners (Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2007). In the light of 
above arguments the negative relationship between managerial ownership and dividend 
policy shows that critical governance issue of Sri Lankan companies is the minority 
rights protection from the controlling shareholders’ opportunism.  
Rests of the variables in the model are controls, as suggested by Fama and French (2001) and Li 
and Zhao, (2007). Size of firm is measured by taking natural log of total assets of company. Size is 
significantly related with dividend payouts in India, Sri Lanka and with dividend intensity in all 
countries. The relationship of size of firm is positive in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka which 
shows that large size firms pay more dividends which is in line with the study of Stacescu, (2006) 
and Al-Malkawi, (2007). However, in Pakistan large size firms are reluctant to pay dividend. Afza 
and Mirza (2010) argued that in Pakistan large companies pay fewer dividends in order to avoid 
external finance which is more costly as compared to internal funds. Similar results are also 
reported by Ahmed and Attiya (2009) in Pakistan. The leverage of firm is significantly and 
negatively related with dividend payout in all South Asian countries which shows that highly 
levered firms are less likely to pay high dividends. However, profitability does not seem to have 
significant relationship with dividend payout which is in line with the study of Aivazian et al. 
(2003) for emerging economies. However, profitability is positively related with payouts in case of 
Pakistan which shows that dividend depends on profitability of firms, in Pakistan.  
Table 6.4 presents the results of ownership model before and after the year of financial 
crisis i.e. 2008. The purpose is to analyze the change in relationship between managerial 
ownership and dividend policy after period of crisis. Earlier studies (see Campello et al. 
2009) argued that financial crisis is an excuse for managers for not paying dividend 
therefore, during and after the crisis managers cut dividends. However, there is no 
empirical evidence on impact of crisis on relationship of managerial ownership and 
payouts, to the best of author’s knowledge. The estimated results of Table 6.4 show that 
there is no change in the direction of relationship between managers’ ownership and 
payout in pre and post crisis period. However, the level of significance and explanatory   
   
  
  
Table 6.3: Managerial Ownership Model (Equation 5.1 a)  
 
CNT  
DV  
BNG  BNG  BNG  BNG  IND  IND  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  SL  SL  
DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  
Constant  
1.762  
[2.733]  
(0.009)  
-0.476  
[-0.715]  
(0.478)  
-0.029  
[-0.367]  
(0.715)  
0.451  
[0.412]  
(0.683)  
8.340  
[1.339]  
(0.183)  
-19.291  
[-1.863]  
(0.065)  
-0.015  
[-1.071]  
(0.286)  
-0.057  
[-2.483]  
(0.014)  
0.382  
[7.227]  
(0.000)  
0.533  
[1.741]  
(0.082)  
0.057  
[7.976]  
(.000)  
0.137  
[3.381]  
(.001)  
0.331  
[4.471]  
(0.000)  
-0.051  
[-0.143]  
(0.887)  
0.028  
[-1.995]  
(0.000)  
0.117  
[-4.733]  
(0.000)  
MNG  
0.005  
[2.831]  
(0.007)  
0.005  
[3.883]  
(0.000)  
.007  
[2.985]  
(.000)  
.007  
[2.753]  
(.009)  
0.264  
[2.270]  
(0.024)  
0.501  
[4.123]  
(0.000)  
0.001  
[2.924]  
(0.004)  
0.001  
[4.662]  
(0.000)  
-0.300  
[-2.034]  
(0.037)  
-0.173  
[-2.082]  
(0.033)  
-.090  
[-4.488]  
(.000)  
-.075  
[-3.564]  
(.000)  
-0.004  
[-1.436]  
(0.154)  
-0.578  
[-1.941]  
(0.050)  
0.004  
[-1.995]  
(0.049)  
-0.037  
[-1.992]  
(0.048)  
SZ  
---  
---  
---  
0.022  
[0.932]  
(0.357)  
---  
---  
---  
.094  
[2.089]  
(0.033)  
---  
---  
---  
3.432  
[3.237]  
(0.002)  
---  
---  
---  
0.004  
[1.804]  
(0.073)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.014  
[-0.190]  
(0.850)  
---  
---  
---  
-.021  
[-2.157]  
(.032)  
---  
---  
---  
0.032  
[1.992]  
(0.051)  
---  
---  
---  
0.007  
[6.540]  
(0.000)  
LVG  
---  
---  
---  
-0.395  
-[0.212]  
(0.069)  
---  
---  
---  
0.037  
[0.118]  
(.907)  
---  
---  
---  
-3.582  
[-3.879]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.009  
[-4.285]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.494  
[-2.551]  
(0.019)  
---  
---  
---  
-.033  
[-1.275]  
(.203)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.511  
[-4.002]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.027  
[-3.153]  
(0.002)  
PRFT  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[0.185]  
(0.854)  
---  
---  
---  
0.002  
[0.118]  
(0.907)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.032  
[-0.406]  
(0.685)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[1.166]  
(0.246)  
---  
---  
---  
0.004  
[2.449]  
(0.012)  
---  
---  
---  
.001  
[5.519]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
0.004  
[0.259]  
(0.796)  
---  
---  
---  
.001  
[6.514]  
(0.000)  
N  193  193  195  195  458  458  458  458  301  301  301  301  98  98  98  98  
R2  0.134  0167  0.162  .192  0.034  0.186  0.055  0.223  0.009  0.037  0.043  0.127  0.018  0.299  0.034  0.546  
Adj R2  0.117  0.17  0.144  .111  0.027  0.162  0.048  0.201  0.007  0.026  0.041  0.119  0.009  0.268  0.026  0.525  
D/W  1.760  1.631  1.773  1.559  1.819  1.771  2.579  2.601  1.838  1.858  1.537  1.624  2.353  1.699  1.050  1.848  
F-STAT  8.016  2.548  8.910  2.337  5.155  7.827  8.550  9.845  4.136  3.965  20.141  15.998  3.549  9.614  3.979  26.184  
Sig- F  0.007  0.005  .000  .048  0.025  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.013  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.040  0.000  0.040  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) and Dividend Intensity (DINT); Independent variables: Managerial Ownership (MNG);, Size of Firm 
(SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of 
Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value). N represents number of valid firm-year observations. In case of 
Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends at 1%.  
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power of the model is adversely affected after the crisis. The possible justification of this 
decline in significance could be the nature of crisis itself. The credit crisis of 2008 
affected the growth of economy and access to credit due to which managers were forced 
to reduce dividend but this reduction in dividend cannot be attributed to changes in 
ownership structure because no change is observed in managerial ownership of 
companies in any country in pre and post crisis period. Now because in post crisis period 
the change in dividend was not due to change in managerial ownership so it is logical that 
the explanatory power of the model is declined.  
Table 6.4: Managerial Ownership Model (Pre and Post Financial Crisis of 2008)  
CNT  
FC  
BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  
Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post  
MNG  
0.006  
[2.311]  
(0.038)  
0.005  
[2.774]  
(.041)  
0.581  
[2.914]  
(0.005)  
0.439  
[2.790]  
(0.007)  
-0.481  
[2.705]  
(0.007)  
-0.283  
[1.421]  
(0.157)  
-0.015  
[-3.041]  
(0.014)  
-0.037  
[-3.022]  
(0.012)  
N  193  193  458  458  301  301  98  98  
Intercept Sig  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R Square  0.733  0.144  0.241  0.165  0.151  0.063  0.773  0.341  
Adjusted R  0.650  0.091  0.182  0.124  0.135  0.045  0.672  0.288  
F stat  8.906  2.697  4.058  4.010  9.614  3.512  7.662  6.353  
Sig F  0.001  0.038  0.006  0.005  0.000  0.008  0.006  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO). Independent variables: Managerial Ownership (MNG); 
Control includes: Size of Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique 
(OLS):  
VIF values are less than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of Multicolinearity in the model estimation; 
Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value). CNT represents country; FC represents Financial Crisis period. 
N represents number of valid firm-year observations.  
  
Table 6.5 estimates the ownership model using Tobit and Logit regressions. One of the 
limitations of using ordinary least square regression is its downward biasness of slop 
coefficient and upward biasness of intercept coefficient in a situation where data clusters 
at either upper level or lower or both. It is logical to think that company can either pay 
dividend or cannot pay it at all, but company cannot pay negative dividend. This means 
that dividend data clusters at some lower boundary which dividend equals to zero. This 
type of data has a lower boundary, in which least square regression will not give good 
results. Therefore, for robustness of results this study has employed Tobit regression 
which is based on maximum likelihood estimation. The estimated results of Tobit model 
are significant for MNG in all countries which confirms the findings of least square 
model.  
These results are robust and in line with existing literature and findings of previous 
researchers discussed in the beginning of section 6.3.1. The control variable of size is 
significant in India (positive sign) and Pakistan (negative sign) which shows that large 
companies are more willing to pay dividend in India as compared to large companies of 
Pakistan. The possible reason of this difference could be the capital market development. 
The Indian capital market is not only developed but also efficient in providing external 
finance therefore, large Indian companies do not face much difficulty in raising capital 
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hence they do not feel need to reduce dividends. However, in Pakistan the capital market 
is not developed and large companies face difficulty in raising external capital which 
costly. Therefore, they rely more on internal funds which reduce their ability to pay high 
dividend. Leverage is also significantly negative in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka which 
endorses the results reported in Table 6.3. Likewise, profitability is significantly positive 
in Pakistan which shows that highly levered firms pay fewer dividends in Indian, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka while highly profitable firms pay high dividends in Pakistan.  
The impact of ownership by managers on decision to pay dividend or not, is estimated 
using Logit model. The results show that managers’ ownership significantly affects 
decision to pay dividend in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan but the relationship is 
insignificant in case of Sri Lanka. In case of Bangladesh, a unit increase in managers’ 
ownership increases the odd of paying dividend with 5.9% and 8.2% in India. However, 
in  
Pakistan increase in managers’ ownership decreases the odd of dividend payment with 
6.2% which confirms the results of Table 6.3. The relationship of MNG with dividend 
decision in Sri Lanka is insignificant which shows that change in mangers’ ownership 
does not significantly affect decision to pay or not to pay dividend.   
  
  
  
  
Table 6.5: Managerial Ownership Model (Tobit and Logit Estimation)  
 
CNT  
Estimation  
BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  
Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  
Constant  
-0.720  
[0.88]  
(0.383)  
-1.321  
[0.267]  
(0.817)  
-57.143  
[-3.41]  
(0.001)  
-7.189  
{.001}  
(.001)  
1.237  
[2.48]  
(0.013)  
5.120  
[67.283]  
(.000)  
-5.329  
[-4.46]  
(0.000)  
-5.134  
[0.006]  
(.143)  
 
MNG  
0.008  
[4.47]  
(0.000)  
.074  
{1.077}  
(0.000)  
.695  
[4.47]  
(0.000)  
.078  
{1.082}  
(0.000)  
-.767  
[-2.81]  
(0.005)  
-2.776  
{0.062}  
(0.000)  
-.0.025  
[-2.86]  
(0.000)  
-2.492  
{0.083}  
(0.384)  
SZ  
0.024  
[0.66]  
(0.509)  
-0.001  
{0.984}  
(.962)  
6.695  
[4.57]  
(0.000)  
.584  
{1.793}  
(.002)  
-.138  
[-1.16]  
(0.046)  
-.690  
[-0.502]  
(.000)  
0.278  
[4.82]  
(0.000)  
0.391  
{1.478}  
(.0.021)  
LVG  
-0.321  
[-1.42]  
(0.159)  
-0.830  
{0.013}  
(.126)  
-5.782  
[-4.08]  
(0.000)  
-1.369  
{.254}  
(.000)  
-1.145  
[-3.58]  
(0.000)  
-3.631  
{.026}  
(.000)  
-0.411  
[-0.55]  
(0.582)  
-5.405  
{0.004}  
(0.001)  
PRFT  
.0002  
[0.27]  
(0.788)  
0.006  
{1.006}  
(0.817)  
.0100  
[0.11]  
(0.914)  
.016  
{1.016}  
(.324)  
.0122  
[4.36]  
(0.000)  
.029  
{1.030}  
(.000)  
.001  
[0.13]  
(0.898)  
0.053  
{1.055}  
(0.011)  
N  193  193  458  458  301  301  98  98  
Pseudo R2  0.1976  0.434  0.0380  0.458  0.0704  0.416  0.1116  0.376  
Log Likelihood  -45.85  43.264  -521.51  136.82  -483.141  440.653  -88.879  20.650  
LR Chi2(5)  21.48  ---  41.15  ---  73.16  ---  22.25  ---  
P-Value Chi2  0.000  ---  0.000  ---  0.000  ---  0.000  ---  
Cox and Snell  ---  0.305  ---  0.342  ---  0.306  ---  0.268  
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Nagelkerke R2  ---  0.434  ---  0.458  ---  0.416  ---  0.376  
Wald test  ---  8.115  ---  9.568  ---  13.189  ---  2.776  
Sig-Wald  ---  0.001  ---  0.000  ---  0.000  ---  0.002  
 
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO). Independent variables: Managerial Ownership (MNG); Size 
of Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (Tobit and Logit): 
Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value);{Exp-B}. N represents firm-year observations. In case of 
Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends at 1%.   
Existing studies (Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Bohren 
and Odegaard, 2001; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) argued that ownership is an 
endogenous variable. Most of these studies have estimated the relationship between 
ownership structure and firms’ performance. The author also found few studies 
addressing endogeneity of ownership in determining dividend payouts (see for example: 
Desai and Jin, 2011; Bena and Hanousek, 2005) and reported ownership to be 
endogenous determinant of dividend policy. However, other studies did not find 
endogeneity in ownership structure and dividend policy (see for example: Short et al., 
2002; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Thanatawee, 2013). In order to address the problem 
caused by endogenous explanatory variable, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggested 
an augmented regression test commonly known as Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test. 
The results are presented in Table 6.6.  
  
Table 6.6: Test of Endogeneity in Managerial Ownership Model  
 
DV  
Stage 1  
MNG  
Stage 2  
DPO  
Stage 1  
MNG  
Stage 2  
DPO  
Stage 1  
MNG  
Stage 2  
DPO  
Stage 1  
MNG  
Stage 2  
DPO  
Constant  
38.863  
[3.538]  
(0.001)  
-0.409  
{-1.014}  
(.313)  
36.562  
[26.919]  
(0.000)  
-20.120  
{1.894}  
(.060)  
-0.037  
[3.402]  
(0.001)  
0.557  
{1.828}  
(.068)  
14.364  
[4.715]  
(0.000)  
0.014  
{.0.040}  
(.968)  
MNG  
---  
---  
---  
.005  
{3.506}  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
0.513  
{4.065}  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.215  
{-2.343}  
(.013)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.008  
{-2.752}  
(0.007)  
Rank  
1.120  
[39.440]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
1.471  
[43.324]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
0.014  
[77.997]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
1.002  
[37.606]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
Res_1  
---  
---  
---  
0.006  
[1.006]  
(0.318)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.180  
{-0.372}  
(.711)  
---  
---  
---  
3.021  
{2.206}  
(.028)  
---  
---  
---  
0.038  
{3.175}  
(0.002)  
Exogenous  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-Sig  0.000  0.007  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Variable Explanation: Dividend Payout (DPO); Managerial Ownership (MNG); Size of Firm (SZ); 
Leverage  
(LVG) and Profitability (PRFT). N is same as given in Table 6.5  
Initially the correlations between residual of original model and explanatory variables are 
estimated. The results showed no significant association between explanatory variables 
and the residual (not reported here). At second level, more advanced technique was 
applied to test the endogeneity of ownership variable, as suggested by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993). In this method the instrument i.e. ranked ownership along with other 
CNT   BNG   BNG   IND   IND   PAK   PAK   SL   SL   
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exogenous variables were regressed on the suspected endogenous variable of ownership 
and residual from this equation is then used among explanatory variables in original 
model. The insignificant coefficient of additional residual showed that the model is not 
suffered from endogeneity bias of ownership variable in Bangladesh and India. However, 
in Pakistan and Sri Lanka the significant coefficient value of residual signals endogeneity 
in ownership model.   
Table 6.7: IV-TSLS and IV-GMM Estimation  
 
 
 Adj R2  0.0757  0.0757  0.2948  0.2948  
 Wald-Sig  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 J-stat  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
Standard errors & covariance computed using White weighting Matrix Instrument specification: C 
RANK_MNG SZ LVG PRFT Sargan statistic (over identification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified). N represents number of firm year observations.  
  
Table 6.7 presents the estimated results of ownership model using instrumental variable 
TSLS and GMM method. The order rank of managerial ownership is considered as 
instrument to control the endogeneity due to ownership structure. The estimated results 
show a significantly negative relationship of managerial ownership with payouts in 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka which confirms the findings of Table 6.3.   
6.3.2. Impact of Institutional Ownership on Dividend Policy  
The existing literature provides evidence and support the idea of relationship between 
corporate payout behavior and structure of ownership characterized by institution, 
because institutional owners are more efficient in controlling agency problem than 
individual owners. Rozeff (1982) supported that dividend is tool of indirect controlling of 
corporate affairs where active monitoring of a firm’s management by its shareholders is 
missing. According to the agency cost hypothesis, the corporate dividend policy should 
be deliberated in a way that it would be helpful in mitigating the agency cost of 
monitoring (Easterbrook and Frank, 1984). This statement highlights the role of 
ownership structure in scheming corporate dividend payouts.   
Several researchers (See For example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Brickley et al., 1985; 
Graves and Waddock, 1990) have established that institutional owners, due to their 
power of professional decision making, are more capable and alert in monitoring the 
agency cost, because they enjoy economies of scale in collecting information. 
Institutional investors employ intellectual human resources and use refined data scrutiny 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Constant  
0.630  
[2.49]  
(0.013)  
0.630  
[2.32]  
(0.021)  
0.0136  
[0.040]  
(.968)  
0.0136  
[0.040]  
(.968)  
MNG  
-0.383  
[-2.84]  
(0.004)  
-0.383  
[-4.77]  
(0.000)  
-0.0081  
[-2.69]  
(0.007)  
-0.0081  
[-3.19]  
(0.001)  
N  301  301  98  98  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
CNT   PAK   PAK   SL   SL   
Estimation   IV - TSLS   IV - GMM   IV - TSLS   IV - GMM   
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methodologies, and they also have improved knowledge of assessment of firm’s 
performance based on which they maintain a better control over managerial affairs of the 
company.  
It is generally argued that institutional owners have enhanced grip over affairs of 
management therefore; companies in which institutional ownership is high, have a 
relatively less apprehension with respect to agency problem and are expected to pay low 
dividend. But on the other hand, the tax based hypothesis supports that sometimes 
institutions investors have enticement in enjoying high dividend income based on their 
respective tax treatments. For example, tax on dividend is deductible at source therefore; 
dividend income is exempted from tax while calculating net tax on total income. Many 
researchers have argued that institutional investors have been attracted towards higher 
dividend (Han et al., 1999; Dhaliwal et al., 1999; Short et al., 2002; Allen et al., 2000). 
Last but not least, the reason of predilection of high dividend payouts by institutional 
owners could be the prudent man rule. Institutional investors are sometimes subject to 
certain limitations in their charter (for example the “prudent man rule”) which put off 
them from investing in the stocks pay either less or no dividends at all. These two 
arguments may not be mutually exclusive all the times as the corporate dividend decision 
could be affected by both of them simultaneously. Based on the type of institution, the 
preference towards high or low dividend may also change.  
Table 6.8 presents the estimated results of relationship between institutional ownership 
and dividend policy. In Bangladesh the estimated results show that institutional 
ownership is significantly and positively related with both dividend payout and dividend 
intensity. The model explains 21% and 34% variation in dividend payout and dividend 
intensity respectively, when estimated with control variables. The DW test is within 
acceptable range except when the model does not include control variables. One of the 
reasons of serial correlation is omitted independent variables due to which the value of 
DW becomes low. The value of F-stat is significant for all models which show the fitness 
of model after 1% trimming for outliers22. The estimated results suggest that institutional 
investors positively affect dividend policy of firms.  Imam and Malik (2007) reported that 
firms in which institutional shareholding is high, pay more dividends. They argued that in 
particular firms’ profitability is positively and significantly correlated with the fraction of 
institutional ownership, suggesting that institutional investors have the incentive as well 
as the power to monitor and control the behavior of the management, and have played a 
significant role in corporate governance. The coefficient of institutional ownership is 
positive and highly significant which shows that increase in institutional ownership 
increases the dividend payout of sample companies.   
The estimated results of institutional ownership model in India shows a significantly 
positive relationship (P-value <1%) between institutional ownership and dividend policy. 
The model captures 13% and 10% change in dividend payout and dividend intensity, 
when estimated with control variables. The DW test is within the acceptable range and 
Fstatistics is significant which shows the fitness of model. The results show that 
companies with higher institutional ownership pay more dividends, which is in line with 
the results of Perry and Rimbey (1995). Kumar (2006) reported nonlinear relationship 
between institutional ownership and dividend intensity. The coefficient on institutional 
ownership was negative but positive in square form in the study conducted by Kumar 
(2006) in India. As per the results of this study, the institutional ownership positively and 
                                                 
22 Data trimming did not affect the relationship of institutional ownership and payout it just improved the 
model fitness in case of Bangladesh.  
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significantly related with dividend policy.  Lee and Suk (1999) tested the agency cost 
based hypothesis and found dividend payout to be positively related with the institutional 
ownership. They provide support for the tax-based hypothesis, suggesting a “dividend 
clientele” for institution’s preference for higher dividends. In the light of above 
mentioned studies it is perceivable that institutional owners have more tendencies to pay 
dividends in India.  The institutional ownership is insignificantly related with dividend 
policy in Pakistan. The estimated results of ownership model presented in Table 6.8 
shows that institutional ownership is insignificantly related with dividend policy. The 
model does not show any sign of serial correlation and F statistics is also significant, 
however, the models explanatory power is week (i.e. R-square =0.3% with dividend 
payout and 10% with dividend intensity). One of the main reasons could be the 
differences among institutional owners and their preferences. For example, in Pakistan 
major institutional investors are mutual funds, insurance companies, banking companies 
and modarbah companies. (Afza and Chowdhary, 2009). The preference of these 
institutions towards high or low dividend changes on the basis of nature of business of 
that institution. For instance, in firms where greater proportion of shares are held by 
banking companies, dividend payout might be very low, because banks seek greater 
security for their debt (Amihud and Murgia, 1997) in the form of high retained earnings 
while insurance companies prefer regular and high dividend payout to fulfill their 
immediate cash requirements (Al-Malkawi, 2007). Afza and Mirza (2010) analyzed the 
types of institutions and their impact on payout policy of listed companies in Pakistan 
and reported that ownership by insurance companies has a significant and positive 
relationship with dividend payout policy. It is therefore, more suitable to analyze the 
impact of different types of institutional ownership on dividend policy in Pakistan.   
The role of institutional ownership in determining dividend policy in Sri Lanka is 
estimated in the last section of Table 6.8. The estimated coefficient of institutional 
ownership variable is insignificant with both proxies of dividend policy i.e. dividend 
payout and dividend intensity. This shows that institutional ownership does not play a 
significant role in determining dividend policy in Sri Lanka. The explanatory power of 
the model is also weak. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) argued that the preference of 
institutional investors is for low dividend paying companies; Institutional investors prefer 
companies that pay dividend but among those who pay dividend they like low dividend 
payers as they like the company to expand. The possible reason of this insignificant 
relationship could be the financial crisis. After financial crisis most of the institutional 
investors prefer that company may retain profits so that it can sustain over a long period 
of time. To further analyze the issue Table 6.9 dividends the sample in to pre and post 
crisis period.   
   
  
  
Table 6.8: Institutional Ownership Model  
CNT  
DV  
BNG  BNG  BNG  BNG  IND  IND  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  SL  SL  
DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  
Constant  
0.117  
[1.844]  
(0.069)  
0.155  
[0.369]  
(0.713)  
-.086  
[-1.249]  
(.216)  
.770  
[1.516  
(.133)  
13.223  
[3.234]  
(0.018)  
13.094  
[2.004]  
(0.047)  
0.026  
[2.607]  
(0.010)  
0.029  
[1.928]  
(0.056)  
.028  
[5.882]  
(.000)  
0.423  
[1.478]  
(0.140)  
.035  
[4.491]  
(.000)  
.086  
[2.243]  
(.025)  
.415  
[2.836]  
(.007)  
0.507  
[-.846]  
(.401)  
.019  
[1.233]  
(.224)  
-0.101  
[-2.716]  
(0.009)  
INST  
0.017  
[3.483]  
(0.001)  
0.021  
[5.261]  
(0.000)  
.019  
[3.521]  
(.216)  
0.031  
[6.731]  
(.000)  
1.230  
[2.411]  
(0.011)  
0.357  
[2.537]  
(0.012)  
0.000  
[1.724]  
(0.012)  
0.000  
[0.642]  
(0.522)  
.015  
[.905]  
(.366)  
-0.194  
[-0.942]  
(0.347)  
-.001  
[-.026]  
(.979)  
-.014  
[-.493]  
(.622)  
-.001  
[-.431]  
(.668)  
0.003  
[1.315]  
(0.194)  
.000  
[.274]  
(.785)  
0.000  
[1.408]  
(0.165)  
SZ  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[0.028]  
(0.977)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.029  
[-1.241]  
(0.217)  
---  
---  
---  
3.192  
[2.801]  
(0.006)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[0.022]  
(0.983)  
---  
---  
---  
0.024  
[0.337]  
(0.736)  
---  
---  
---  
-.009  
[-.959]  
(.338)  
---  
---  
---  
0.016  
[0.667]  
(0.507)  
---  
---  
---  
0.007  
[4.851]  
(0.000)  
LVG  
---  
---  
---  
-0.175  
[-1.174]  
(0.243)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.678  
[-3.813]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-3.303  
[-3.459]  
(0.001)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.007  
[-3.094]  
(0.002)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.362  
[-1.867]  
(0.063)  
---  
---  
---  
-.049  
[-1.887]  
(.060)  
---  
---  
---  
-1.065  
[-3.490]  
(0.001)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.065  
[-3.410]  
(0.001)  
PRFT  
---  
---  
---  
-0.001  
[-1.851]  
(0.067)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[1.830]  
(0.070)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.047  
[-0.571]  
(0.569)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[1.313]  
(0.191)  
---  
---  
---  
.005  
[2.696]  
(.007)  
---  
---  
---  
.001  
[6.005]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.000  
[-0.107]  
(0.194)  
---  
---  
---  
.001  
[7.155]  
(.000)  
N  192  192  195  195  452  452  452  452  302  302  302  302  95  95  95  95  
R2  0.148  0.217  0.158  0.344  0.103  0.126  0.092  0.103  0.003  0.034  0.002  0.103  0.009  0.065  0.005  0.462  
Adj R2  0.136  0.188  0.145  0.318  0.101  0.111  0.037  0.077  0.000  0.026  0.000  0.094  0.002  0.055  0.001  0.399  
D/W  1.208  1.688  1.003  1.957  2.182  1.819  0.213  1.515  1.572  1.856  1.654  1.595  1.454  1.947  1.454  1.558  
F-STAT  12.134  7.407  12.398  13.263  6.396  4.941  5.565  3.922  3.454  3.894  6.458  12.601  8.988  3.945  5.454  7.295  
Sig- F  0.001  0.000  .001  .000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.005  0.006  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.007  0.007  0.023  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) and Dividend Intensity (DINT); Independent variables: Institutional Shareholdings (INST); Size of Firm  
(SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of 
Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value). N represents the number of firm year observations. In case of 
Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends at 1%.  
 .  
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The estimated results of Table 6.9 show no change in the direction of relationship 
between institutional ownership and dividend policy in Bangladesh; however the 
explanatory power of the model is reduced in post crisis period. As explained earlier that 
in post crisis period no change in observed in ownership structure of companies 
therefore, any change in dividend cannot be related with ownership structure in post 
crisis period. Similar results are observed in India but the role of institutional owners is 
significantly positive in determining payout in post crisis period this is due to the fact that 
Indian financial institutions played important role in uplifting of economy after the crisis 
especially by providing credit access. Institutional investors mainly consisting financial 
institution may preferred to receive high dividend in post crisis period due to prudent-
man rule which is evident not only from significance of results but also increased 
explanatory power of model in post crisis period. But in case of Pakistan the results 
remained insignificant in both time periods. In Sri Lanka the Institutional investors seem 
to have positive relationship with dividend before crisis but in significant in post crisis 
period.  
Table 6.9: Institutional Ownership Model (Pre and Post Financial Crisis of 2008)  
CNT  
FC  
BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  
Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post  
INST  
0.012  
[4.796]  
(0.000)  
0.024  
{4.813}  
(0.000)  
-0.240  
[-0.979]  
(0.332)  
0.453  
[2.596]  
(0.011)  
-0.110  
[-0.501]  
(0.617)  
0.001  
[0.003]  
(0.998)  
0.009  
[3.135]  
(0.009)  
-0.002  
[-0.508]  
(0.613)  
N  192  192  452  452  302  302  95  95  
Intercept Sig  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R Square  0.846  0.239  0.131  0.155  0.124  0.054  0.647  0.095  
Adjusted R  0.813  0.203  0.063  0.114  0.108  0.036  0.519  0.045  
DW  1.939  1.583  1.508  1.568  1.936  1.859  1.757  2.136  
F stat  26.079  6.527  1.930  3.724  7.667  2.979  5.047  2.353  
Sig F  0.000  0.000  0.120  0.008  0.000  0.020  0.010  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO); Independent variables: Managerial Ownership (MNG); Size 
of Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less 
than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain 
[t-statistic]; (P-Value). 1% data trimming is performed for Bangladesh.  
  
Table 6.10 presents the results from Tobit and Logit regression. The Tobit model for 
Bangladesh confirms the results of OLS model of institutional ownership which shows 
that institutional ownership has a significantly positive relationship with dividend payout.  
Table 6.10: Institutional Ownership Model (Tobit and Logit Estimation)  
CNT  
Estimation  
BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  
Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  
Constant  
1.163  
[1.06]  
(0.292)  
4.827  
{124.82]  
(0.289)  
3.358  
[1.10]  
(0.273)  
.642  
{1.901}  
(0.426)  
.499  
[-1.16]  
(0.252)  
2.297  
{9.942}  
(0.006)  
-8.144  
[-1.16]  
(0.252)  
4.953  
{141.574}  
(0.361)  
100  
  
INST  
0.025  
[4.86]  
(0.000)  
0.085  
{1.089]  
(0.034)  
-0.326  
[0.090]  
(0.926)  
0.074  
{1.929}  
(0.001)  
-.0294  
[1.20]  
(0.238)  
1.033  
{2.809}  
(0.080)  
.025  
[1.20]  
(0.238)  
0.039  
{1.960}  
(0.082)  
SZ  
-0.0094  
[-0.37]  
(0.709)  
-0.350  
{0.705}  
(0.068)  
4.623  
[-0.05]  
(0.958)  
.374  
{1.454}  
(0.010)  
-0.0061  
[0.80]  
(0.431)  
-0.279  
{.757}  
(.180)  
0.237  
[0.80]  
(0.431)  
0.104  
{1.110}  
(0.594)  
LVG  
-0.269  
[-1.40]  
(0.164)  
-2.173  
{0.114}  
(0.097)  
-5.482  
[-4.31]  
(0.000)  
-1.386  
{.250}  
(.000)  
-1.371  
[1.56]  
(0.125)  
-3.934  
{.020}  
(.000)  
5.069  
[1.56]  
(0.125)  
-11.119  
{0.001}  
(0.007)  
PRFT  
0.003  
[0.90]  
(0.370)  
0.009  
{1.010}  
(0.064)  
-0.0185  
[5.01]  
(0.000)  
0.008  
{1.008}  
(0.585)  
0.014  
[0.53]  
(0.602)  
0.039  
{1.039}  
(0.000)  
0.012  
[0.53]  
(0.602)  
0.084  
{1.087}  
(0.033)  
N  192  192  452  452  302  302  95  95  
Pseudo R2  0.1658  ---  0.057  ---  0.0171  ---  0.017  ---  
Log Likelihood  -55.311  71.760  -490.316  141.827  -99.547  479.604  -99.547  36.396  
LR Chi2(4)  21.05  ---  60.03  ---  3.46  ---  3.46  ---  
P-Value Chi2  0.000  ---  0.0000  ---  0.4837  ---  0.4837  ---  
Cox and Snell  ---  0.125  ---  0.319  ---  0.224  ---  0.212  
Nagelkerke R2  ---  0.182  ---  0.426  ---  0.329  ---  0.329  
Wald test  ---  22.594  ---  11.568  ---  13.500  ---  2.565  
Sig-Wald  
  0.000  ---  0.000  ---  0.000  ---  0.002  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO). Independent variables: Institutional Shareholdings (INST); 
Size of Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (Tobit and Logit):  
Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value);{Exp-B}. N represents number of valid firm- year observations. 
In case of Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends at 1%.   
However, the coefficient of Tobit model in India is insignificant. In case of Pakistan the 
results confirm the finding of OLS model i.e institutional ownership has no significant 
relationship with dividend payout. In Sri Lanka, it is found that institutional ownership is 
significantly related with payout in pre-crisis period but not in post crisis period. In order 
to estimate the impact of institutional shareholdings on decision to pay dividend Logit 
model is applied. The coefficient of institutional ownership is significant in Bangladesh 
and India but insignificant in case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The binary logistic 
regression (Logit) measure the impact of ownership structure on decision to pay or not to 
pay dividend, which is significant in India and Bangladesh which shows that the 
institutional ownership is not significantly related with decision to pay dividends.   
Several researchers (see for example; Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Loderer and Martin, 1997; 
Cho, 1998; Bohren and Odegaard, 2001; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) argued that 
ownership is endogenous with firm performance. However, very few studies have 
considered the endogeneity of ownership in determining dividend payouts (see for 
example: Desai and Jin, 2011; Bena and Hanousek, 2005). Short et al., (2002), Grinstein 
& Michaely (2005) and Thanatawee (2013) claimed that endogeneity is the issue when 
using ownership structure to estimate firm performance and for dividend policy 
endogeneity is unlikely to exist. The present study applied endogeneity test to resolve the 
problem caused by endogenous explanatory variable, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) 
suggested an augmented regression test commonly known as Durbin–Wu–Hausman test, 
which is conducted by including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side 
variable, as a function of all exogenous variables, in a regression of the original model.   
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At first stage the correlations between residual of original model and explanatory 
variables are estimated. The results showed no significant association between 
explanatory variables and the residual (not reported here). At second level, more 
advanced technique was applied to test the endogeneity of ownership variable, as 
suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). In this technique the instrument i.e. 
ranked ownership along with other exogenous variables were regressed on the suspected 
endogenous variable of ownership and residual from this equation is then used among 
explanatory variables in original model. The insignificant coefficient of additional 
residual showed that the model is not suffered from endogeneity due to institutional 
ownership variable. The results are presented in Table 6.11.  
  
  
  
Table 6.11: Test of Endogeneity in Institutional Ownership Model  
CNT  
Estimation  
BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  
Step 1 
INST  
Step 2  
DPO  
Step 1 
INST  
Step 2  
DPO  
Step 1 
INST  
Step 2  
DPO  
Step 1 
INST  
Step 2  
DPO  
Constant  
2.718  
[1.299]  
(0.197)  
0.161  
{0.388}  
(.606)  
-8.337  
[-4.208] 
(0.000)  
13.568  
{2.079}  
(.039)  
-0.002  
[-0.187] 
(0.852)  
0.423  
{1.479}  
(.140)  
72.951  
[2.744]  
(0.007)  
-0.729  
{-1.090}  
(.280)  
INST  
---  
---  
---  
0.020  
{4.829}  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
0.248  
{2.533}  
(.017)  
---  
---  
---  
0.238  
{2.689}  
(.007)  
---  
---  
---  
0.006  
{2.749}  
(.007)  
Rank  
0.183  
[48.372] 
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
1.459  
[0.326]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
0.013  
[15.390] 
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
2.964  
[5.929]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
Res_1  ---  0.034  ---  -0.437  ---  1.109  ---  0.014  
 
 ---  [1.748]  ---  {1.348}  ---  {1.103}  ---  {1.201}  
 ---  (0.083)  ---  (.180)  ---  (.303)  ---  (0.212)  
 Exogenous  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 F-Sig  0.000  0.007  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.000  0.000  
 
DWH test of endogeneity: INST is proportion of institutional shareholdings: DPO represents dividend 
payout. N is same as given in Table 6.10  
  
6.3.3. Impact of Cash Flow on Dividend Policy  
In addition to ownership structure the liquidity position of the company at a given point 
in time is also very important in determining the amount of cash dividends. The company 
which is facing constraints related to liquidity may desire to choose bonus shares or stock 
dividend rather than paying dividends in cash. Jensen (1986) argued in his free cash flow 
proposition that primarily companies prefer to utilize their own resources available in 
liquid form to invest in profitable projects and cash dividend is paid from the remaining 
amount, if left unutilized.   
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According to Berle & Means (1932) the unproductive use of funds, left after making 
investments in profitable projects by management is the major source of conflict of 
interest between ownership and management. The payment of cash dividend (and interest 
as well) helps in reducing the position of miss-utilization of funds by managers on the 
projects their private benefits by reducing the free cash flow available to management. 
From company’s perspective, the most significant role in deciding cash dividend is 
played by the availability of operating cash flow. It is understandable that companies 
having high cash produced from its regular business operations are expected to be in a 
better position to pay cash dividends as compared to the companies having negative or 
very less cash flow from operations.  Table 6.12 presents the estimated result of cash 
flow model using dividend payout and dividend intensity as dependent variables. The 
estimated results of CFO in Bangladesh are significant (P-value < 1%) with control 
variables. This shows that operating cash flow is significantly and positively related with 
dividend payout and dividend intensity in Bangladesh. The explanatory power of models 
shows that cash flow, along with control variables, explains 13% of change in dividend 
payout and dividend intensity.  The results of cash flow model are in line with the study 
of Huda & Farah (2011) which analyzed the relationship between cash balance and 
dividend policy and reported a significantly positive impact of operating cash flow on 
dividend policy measured by dividend payout. However, when estimated with dividend 
intensity (DINT) the cash flow model was rejected and not reported in the table 6.12.   
Similarly, in India the relationship between operating cash flow and dividend policy is 
significant. The cash flow model is estimated with and without control variables and 
results show that operating cash flow plays a major role in determining dividend payout 
and dividend intensity in India. The high value of coefficient of CFO in payout model 
shows that one unit increase in operating cash increases the payout with 9.8 
approximately, which is the indication of major contribution of cash flow in determining 
dividend payouts.  Mahapatra & Sahu (1993) also reported the positive impact of 
operating cash flow on dividend policy in India.  
The cash flow model is also estimated in Pakistan and the results showed that cash flow 
from operations is an important determinant of dividend payout and dividend intensity in 
Pakistan. The coefficients of CFO are significant at the level 1% with estimated with 
control variables. The explanatory power of the model is around 16% with dividend 
intensity as dependent variable. The positive relation of operating cash flow with 
dividend policy is in line with the finding of Afza & Mirza (2010) who argued that 
Pakistani companies pay more dividends if operating cash flow is high.  
Similar results are also observed in Sri Lanka where the coefficients of CFO are 
significantly positive with dividend intensity. Few researchers have investigated the 
relationship between cash and dividend policy in Sri Lanka. The author found only the 
study of Elangkumaran (2012) on determinant of dividend payout ratio in Sri Lanka 
which considered cash as a determinant of dividend payout. The result of Elangkumaran 
(2012) showed a significantly positive relationship of cash and dividend payout. The 
result of this study also showed that the companies in which cash flow from operations is 
high pay more dividends.  
The estimated results show the importance of cash flow from operations in determining 
dividend payouts in South Asian countries. Companies do not prefer the source of 
investments or financing to pay regular dividend because these sources are not 
sustainable and business cannot rely on them in long run. Using the logic developed by 
Lintner (1956) managers would only be ready to increase dividends as a result of 
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increased earnings if they believe that this increase in earnings is sustainable. In the same 
way, business would not use that source of cash flow to pay dividends which is not 
sustainable. For example, if firm uses cash generated from investing activity i.e. sale of 
assets or financing activity i.e. by note payable, firm would not be able to pay future 
dividends using this source as this will severely damage the financing strength of 
business. Therefore, operating cash flow is the only source which should be used to pay 
dividend and the firm must put its efforts in strengthening the source of operating cash so 
that it can maintain dividend payout over a long period of time.    
    
   
  
Table 6.12: Cash Flow Model (Equation 5.1 c)  
 
CNT  BNG  BNG  BNG  IND  IND  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  SL  SL  
DV  DPO  DPO  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  
Constant  
0.130  
[2.516]  
(0.014)  
-0.981  
[-1.972]  
(0.053)  
-0.003  
[-0.093]  
(0.926)  
20.616  
[15.907]  
(0.000)  
17.916  
[4.037]  
(0.000)  
0.017  
[7.871]  
(0.000)  
0.019  
[2.578]  
(0.010)  
0.234  
[5.111]  
(0.000)  
0.201  
[0.591]  
(0.555)  
0.019  
[3.177]  
(0.002)  
0.055  
[1.244]  
(0.214)  
0.383  
[3.728]  
(.000)  
-1.803  
[-1.571]  
(0.121)  
-0.115  
[-3.218]  
(.001)  
-0.105  
[-3.108]  
(.003)  
CFO  
0.572  
[1.761]  
(0.083)  
0.901  
[2.397]  
(0.020)  
0.490  
[2.143]  
(0.036)  
10.325  
[2.015]  
(0.045)  
9.800  
[2.860]  
(0.004)  
0.050  
[6.028]  
(0.000)  
0.050  
[5.797]  
(0.000)  
0.277  
[2.171]  
(0.031)  
0.220  
[2.690]  
(0.004)  
0.094  
[5.527]  
(0.000)  
0.077  
[4.576]  
(0.000)  
0.367  
[0.369]  
(0.713)  
0.121  
[0.119]  
(0.906)  
0.011  
[2.214]  
(0.043)  
0.015  
[2.524]  
(0.032)  
SZ  
---  
---  
---  
0.053  
[2.287]  
(0.026)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
0.491  
[0.636]  
(0.525)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[-0.281]  
(0.779)  
---  
---  
---  
0.022  
[0.265]  
(0.791)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.006  
[-0.536]  
(0.592)  
---  
---  
---  
0.109  
[2.038]  
(0.046)  
---  
---  
---  
0.006  
[4.031]  
(.000)  
LVG  
---  
---  
---  
-0.201  
[-1.208]  
(0.232)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
-0.016  
[-1.112]  
(0.267)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[-0.685]  
(0.494)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.161  
[-0.688]  
(0.492)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.044  
[-1.459]  
(0.145)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.150  
[-0.378]  
(0.706)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.034  
[-2.900]  
(0.005)  
PRFT  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[-0.629]  
(0.532)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
0.007  
[0.380]  
(0.704)  
---  
---  
---  
0.002  
[0.121]  
(0.940)  
---  
---  
---  
0.005  
[2.494]  
(0.013)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[5.062]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.001  
[-0.181]  
(0.857)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[3.687]  
(0.000)  
N  201  201  201  598  598  598  598  401  401  401  401  156  156  156  156  
R2  0.044  0.122  0.067  0.012  0.018  0.095  0.094  0.012  0.036  0.076  0.158  0.045  0.074  0.403  0.201  
Adj R2  0.030  0.063  0.052  0.009  0.006  0.092  0.083  0.009  0.026  0.074  0.149  0.002  0.017  0.364  0.161  
D/W  1.805  1.875  1.676  1.778  1.988  2.114  2.221  1.945  1.653  1.729  1.987  1.827  1.957  1.827  1.762  
F-STAT  3.102  2.079  4.593  4.061  1.484  36.335  8.602  4.712  3.443  30.547  17.182  2.565  3.767  10.316  12.374  
Sig- F  0.083  0.005  0.036  0.045  0.007  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.009  0.000  0.000  0.713  0.057  0.000  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) and Dividend Intensity (DINT); Independent variables: Cash Flow from Operations (CFO); Size of Firm  
(SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of 
Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value). N represents number of valid firm-year observations. In case of 
Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends at 1%..  
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 In order to analyze the impact of financial crisis on relationship between operating cash 
flow and dividend payout, the sample data is divided in two periods i.e. pre and post 
crisis. Table 6.13 presents the results which show no significant change in direction of 
relationship between cash flow and dividend payout in pre and post crisis in Bangladesh. 
Similarly in India the operating cash flow is significant in both pre and post crisis period 
only. During and after the crisis the companies reduce dividends and their free cash flow 
is more important to meet their working capital need therefore, in post crisis period the 
operating cash flow relevant for payment of cash dividends. In Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
the relationship of cash flow is significant in post crisis period. As these two economies 
are not rapidly growing as compared to India and the option of share repurchase is also 
not widely used in these countries therefore, the justification of this significant 
relationship could be the lack of growth opportunities available to the companies due to 
which companies’ preferred to pay cash dividends out of free cash flows.  The overall 
explanatory power of all models is weak in post crisis period.  
Table 6.13: Cash Flow Model (Pre and Post Financial Crisis of 2008)  
CNT  
FC  
BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  
Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post  
OCF  
1.074  
[2.246]  
(0.043)  
0.969  
[2.050]  
(0.047)  
0.581  
[2.914]  
(0.005)  
1.380  
[2.912]  
(0.006)  
0.238  
[1.412]  
(0.159)  
0.437  
[2.123]  
(0.037)  
-1.981  
[-1.767]  
(0.108)  
1.176  
[3.007]  
(0.004)  
N  201  201  598  598  401  401  156  156  
Intercept Sig  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R Square  0.752  0.100  0.241  0.038  0.055  0.093  0.152  0.326  
Adjusted R  0.676  0.014  0.182  0.008  0.039  0.045  0.092  0.270  
DW  2.341  1.534  1.562  1.509  1.936  1.859  1.701  2.571  
F stat  9.875  2.697  4.058  1.251  3.398  3.512  1.362  5.810  
Sig F  0.001  0.008  0.006  0.054  0.010  0.008  0.361  0.001  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) Independent variables: Operating Cash Flow (CFO), Size of  
Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less 
than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain 
[tstatistic]; (P-Value). N represents number of firm year observations.  
Table 6.14 presents the result of cash flow model using Tobit regression and also to judge 
the impact of operating cash flow on decision to pay or not to pay dividend. Estimated 
results from Tobit model reconfirm the finding in Table 6.13 and shows that cash flow 
from operations significantly and positively related with dividend policy in South Asian 
countries.  Regarding decision to pay or not to pay dividend only in India and Pakistan 
the increase in operating cash flow seems to have an increasing effect on probability to 
pay dividends.   
Table 6.14: Cash Flow Model (Tobit and Logit Estimation)  
 
CNT  
Estimation  
BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  
Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  
Constant  
32.591  
[1.64]  
(0.104)  
1.505  
{4.506}  
(0.755)  
0.012  
[1.40]  
(0.163)  
-0.598  
{0.550}  
(0.217)  
0.011  
[0.17]  
(0.862)  
1.134  
{3.107}  
(.233)  
-6.782  
[-1.50]  
(0.137)  
-5.352  
{.005}  
(.161)  
 CFO  
2.322  
[2.11]  
(0.036)  
5.121  
{167.528}  
(0.212)  
0.048  
[4.79]  
(0.000)  
0.183  
{0.833}  
(0.037)  
0.109  
[4.59]  
(0.000)  
4.010  
{55.163}  
(0.000)  
-4.923  
[-1.28]  
(0.204)  
2.696  
{14.818}  
(0.376)  
SZ  
-1.625  
[-1.79]  
(0.076)  
-0.108  
{0.897}  
(0.631)  
0.003  
[2.23]  
(0.027)  
0.384  
{1.468}  
(0.000)  
0.000  
[0.34]  
(0.732)  
-0.101  
{.904}  
(.670)  
0.332  
[1.58]  
(0.118)  
0.341  
{1.406}  
(.064)  
LVG  
.189  
[0.11]  
(0.910)  
1.039  
{0.561}  
(2.826)  
-0.015  
[-7.40]  
(0.000)  
-0.498  
{0.608}  
(0.000)  
-0.170  
[-3.59]  
(0.000)  
-3.478  
{.031}  
(.000)  
-.999  
[-0.58]  
(0.565)  
-3.329  
{.036}  
(.015)  
PRFT  
.0139  
[0.95]  
(0.343)  
0.028  
{0.085}  
(0.085)  
-.0042  
[-1.40]  
(0.432)  
0.008  
{1.008}  
(0.022)  
.003  
[6.92]  
(0.000)  
.029  
{1.030}  
(.000)  
.016  
[0.97]  
(0.336)  
.043  
{1.044}  
(.058)  
N  201  201  598  598  401  401  156  156  
Pseudo R2  0.0073  ---  0.1420  ---  0.2922  ---  0.0179  ---  
Log Likelihood  -276.330  64.922  -384.58  305.443  -397.58  373.256  -133.066  72.847  
LR Chi2(4)  4.08  ---  95.06  ---  109.77  ---  4.86  ---  
P-Value Chi2  0.3950  ---  0.0000  ---  0.000  ---  0.3017  ---  
Cox and Snell  ---  0.194   ---  0.203  ---  0.250  ---  0.197  
Nagelkerke R2  ----  0.278   ---  0.299  ---  0.334  ---  0.278  
Wald test  ----  11.099   ---  72.245  ---  31.697  ---  10.297  
Sig-Wald  ----  0.001  ---  0.000  ---  0.000  ---  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO). Independent variables: Cash Flow from Operations (CFO); 
Size of Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (Tobit and Logit): 
Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value);{Exp-B} In case of Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends 
at 1%. . N represents number of firm year observations.  
6.3.4. Impact of Sensitivity of Cash on Dividend Policy  
Table 6.15 presents the estimated results from sensitivity of cash model which shows that 
in Bangladesh the sensitivity of cash significantly and negatively affect the dividend 
payout and dividend intensity of listed companies while in Pakistan cash flow sensitivity 
is negatively related with dividend intensity only. This shows that in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan companies with high cash flow sensitivity pay less dividends.  This result is in 
line with the argument of Almeida et al. (2004). Firms facing financial constraints 
maintain greater level of cash reserves and retain greater portion of the cash for future 
needs. In other words, the liquidity of a firm is significantly more important when the 
firm is unable to arrange finance from capital market. In such scenario liquid resources 
are necessary for capturing  
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future profitable investment opportunities and development projects (Khurana et al., 
2006). Almeida et al. (2004) also pointed out that firms facing financial constraints will 
save more cash today to finance future investment and growth opportunities. It is 
intuitive that if a firm’s cash saving tendency is increasing and it has started 
accumulating more cash reserve, then this is an indication of availability of profitable 
investment opportunities and/or financial constraints, as a result the firms tendency to pay 
high cash dividend or the payout ratio of the firm starts decreasing (Almeida et al., 2004). 
The estimated results of Bangladesh and Pakistan show that the listed companies reduce 
their dividends when they are cash flow sensitive.  
 In case of India and Sri Lanka, the sensitivity of cash does not have significant 
relationship with dividend payout except with dividend intensity, which exists only in 
India. On the reasons behind the insignificant relationship of cash flow sensitivity and 
dividend payout could be the non-availability of profitable investment opportunities. 
Saving cash at present time could be expensive for the firms because to save cash today it 
has to scarify the current investment opportunities. The firm with financial constraints 
attempts to design a best cash management strategy that helps in creating a trades-off 
between future growth opportunities and investments. But if firms are not available with 
good investment opportunities then sensitivity of cash has lesser role to play in 
determining dividend policy (Almeida et al., 2004). The estimated result of cash flow 
sensitivity model with dividend payout is not reported for Sri Lanka due to insignificant 
F value. However, with alternate proxy of dividend payout policy i.e. dividend intensity 
the relationship is negative but insignificant. Rest of the three variables is controls and 
the F value of models are significant at the level less than 5% except in case of dividend 
payout for India.   
  
   
  
  
  
Table 6.15: Sensitivity of Cash Model (Equation 5.1 d)  
 
CNT  
DV  
BNG  BNG  BNG  BNG  IND  IND  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  
DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DINT  DINT  
Constant  
0.164  
[4.84]  
(0.000)  
-0.517  
[-1.125]  
(0.265)  
0.022  
[1.014]  
(0.314)  
0.443  
[1.411]  
(0.164)  
21.563  
[17.833]  
(0.000)  
41.391  
[9.328]  
(0.000)  
0.021  
[10.382]  
(0.000)  
0.020  
[2.821]  
(0.005)  
0.234  
[5.111]  
(0.000)  
0.201  
[0.591]  
(0.555)  
0.019  
[3.177]  
(0.002)  
0.055  
[1.244]  
(0.214)  
.019  
[5.892]  
(.000)  
-.103  
[-3.02]  
(.004)  
CFS  
-1.532  
[-2.507]  
(0.015)  
-1.589  
[-2.430]  
(0.018)  
-1.496  
[-3.57]  
(0.001)  
-1.601  
[-3.45]  
(0.001)  
5.602  
[0.487]  
(0.627)  
-10.657  
[-0.649]  
(0.5167)  
0.019  
[0.970]  
(0.332)  
0.019  
[1.969]  
(0.049)  
-0.277  
[-2.171]  
(0.031)  
-0.220  
[-1.690]  
(0.092)  
-0.094  
[-5.52]  
(0.000)  
-0.077  
[-4.57]  
(0.000)  
-.016  
[-.405]  
(.686)  
-0.022  
[-0.62]  
(0.536)  
SZ  
---  
---  
---  
0.035  
[1.610]  
(0.113)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.020  
[-1.335]  
(0.187)  
---  
---  
---  
-1.429  
[-1.924]  
(0.055)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[0.146]  
(0.883)  
---  
---  
---  
0.022  
[0.265]  
(0.791)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.006  
[-0.536]  
(0.592)  
---  
---  
---  
.006  
[3.968]  
(.000)  
LVG  
---  
---  
---  
-0.250  
[-1.470]  
(0.147)  
---  
---  
---  
0.061  
[0.517]  
(0.608)  
---  
---  
---  
-2.022  
[-1.809]  
(0.0715)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[-3.65]  
(0.003)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.161  
[-0.688]  
(0.492)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.044  
[-1.459]  
(0.145)  
---  
---  
---  
-.034  
[-2.910]  
(.005)  
PRFT  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[0.069]  
(0.946)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[-0.417]  
(0.678)  
---  
---  
---  
0.024  
[1.445]  
(0.149)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[0.339]  
(0.738)  
---  
---  
---  
0.005  
[2.494]  
(0.013)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[5.062]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
.001  
[4.001]  
(.000)  
N  201  201  201  598  598  598  598  401  401  401  401  156  156  156  
R2  0.086  0.351  0.167  0.209  0.002  0.036  0.052  0.068  0.012  0.036  0.076  0.158  0.004  0.405  
Adj R2  0.072  0.123  0.154  0.151  0.001  0.020  0.003  0.008  0.009  0.026  0.074  0.149  0.001  0.366  
D/W  1.745  1.765  1.663  1.734  1.944  1.414  1.023  1.599  1.831  1.653  1.729  1.987  1.878  1.949  
F-STAT  6.283  2.173  12.810  3.569  0.237  2.377  0.942  3.355  4.712  3.443  30.547  17.182  1.364  10.363  
Sig- F  0.015  0.076  0.000  0.012  0.627  0.049  0.332  0.009  0.004  0.009  0.000  0.000  0.686  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) and Dividend Intensity (DINT); Independent variables: Cash Flow Sensitivity (CFS), Size of Firm (SZ); 
Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of 
Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value). In case of Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends at 1%.   
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One of the reasons behind the insignificant relationship of CFS with proxies of payout 
policy could be the financial crisis of 2008 because cash flow sensitivity of firms 
increases during and after the period of crisis. In order to analyze the impact of financial 
crisis, the sample is divided in pre and post crisis period. It is observed that only in 
Bangladesh the cash flow sensitivity is significant in pre-crisis period but insignificant 
after the crisis. The possible justification of pre-crisis significance could be that before 
crisis firms have growth opportunities due to which high cash sensitivity firms paid lesser 
dividends. For the rest of the countries the CFS remained insignificant in both pre and 
post crisis. The explanatory power of the models also reduced in post crisis period.  
Table 6.16: Sensitivity of Cash Model (Pre and Post Financial Crisis of 2008)  
 CNT  BNG  BNG  IND  PAK  
 Pre  Post  Pre  Post  
CFS  
-1.209  
[-2.559]  
(0.024)  
-4.188  
{-1.735}  
(0.051)  
9.828  
[0.634]  
(0.527)  
20.542  
[0.851]  
(0.396)  
-0.274  
[-1.192]  
(0.235)  
0.115  
[0.361]  
(0.719)  
-2.082  
[-1.297]  
(0.224)  
0.059  
[0.108]  
(0.915)  
N  201  201  598  598  401  401  156  156  
Intercept Sig  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Control   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R Square  0.771  0.344  0.041  0.017  0.060  0.025  0.272  0.199  
Adjusted R  0.701  0.241  0.012  0.010  0.044  0.010  0.012  0.133  
DW  2.341  1.534  1.562  1.529  1.656  1.745  2.701  2.571  
F stat  10.968  2.697  4.058  4.010  3.694  3.512  2.662  2.990  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) Independent variables: Cash Flow Sensitivity (CFS), Size of  
Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less 
than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain 
[tstatistic]; (P-Value). N represents the number of firm year observations.  
In Table 6.17 the results of Tobit model showed insignificant relationship of cash flow 
sensitivity with payout policy in all sample countries which confirms the results of OLS 
model. No evidence of cash flow sensitivity is observed in sample countries of South 
Asia, using Tobit estimation technique. Similarly, the cash flow sensitivity does not 
significantly affect decision to pay dividend, as estimated in Logit model. Based on 
estimated results it seems that cash flow sensitivity is not an important determinant of 
dividend payout policy in India and Sri Lanka.  
  
Table 6.17: Sensitivity of Cash Model (Tobit and Logit Estimation)  
 
 
Constant  
34.711  
[1.75]  
(0.083)  
4.447  
{85.342}  
(0.305)  
12.559  
[2.16]  
(0.032)  
-0.642  
{0.526}  
(0.188)  
.525  
[-1.47]  
(0.145)  
2.000  
{7.391}  
(.028)  
-6.284  
[-1.47]  
(0.145)  
-5.291  
{.005}  
(.164)  
CFS  
2.587  
[0.23]  
(0.821)  
-0.075  
{0.928}  
(0.979)  
16.020  
[0.94]  
(0.347)  
2.295  
{9.926}  
(0.110)  
-0.142  
[-1.61]  
(0.111)  
1.051  
{2.861}  
(.128)  
-11.623  
[-1.88]  
(0.063)  
1.043  
{2.838}  
(.788)  
  BNG   BNG   IND   IND   PAK   PAK   SL   SL   
  Tobit   Logit   Tobit   Logit   Tobit   Logit   Tobit   Logit   
IND   PAK   SL   SL   
FC   Post   Pre   Pre   Post   
 SZ  
-1.704  
[-1.88]  
(0.063)  
-0.221  
{0.802}  
(0.298)  
2.481  
[2.50]  
(0.013)  
0.382  
{1.465}  
(0.000)  
-.136  
[1.55]  
(0.125)  
-.247  
{.781}  
(.283)  
.308  
[1.55]  
(0.125)  
.340  
{1.404}  
(.064)  
LVG  
-.066  
[-0.04]  
(0.972)  
1.073  
{2.925}  
(0.553)  
-6.361  
[-5.00]  
(0.000)  
-0.491  
{0.612}  
(0.000)  
-.846  
[-0.61]  
(0.543)  
-3.662  
{.026}  
(0.000)  
-1.017  
[-1.61]  
(0.075)  
-3.330  
{.036}  
(.014)  
PRFT  
.0143  
[0.98]  
(0.328)  
0.032  
{1.032}  
(0.305)  
-.0049  
[-0.21]  
(0.830)  
0.009  
{1.009}  
(0.019)  
.018  
[1.12]  
(0.265)  
.037  
{1.038}  
(0.000)  
.0176  
[1.12]  
(0.265)  
.047  
{1.048}  
(.036)  
N  201  201  598  598  401  401  156  156  
Pseudo R2  0.0072  
  0.017    0.070    0.035    
Log Likelihood  -276.37  66.675  -1246.68  302.225  -365.377  32.338  -130.68  73.852  
LR Chi2(5)  4.00  
  44.87    55.53  0.000  9.62    
P-Value Chi2  0.405  
  0.0000    0.0000    0.0473    
Cox and Snell  
  0.173    0.211    0.213    0.189  
Nagelkerke R2  
  0.248    0.310    0.293    0.266  
Wald test  
  11.099    72.245    32.338    10.297  
Sig-Wald  
  0.001    0.000    0.000    0.000  
 
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO). Independent variables: Cash Flow Sensitivity (CFS); Size of 
Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (Tobit and Logit): Parentheses 
contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value);{Exp-B}. In case of Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends at 1%.   
6.4.5. Impact of Growth Opportunities on Dividend Policy  
Based on perceived future growth opportunities, companies plan to accumulate funds for 
their future needs. Therefore, future expected growth opportunities play important role in 
defining the level of free cash flow available for distribution of cash dividends. 
According to the dividend irrelevance hypothesis, the decision to pay dividends is 
independent from decision to make investments, keeping perfect market assumptions 
under consideration. But this is due to the violations of perfect capital market 
assumptions that these two decisions compete for the cheaper source of funds i.e. retained 
earnings. The dependence of investment and dividend decisions is due to the dividend 
payments made by company out of retained earnings, and defer the utilization of 
relatively expensive sources of debt or new equity issue. That is why, dividend payouts 
reduce the potential of company to make investments in high profit yielding projects, as a 
result both investment and dividend decision becomes dependent on each other. 
According to Mirza (2010) “to have profitable investment opportunities or positive NPV 
projects, requires internally generated funds, therefore, such companies pay lower 
dividend”, which is in line with the pecking order  
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theory presented by Mayers & Majluf (1984). The study argued that firms pay lesser 
dividends due to the reason of high investments and lesser free cash flow available. The 
present study analyzed the impact of growth opportunities on dividend payouts by 
employing a proxy variable for future growth opportunities (GRTH) which is measure 
with market to book ratio.   
Table 6.18 presents the estimated results of growth model using ordinary least square 
regression. Dividend payout and dividend intensity are used as dependent variables. In 
Bangladesh, the growth model is estimated with and without control variables of size, 
 leverage and profitability. The relationship of growth opportunity23 with dividend payout 
is negative but insignificant. However, with dividend intensity the relationship is 
significantly negative which shows that growth opportunities negatively affect corporate 
dividend decisions in Bangladesh. However, the explanatory power of the model is very 
low which means the growth opportunities do not play a major role in determining 
dividend payout of companies in Bangladesh.   
Similarly in India the growth opportunities have negative relationship with dividend 
intensity. According to the hypothesis, GRTH is expected to have negative impact of 
dividend payout capability of firm due to the fact that in growth phase companies do not 
have sufficient funds to pay dividends but on the other side in order to maintain price of 
share in the market companies do not cut or reduce dividends. This shows that Indian 
companies reduce dividends when they are available with good investment opportunities.   
                                                 
23 In case of Bangladesh GRTH is trimmed from both ends at 1% to exclude outliers. This improved the 
significance of variables and explanatory power of model. However, no change in the direction of 
relationship is observed.  
  
   
  
  
Table 6.18: Growth Model (Equation 5.1 e)  
 
CNT  
DV  
BNG  BNG  BNG  BNG  IND  IND  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  SL  SL  
DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  
Constant  
0.279  
[6.914]  
(0.000)  
1.295  
[2.101]  
(0.042)  
0.049  
[1.214]  
(0.229)  
0.255  
[0.397]  
(0.692)  
21.488  
[17.857]  
(0.000)  
16.529  
[3.748]  
(0.000)  
0.022  
[10.443]  
(0.000)  
.0160  
[1.793]  
(0.074)  
.262  
[7.927]  
(0.000)  
.388  
[1.672]  
(.095)  
.028  
[7.411]  
(0.000)  
.073  
[2.854]  
(.004)  
.137  
[2.131]  
(.037)  
-.453  
[-.961]  
(.340)  
.008  
[1.697]  
(.094)  
-.052  
[-1.574]  
(.121)  
GRTH  
0.001  
[0.686]  
(0.495)  
-0.003  
[-0.855]  
(0.396)  
-0.004  
[-2.837]  
(0.006)  
-0.005  
-[2.860]  
(0.006)  
-0.058  
[-0.882]  
(0.379)  
0.779  
[1.437]  
(0.142)  
0.000  
[0.241]  
(0.810)  
-0.006  
[-6.450]  
(0.000)  
-0.003  
[3.215]  
(0.001)  
-0.003  
[3.388]  
(0.001)  
-0.001  
[-8.820]  
(0.000)  
-0.001  
[-9.275]  
(0.000)  
-0.095  
[-2.291]  
(.025)  
0.037  
[.805]  
(.424)  
-0.008  
[-2.848]  
(.006)  
-0.007  
[-1.872]  
(.046)  
SZ  
---  
---  
---  
-0.034  
[-1.279]  
(0.205)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.009  
[-0.3+  
806]  
(0.761)  
---  
---  
---  
0.807  
[1.096]  
(0.274)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[-0.340]  
(0.734)  
---  
---  
---  
.036  
[.618]  
(0.537)  
---  
---  
---  
.001  
[.078]  
(.938)  
---  
---  
---  
.039  
[1.692]  
(.096)  
---  
---  
---  
.004  
[2.184]  
(.033)  
LVG  
---  
---  
---  
-0.093  
[-1.856]  
(0.068)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.025  
[-0.531]  
(0.604)  
---  
---  
---  
-2.342  
[-3.665]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.004  
[-3.389]  
(0.001)  
---  
---  
---  
-.478  
[-2.736]  
(0.006)  
---  
---  
---  
-.091  
[-4.657]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-.363  
[-2.215]  
(.031)  
---  
---  
---  
-.033  
[-2.555]  
(.013)  
PRFT  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[-3.039]  
(0.003)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[0.143]  
(0.886)  
---  
---  
---  
0.112  
[1.657]  
(0.099)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[3.276]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
.002  
[2.124]  
(0.034)  
---  
---  
---  
.001  
[4.804]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
.000  
[.082]  
(.935)  
---  
---  
---  
.000  
[2.098]  
(.040)  
N  199  199  199  199  550  550  550  550  398  398  398  398  146  146  146  146  
R2  0.007  0.166  0.099  0.155  0.047  0.088  0.013  0.215  0.017  0.045  0.113  0.195  0.078  0.190  0.334  0.334  
Adj R2  0.002  0.113  0.087  0.098  0.002  0.075  0.002  0.204  0.015  0.038  0.112  0.190  0.063  0.135  0.291  0.291  
D/W  1.996  1.900  1.104  1.892  1.232  1.532  1.112  2.285  2.119  1.883  1.495  2.343           
F-STAT  0.471  3.124  8.046  2.714  0.777  6.674  0.058  18.926  10.337  6.987  77.789  36.857  5.248  3.449  7.887  7.887  
Sig- F  0.495  0.021  0.006  0.038  0.379  0.000  0.810  0.000  0001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.025  0.013  0.000  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) and Dividend Intensity (DINT); Independent variables: Growth Opportunities (GRTH), Size of Firm (SZ); 
Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of 
Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value). In case of Bangladesh DPO and GRTH is trimmed from both ends 
at 1%.   
 .  
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The explanatory power of the model using DINT as dependent variable is 21% and F 
statistic shows the fitness of the model.  
In case of Pakistan, GRTH has a significantly negative impact on dividend payout which 
shows that Pakistani companies reduce dividends whenever they have investment 
opportunities. The relationship is significant with both proxies of payout policy when 
estimated with control variables. However in Sri Lanka the growth opportunities as 
determined by market to book ratio has an insignificant relationship with dividend 
payout, but the relationship is significant with alternate proxy of payout i.e. dividend 
intensity. This shows that Pakistani and Sri Lankan companies reduce dividends if they 
have growth opportunities. The low R2 value also depicts that growth opportunities only 
explain a bit of changes in dividend payouts and the model fit as determined by 
significance of F value is significant in all countries, when estimated using control 
variables.   
  
Table 6.19: Growth Model (Pre and Post Financial Crisis of 2008)  
 CNT  BNG  
Pre  
 0.001  -0.003  0.015  0.064  
 GRTH  [0.308]  {-2.880}  [0.488]  [-2.394]  [-2.755]  [-2.005]  [0.190]  [1.031]  
 (0.762)  (0.006)  (0.627)  (0.015)  (0.006)  (0.046)  (0.853)  (0.308)  
N  199  199  550  550  398  398  146  146  
Intercept Sig  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R Square  0.733  0.190  0.066  0.122  0.061  0.050  0.183  0.225  
Adjusted R  0.742  0.134  0.031  0.101  0.048  0.035  0.012  0.153  
DW  2.341  1.534  1.562  1.529  1.936  1.859  2.701  2.571  
F stat  15.344  3.394  4.058  5.772  4.829  3.928  7.662  3.127  
Sig F  0.001  0.015  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.006  0.004  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO); Independent variables: Growth Opportunities; Control; Size 
of Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less 
than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain 
[t-statistic]; (P-Value).  
  
It is argued that growth opportunities quickly disappear during crisis but after the crisis 
the companies again start growing. At the end of crisis companies who have more growth 
opportunities reduce their dividend payouts. Table 6.19 shows the estimated results of 
growth model in pre and post crisis period. It is found that in Bangladesh and India the 
growth opportunities are significantly negative in post crisis period which shows that 
after the crisis the companies are available with high growth opportunities therefore they 
BNG   IND   IND   PAK   PAK   SL   SL   
FC   Post   Pre   Post   Pre   Post   Pre   Post   
- 0.0 17   0.486   - 0.851   - 0.008   
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are reluctant to pay high dividends. In Pakistan the growth opportunities are significantly 
and negatively related with dividend payouts in both pre and post crisis period. However, 
in Sri Lanka no significant relationship of growth opportunities is found in both periods.  
Table 6.20: Growth Model (Tobit and Logit Estimation)  
CNT  
Estimation  
BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  
Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Logit  
Constant  
35.566  
[1.51]  
(0.136)  
9.966  
{2129.5}  
(0.055)  
13.256  
[2.20]  
(0.029)  
-1.952  
{0.142}  
(0.005)  
.297  
[0.88]  
(0.379)  
1.610  
{5.000}  
(.023)  
-5.360  
[-1.06]  
(0.292)  
.114  
{1.120}  
(.972)  
GRTH  
-.0123  
[-1.32]  
(0.191)  
-0.013  
{0.987}  
(0.073)  
-.349  
[-0.92]  
(0.357)  
-0.047  
{0.954}  
(0.561)  
-.004  
[-3.39]  
(0.001)  
-.457  
{1.579}  
(0.000)  
.185  
[0.74]  
(0.464)  
.106  
{1.111}  
(.757)  
SZ  
-1.735  
[-1.57]  
(0.120)  
-0.451  
{0.637}  
(0.056)  
1.818  
[1.85]  
(0.066)  
0.300  
{1.350}  
(0.010)  
.068  
[0.78]  
(0.435)  
-.021  
{.979}  
(0.907)  
.248  
[1.03]  
(0.307)  
.084  
{1.088}  
(.599)  
LVG  
.760  
[0.09]  
(0.926)  
0.175  
{1.192}  
(0.828)  
-5.690  
[-4.25]  
(0.000)  
-0.293  
{0.746}  
(0.035)  
-1.393  
[-5.36]  
(0.000)  
-5.088  
{.006}  
(0.000)  
-1.247  
[-0.65]  
(0.517)  
-3.385  
{.034}  
(.015)  
PRFT  
.0126  
[0.76]  
(0.447)  
0.083  
{1.086}  
(0.007)  
.184  
[1.96]  
(0.051)  
0.463  
{1.590}  
(0.000)  
.009  
[4.95]  
(0.000)  
.034  
{1.035}  
(0.000)  
.009  
[0.53]  
(0.597)  
.002  
{1.002}  
(.820)  
N  199  199  550  550  398  398  146  146  
Pseudo R2  0.010  ---  0.0146  ---  0.0642  ---  0.013  ---  
Log Likelihood  -232.561  45.648  -1214.98  176.422  -629.918  586.973  -126.37  76.995  
LR Chi2(5)  5.08  ---  35.94  ---  86.39  ---  3.52  ---  
P-Value Chi2  0.279  ---  0.0000  ---  0.0000  ---  0.475  ---  
Cox and Snell  ---  0.357  ---  0.458  ---  0.327  ---  0.137  
Nagelkerke R2  ---  0.519  ---  0.678  ---  0.441  ---  0.190  
Wald test  ---  12.299  ---  71.005  ---  18.858  ---  6.856  
Sig-Wald  ---  0.000  ---  0.000  ---  0.000  ---  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO). Independent variables: Growth Opportunities (GRTH); Size 
of Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (Tobit and Logit): 
Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value);{Exp-B}. In case of Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both 
ends at 1%.  
Based on Tobit estimation, the estimated results of Table 6.20 shows that growth 
opportunities are significantly negative in case of Pakistan but no significant relationship 
of GRTH and dividend policy is observed in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. Similarly, 
Logit regression is used to estimate the role of growth opportunities in decision to pay or 
not pay dividends. The estimated coefficient of growth opportunities using Logit 
regression is significantly negative in Pakistan which shows that increase in growth 
opportunities increase the probability of nonpayment of dividend. However, in rest of 
countries Logit model does not show any significant role of growth opportunities in 
decision to pay dividend.  
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6.3.6. Impact of Ownership Dispersion on Dividend Policy  
One of the important factors which affect dividends is the agency cost of controlling. 
Many researchers analyzed the issue for empirical explanation of the role of agency cost 
in financial decisions related to capital structure, and dividend policy (see for example, 
Ang et al., 2000). The managers, who act on behalf of shareholders as agents, actually 
control company’s asset without proper knowledge of owners, the shareholders, and they 
put these assets for a range of purposes which could be disadvantageous to the interest of 
the shareholders. They can also do this to get private benefit of control. It is argued in 
existing literature that, in order to reduce the agency problems and its associated costs, 
the company should pay higher dividends. Rozef, (1982) argued that in the presence of 
large number of shareholders the monitoring of the company would be more costly. The 
most commonly used measure of dispersion of ownership is the number of shareholders 
(Rozeff, 1982, Dempsey & Laber, 1992, Schooley & Barney, 1994 & Deshmukh, 2003). 
If due to ownership concentration the interest between management and shareholder get 
aligned, as studies of corporate performance have suggested, there should be a higher 
dividend payout (Deshmukh, 2003). However, ownership concentration can also 
facilitate rent extraction by dominant shareholders, resulting in lower payouts (Harada & 
Pascal, 2006). In order to analyze the impact of ownership dispersion on firm’s potential 
to pay dividends; the present study has used ODIS as proxy to capture the firms level 
ownership dispersion.   
The estimated results of Table 6.21 support the outcome model of dividend in South 
Asian countries. In Bangladesh the ownership dispersion is significantly positively 
related with dividend payout. However, the relationship of ownership dispersion with 
dividend intensity is negative and insignificant. The model explained 16% variation in 
dividend payout when estimated with control variables. The DW test and F stat showed 
that the model is not affected due to serial correlation. The results suggest that in 
Bangladesh, the companies with dispersed ownership are expected to pay more dividends 
as compared to the companies where ownership is concentrated.  
Similar results are observed in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka where ownership dispersion 
is significantly and positively related with dividend payout. The estimated results show 
that ownership dispersion increases the agency problem and shareholders enforce 
managers to pay more dividends. Overall in South Asian companies high dividend payout 
is significantly related with ownership dispersion. Therefore, in companies where 
ownership is dispersed are expected to pay high dividends.   
As discussed earlier that the in South Asia corporate ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of families. The results confirm the idea that dividend outcome model is supported 
in emerging economies and dividend substitute model does not have relevance for 
emerging economies of South Asia. No impact of ownership dispersion is observed in 
decision to pay dividends. The results of Logit model are not reported here as there is no 
significant relationship was observed.    
   
  
  
Table 6.21: Ownership Dispersion Model (Equation 5.1 f)  
 
CNT  
DV  
BNG  BNG  BNG  BNG  IND  IND  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  SL  SL  
DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  
Constant  
0.049  
[1.214]  
(0.229)  
0.255  
[0.397]  
(0.692)  
0.028  
[0.868]  
(0.389)  
-0.910  
[-1.131]  
(0.263)  
0.022  
[10.443]  
(0.000)  
.0160  
[2.160]  
(0.031)  
-0.009  
[-0.723]  
(0.470)  
-0.009  
[-0.715]  
(0.475)  
0.028  
[7.411]  
(0.000)  
0.073  
[2.854]  
(0.004)  
0.011  
[0.254]  
(0.800)  
0.031  
[0.538]  
(0.519)  
0.008  
[1.697]  
(0.094)  
-0.052  
[-1.574]  
(0.121)  
0.008  
[0.400]  
(0.690)  
-0.144  
[-3.237]  
(0.002)  
ODIS  
0.004  
[2.837]  
(0.006)  
0.005  
[2.860]  
(0.006)  
0.000  
[-0.260]  
(0.789)  
-0.005  
[-1.008]  
(0.318)  
0.000  
[0.241]  
(0.810)  
0.001  
[1.957]  
(0.051)  
0.002  
[2.64]  
(0.008)  
0.003  
[3.076]  
(0.002)  
0.001  
[8.820]  
(0.000)  
0.001  
[9.275]  
(0.000)  
0.004  
[0.329]  
(0.742)  
0.015  
[0.918]  
(0.369)  
0.008  
[2.848]  
(0.006)  
0.007  
[1.872]  
(0.046)  
0.002  
[0.650]  
(0.518)  
-0.004  
[-0.911]  
(0.366)  
SZ  
---  
---  
---  
-0.009  
[-0.306]  
(0.761)  
---  
---  
---  
0.007  
[1.557]  
(0.126)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[-0.261]  
(0.794)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.003  
[-1.650]  
(0.100)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[0.078]  
(.938)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.019  
[-1.239]  
(0.216)  
---  
---  
---  
0.004  
[2.184]  
(0.033)  
---  
---  
---  
0.010  
[3.202]  
(0.002)  
LVG  
---  
---  
---  
-0.025  
[-0.531]  
(0.604)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.002  
[-0.423]  
(0.674)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[-1.973]  
(0.049)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[-0.305]  
(0.760)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.091 [- 
4.657]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.002  
[-0.054]  
(0.957)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.033  
[-2.555]  
(.013)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.031  
[-1.789]  
(0.079)  
PRFT  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[0.143]  
(0.886)  
---  
---  
---  
0.002  
[-0.024]  
(0.978)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[4.518]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[2.323]  
(0.021)  
---  
---  
---  
.001  
[4.804]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
0.002  
[6.143]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
.000  
[2.098]  
(.040)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[2.608]  
(0.012)  
N  192  192  195  195  452  452  452  452  302  302  302  302  95  95  95  95  
R2  0.099  0.155  0.005  0.062  0.013  0.269  0.028  0.242  0.113  0.195  0.113  0.195  0.334  0.334  0.006  0.370  
Adj R2  0.087  0.098  0.001  0.022  0.002  0.073  0.024  0.058  0.112  0.190  0.112  0.190  0.291  0.291  -0.008  0.327  
D/W  1.904  1.692  1,734  1.454  1.112  2.285  2.776  2.512  1.945  2.343  1.495  2.343  1.922  1.985  1.999  1.904  
F-STAT  8.046  2.714  1.072  1.823  0.058  6.413  7.098  3.583  77.789  36.857  77.789  36.857  7.887  7.887  0.422  8.530  
Sig- F  0.006  0.038  0.789  0.011  0.810  0.000  0.008  0.007  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.518  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) and Dividend Intensity (DINT); Independent variables: Ownership Dispersion (ODIS); Size of Firm (SZ); 
Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of 
Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value). In case of Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends at 1%.   
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Table 6.22 compares the results of ownership dispersion model in pre and post crisis 
period. It is interesting to note that the relationship is significant in post crisis period in 
Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. This means that companies with dispersed ownership 
pay more dividends in post crisis period as compared to companies with concentrated 
ownership. The possible justification of this result could be that companies with high 
degree of concentrated ownership used the financial crisis as an excuse to reduce 
dividends but companies with dispersed ownership used dividend to reduce agency 
problem in post crisis period by paying high dividends.  
Table 6.22: Ownership Dispersion Model (Pre and Post Financial Crisis of 2008)  
 CNT  BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  
 Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Post  
ODIS  
-0.079  
[-1.782]  
(0.113)  
0.095  
{2.395}  
(0.021)  
2.299  
[2.195]  
(0.031)  
1.558  
[2.117]  
(0.036)  
-0.056  
[0.319]  
(0.750)  
-0.038  
[-0.212]  
(0.833)  
-0.303  
[-1.646]  
(0.134)  
0.139  
[2.687]  
(0.010)  
N  192  192  452  452  302  302  95  95  
Intercept Sig  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R Square  0.733  0.199  0.131  0.075  0.054  0.036  0.352  0.320  
Adjusted R  0.650  0.121  0.092  0.049  0.033  0.006  0.064  0.256  
DW  2.341  1.534  1.562  1.529  1.936  1.859  1.527  2.204  
F stat  7.500  2.548  3.358  2.811  2.572  1.512  7.662  5.053  
Sig F  0.008  0.049  0.014  0.005  0.039  0.007  0.006  0.002  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) Independent variables: Ownership dispersion (ODIS); 
Control; Size of Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF 
values are less than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of Multicolinearity in the model estimation; 
Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value). 1% trimming is performed in case of Bangladesh.  
  
6.3.7. Impact of Dividend Smoothing on Dividend Policy  
The stability of dividends or in other words the dividend smoothing is highlighted by 
several researchers as a significant determinant of dividend payout. According to Afza &  
Mirza (2010), stability means maintaining the level of firm’s dividend payout in relation 
to an upward sloping curve. It is argued that investor is willing to pay premium for a 
constant dividend history due to its informational content, continuous and recurring 
income, and sometimes due to institutional considerations (Afza & Mirza, 2010) Table 
6.23 presents the estimated result of dividend smoothing model using ordinary least 
PAK   SL   SL   
FC   Pre   Pre   Post   
 square regression. It is evident from the results that in South Asian companies the current 
dividend is determined on the bases of past dividends, which is in line with dividend  
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smoothing model. However, the lower value of coefficient of determination shows that 
the smoothing model only explains a small fraction of total change in dividend payout of 
listed companies of South Asia, except India.  
To reconfirm the result the same model is re-estimated with alternate proxies of dividend 
policy in Table 6.23. The estimated results showed the importance of stable dividends 
and how much companies in South Asia pursue its historic dividend maintenance for 
declaring future dividends. The results from least square regression are positively 
significant for all lag dividend variable for all countries and with all alternative proxies of 
dividend policy. The coefficient value of lag is not large but it is positive which shows 
that past dividends play significant role in determining future dividends in South Asian 
countries.  The value of R square is also very high, especially in case of Bangladesh and 
the significance of F statistics ensures the fitness of the model. These results are in line 
with the study of Kumar (2006) which shows a significantly positive relationship of 
historical and current dividends. Based on the results it is established that historical 
dividends are among the important factors which determine the corporate dividend policy 
in emerging economies of South Asia.  
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Table 6.23: Dividend Smoothing Model (Equation 5.1 g)  
 
CNT  
DV  
BNG  BNG  BNG  BNG  IND  IND  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  PAK  PAK  SL  SL  SL  SL  
DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  DPO  DPO  DINT  DINT  
Constant  
0.248  
[4.348]  
(0.000)  
0.119  
[0.263]  
(0.728)  
0.305  
[1.180]  
(0.242)  
1.313  
[0.364]  
(0.717)  
8.837  
[5.686]  
(.000)  
5.085  
[1.229]  
(.220)  
0.006  
[2.851]  
(0.005)  
0.004  
[0.583]  
(0.560)  
0.282  
[6.762]  
(0.000)  
0.399  
[1.370]  
(0.171)  
0.026  
[4.747]  
(0.000)  
0.074  
[1.940]  
(0.053)  
0.352  
[3.602]  
(0.001)  
-1.239  
[-0.795]  
(0.430)  
0.011  
[2.536]  
(0.015)  
-0.095  
[-2.276]  
(0.028)  
LAG  
0.1000  
[2.292]  
(0.025)  
0.123  
[4.862]  
(0.000)  
0.380  
[3.224]  
(0.002)  
-0.020  
[-0.146]  
(0.884)  
0.575  
[10.944]  
(0.000)  
0.580  
[10.746]  
(0.000)  
0.749  
[17.603]  
(0.000)  
0.741  
[16.945]  
(0.000)  
0.085  
[1.794]  
(0.074)  
0.057  
[1.992]  
(0.014)  
0.269  
[5.886]  
(0.000)  
0.181  
[3.839]  
(0.000)  
0.020  
[0.511]  
(0.611)  
0.018  
[2.439]  
(0.003)  
0.363  
[3.446]  
(0.001)  
0.184  
[1.986]  
(0.049)  
SZ  
---  
---  
---  
-0.005  
[-0.224]  
(0.823)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.037  
[-0.229]  
(0.819)  
---  
---  
---  
0.494  
[0.740]  
(0.460)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[-0.081]  
(0.936)  
---  
---  
---  
0.005  
[0.071]  
(0.943)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.009  
[-0.950]  
(0.342)  
---  
---  
---  
0.080  
[1.146]  
(.257)  
---  
---  
---  
0.005  
[2.769]  
(0.008)  
LVG  
---  
---  
---  
-0.037  
[-1.033]  
(0.308)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.128  
[-0.494]  
(0.624)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.005  
[-0.454]  
(0.651)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[-0.098]  
(0.922)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.300  
[-1.540]  
(0.124)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.041  
[-1.634]  
(0.103)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.226  
[-0.465]  
(0.644)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.028  
[-2.221]  
(0.032)  
PRFT  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[0.490]  
(0.626)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.001  
[-0.553]  
(0.587)  
---  
---  
---  
0.083  
[1.190]  
(.235)  
---  
---  
---  
0.000  
[2.074]  
(0.039)  
---  
---  
---  
0.005  
[2.555]  
(0.011)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[4.638]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-0.002  
[-0.229]  
(0.820)  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[4.052]  
(0.000)  
N  221  221  221  221  648  648  648  648  471  471  471  471  174  174  174  174  
R2  0.066  0.280  0.136  0.011  0.331  0.347  0.561  0.564  0.007  0.035  0.073  0.132  0.004  0.045  0.213  0.546  
Adj R2  0.054  0.236  0.123  0.010  0.328  0.336  0.560  0.555  0.005  0.027  0.070  0.124  -0.012  -0.033  0.195  0.501  
D/W  2.109  2.434  2.568  2.012  2.011  2.212  1.912  1.907  2.018  1.982  2.078  1.999  2.210  2.041  2.100  2.151  
F-STAT  5.345  6.365  10.392  3.148  119.780  30.577  309.860  74.401  13.218  13.041  34.233  16,696  0.261  0.581  11.877  12.313  
Sig- F  0.025  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.611  0.678  0.001  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO) and Dividend Intensity (DINT); Independent variables: lag of dividend (LAG); Size of Firm (SZ); 
Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of 
Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain [t-statistic]; (P-Value). In case of Bangladesh DPO is trimmed from both ends at 1%.   
.  
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SL   SL   
Pre   Post   
Table 6.24: Dividend Smoothing (Before and After Financial Crisis of 2008)  
 CNT  BNG  BNG  IND  IND  PAK  PAK  
 FC  Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post  
Lag  
0.106  
[0.554]  
(0.600)  
0.118  
[4.372]  
(0.000)  
0.542  
[4.055]  
(0.000)  
0.583  
[11.790]  
(0.000)  
0.031  
[2.604]  
(0.003)  
0.084  
[2.334]  
(0.019)  
0.114  
[1.360]  
(0.223)  
0.464  
[2.360]  
(0.023)  
N  221  221  648  648  471  471  174  174  
Intercept Sig  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R Square  0.133  0.284  0.231  0.465  0.126  0.057  0.411  0.341  
Adjusted R  0.110  0.231  0.195  0.414  0.110  0.039  0.368  0.288  
DW  2.341  1.534  1.832  1.529  1.936  1.859  2.571  2.571  
F stat  4.276  5.354  6.517  8.010  7.780  3.512  7.438  5.438  
Sig F  0.056  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.016  0.000  0.000  
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO); Independent variables: Lagged Dividend (Lag); Control: Size 
of Firm (SZ); Leverage (LVG) and Profitability (PRFT): Estimation Technique (OLS): VIF values are less 
than 2 for each variable to ensure absence of Multicolinearity in the model estimation; Parentheses contain [t-
statistic]; (P-Value). N represents number of firm year observations.  
Table 6.24 presents the results of dividend smoothing model in pre and post crisis period. 
No significant change in the direction of relationship is observed in post crisis period which 
shows that financial crisis did not significantly affect the relationship between dividend 
smoothing and payout policy. These results are in line with Al Malkawi et al. (2014) which 
argued that financial crisis is not significantly related with agency and smoothing 
explanation of dividend policy.   
The estimated results presented in this chapter showed that ownership structure is among 
the most significant determinants of payout policy in South Asia followed by cash flow, 
dividend smoothing and growth opportunities. The managerial an institutional ownership 
has a positive and significant relationship with payout in South Asia, similarly companies 
with high cash flow pay high dividends. However, companies who are facing growth 
opportunities try to reduce dividends to capture profitable investment opportunities. Most 
of listed companies of South Asia also smooth dividend to enhance the confidence of 
investors. The results are robust to the alternate proxy of payouts. The analysis also 
attempted to capture the impact of financial crisis on the relationship between firm level 
factors and dividend policy. It is observed that the financial crisis has adversely affected the 
explanatory power of the models however, no significant change in the direction of 
relationship between firm level variables and payout is observed. The further analysis of 
role of firm level factors in determining payout policy in the light of country specific 
factors is presented in next chapter.  
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Chapter 7  
Statistical Analysis: Country Level Factors  
    
Previous chapter provided analysis of firm specific factors in determining payout policy. It 
is evident for the estimated results that firm specific attributes play important role in 
determining corporate payout policy. However, the importance of country specific factors 
cannot be ignored in this research focus. During last decade the researchers have laid 
special emphasis on legal, economic and cultural factors and their importance in shaping 
managerial decision regarding important financial matters including dividend policy. This 
chapter investigates the role of country level factors in determining dividend policy.   
7.1. Payout Policy in South Asia  
Based on the discussion in chapter 6, it is evident that the ownership structure is the most 
important factor which determines payout policy at firm level followed by operating cash 
flow, growth opportunities and dividend smoothing effect. Table 7.1 presents the results of 
all important factors which affect corporate payout policy. The estimated results are further 
dividend into pre and post crisis period to investigate the impact of financial crisis on 
determinants of payout policy in South Asia.  
Table 7.1a: Firm Level Determinants of Dividend Policy in South Asia  
Total  
-2.036  
Constant  [4.835]  
(0.000)  
[2.890]  
(0.004)  
[-4.594] 
(0.000)  
MNG  
0.016  
[2.432]  
(0.015)  
0.001  
[0.152]  
(0.880)  
0.036  
[3.329]  
(0.001)  
INST  
0.033  
[3.937]  
(0.016)  
0.028  
[3.124]  
(0.002)  
-0.013  
[-0.918]  
(0.359)  
  (Yr<2008)   (Yr=>2008)   
- 1.370   - 3.176   
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CFO  
2.132  
[2.417]  
(0.016)  
0.686  
[0.904]  
(0.367)  
4.348  
[2.284]  
(0.023)  
GRTH  
-0.023  
[-8.367]  
(0.000)  
-0.010  
[3.670]  
(0.000)  
-0.037  
[-7.629]  
(0.000)  
LAG  
2.598  
[4.248]  
(0.000)  
0.908  
[1.607]  
(0.110)  
5.071  
[4.446]  
(0.000)  
        
N  1215  546  668  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2  0.553  0.550  0.568  
Adj R2  0.545  0.535  0.601  
F-STAT  69.969  23.240  43.658  
Sig- F  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPO); Independent Variables: Managerial ownership (MNG), Institutional 
Ownership (INST), Cash Flow (CFO), Growth Opportunities (GRTH) and lagged dividend (LAG). N represents the 
number of firm year observations.  
The estimated results are in line with cross country analysis of this study presented in 
previous chapter which shows that managerial ownership along with institutional 
ownership is positively related with dividend payout in South Asia. The relationship of 
cash flow from operations and lagged variables are also positively related with payout 
while growth opportunities negatively affect payouts.  
7.2. Country Level Fixed Effect  
In order to analyze the country level fixed effect the present study employed the country 
fixed effect model using Least Square Dummy (LSD) approach. In this model India (being 
the largest economy) is used as reference category while dummy variables have been 
employed for Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Ownership, cash flow, growth and 
agency models are estimated using LSD method to estimate the panel differences in 
determinants of dividend payouts in South Asian Countries. The results are presented in 
Table 7.1b.  In first column the managerial ownership is used as explanatory variable and 
country specific dummy variables are used to capture the country level fixed effect. It is 
observed that relationship of managerial ownership is significantly different (negative) in 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka from India but in Bangladesh the interaction term of managerial 
ownership and country dummy is significantly positive, similar results are presented in 
Table 6.3. The interaction of dummy with institutional ownership is insignificant which 
shows that institutional ownership is insignificant determinant of payout in South Asia. In 
case of operating cash flow the relationship of liquidity is significant in Pakistan which 
shows that in Pakistan dividend is more dependent on operating cash flow as compared to 
India. No significant country level effect is observed in relationship of growth 
opportunities and ownership dispersion with payout policy.  
  
  
  
  
Table 7.1b: Estimated Results of Country Fixed Effect Model (Equation 5.1 h)  
X1=(?)  (MNG)  (INST)  (CFO)  (GRTH)  (ODIS)  
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Constant  
-5.180  
[1.461]  
(.144)  
20.991  
[10.994]  
(0.000)  
17.204  
[9.099]  
(0.000)  
2.083  
[3.616]  
(.000)  
.145  
[.032]  
(.975)  
X1  
0.417  
[8.153]  
(0.000)  
0.206  
[3.618]  
(0.000)  
9.739  
[3.518]  
(0.000)  
-.011  
[-.206]  
(.837)  
.031  
[.022]  
(.983)  
DUM_BANG  -31.667  
[-6.600]  
(0.000)  
-40.912  
[-8.844]  
(0.000)  
-25.693  
[-4.773]  
(0.000)  
1.289  
[.803]  
(.422)  
2.093  
[.311]  
(.756)  
 
 
DUM_PAK  1.377  
[0.462]  
(.644)  
-23.263  
[-17.634]  
(0.000)  
-18.437  
[-15.753]  
(.000)  
22.554  
[23.289]  
(.000)  
19.432  
[2.986]  
(.003)  
DUM_SRI  -28.695  
[-6.593]  
(0.000)  
-40.020  
[-8.505]  
(0.000)  
-24.494  
[-4.897]  
(0.000)  
-.149  
[-.036]  
(.971)  
.225  
[.035]  
(.972)  
X1*DUM_BANG  0.379  
[5.999]  
(0.000)  
0.216  
[1.672]  
(0.095)  
-9.527  
[-1.493]  
(.136)  
-.015  
[-.276]  
(.783)  
-.607  
[-.328]  
(0.743)  
X1*DUM_PAK  -0.698  
[2.484]  
(0.005)  
-1.022  
[-0.518]  
(0.604)  
9.422  
[2.859]  
(.003)  
.115  
[1.060]  
(.289)  
.146  
[.101]  
(.919)  
X1*DUM_SRI  -.349  
[-3.599]  
(.000)  
-1.022  
[-0.518]  
(0.604)  
-16.020  
[-1.142]  
(.254)  
.058  
[.068]  
(.946)  
-.035  
[-.019]  
(.984)  
N  1215  1215  1246  1246  1218  
R2  0.585  0.550  0.417  0.419  0.354  
Adj R2  0.579  0.544  0.411  0.414  0.346  
D/W  1.856  1.601  1.893  1.939  1.959  
F-STAT  95.168  87.945  67.991  78.480  42.006  
Sig- F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
Dependent Variable: DPO; Parentheses contain [t-statistic] and (P-Value). Estimation Techniques is OLS. N 
represents number of firm year observations.  
7.3. Impact of Country Level Factors on Dividend Payout  
The country level analysis is not only helpful in improving international portfolio 
knowledge but also it is likely to provide a reasonable understanding of how country level 
regulatory, economic, socio-political, cultural and corporate environment affect its 
corporate dividend policy (Michael & Shaked, 1986; Glen et.al., 1995; Travlos et al., 2001; 
Kang & Lee, 2003; & Kang, 2004). Existing literature gives several reasons of differences 
in dividend policy of companies operating in different countries. These factors include 
legal, economic and cultural attribute of country. Table 7.2 presents the estimated results of 
regressions equation 5.2a which shows that legal right protection level has a positive effect 
on dividend (2.241; sig<1%) also managerial ownership has a positive relationship with 
payouts (0.149; sig<1%). The positive and significant relationship of interaction term 
(0.160; sig<1%) shows that legal right rights protection level positively moderates the 
relationship between managerial ownership and payouts. This means that in a scenario of 
high legal protection of employees and creditors, where they feel their rights to be strongly 
protected by corporate law of the country, therefore, they do not feel need of enforcing 
managers to reduce dividends and hence the dividend payout of the company, in strong 
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legal right protection regime, is positively related with payout. The model’s R square is 
46% and F statistics is also significant. Equation 5.2c measures the impact of investor 
rights protection level on relationship between managerial ownership and dividend 
payouts. The results show that managerial ownership significantly and positively affect 
dividend payouts (0.188; sig<1%).  
Existing literature gives two theories related to the investors’ response toward strong 
investors protection regime; first, dividend outcome model which is established by La 
Porta et al. (2000) and second, dividend substitute model which is presented by Brockman 
& Unlu (2009).  
The estimated results of equation 5.2 c support the dividend outcome model which argues 
that managers increase the payout as a consequence of increased investor protection. La 
Porta et al. (2000) argued that in common law countries the investor protection is stronger 
than civil law countries. The interaction term between investor protection and managerial 
ownership represents the positive impact of investor protection on managerial ownership 
and dividend policy. This means that in South Asia, the companies in which managerial 
ownership is high pay more dividend if investors’ protection is high. This study argued that 
strong investors’ protection does not substitute dividend in South Asia. The results are in 
line with existing literature (See for example; Mitton, 2004; Chae et al., 2009; Jiraporn et 
al.,  
2011;  Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010;  Bartram et al., 2012; Brockman and Unlu, 2009 &  
2011; Byrne and O’Connor, 2012; Shao et al., 2013; Sawicki, 2009).  
Equation 5.2f estimates the impact of long term orientation on relationship between 
managerial ownership and payout. The results show that long term orientation significantly 
and positively (0.014; sig<1%) moderating relationship between ownership structure and 
dividend payouts. Equation 5.2 b estimates the impact of legal rights protection on payout 
policy of firm with institutional ownership. It is observed that legal right protection does 
not significantly moderate the relationship between institutional ownership and payout.   
Table 7.2: Ownership Model (Moderated Multiple Regressions)  
Equation  5.2a  5.2c  5.2f  5.2b  5.2d  5.2g  
X1=(?)  (MNG)  (MNG)  (MNG)  (INST)  (INST)  (INST)  
X1  
0.149   
[4.87]  
(.000)  
0.188  
 [7.30]  
 (.000)  
-0.132  
[-1.88]  
(0.060)  
0.140  
[4.236]  
(0.000)  
0.169  
[6.40]  
(0.000)  
0.349  
[1.990]  
(.047)  
LGL  
2.241   
[4.86]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
6.160  
[15.95]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
INVST  
---  
---  
---  
64.882  
 [4.70]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
78.289  
[16.53]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
 
 
LTO  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
0.258  
 [9.08]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
0.327  
[7.579]  
(.000)  
X1*LGL  
0.160  
 [7.56]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
0.001  
[0.09]  
(0.931)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
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X1*INVST  
---  
---  
---  
1.018  
[ 4.21]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
1.015  
[3.46]  
(.001)  
---  
---  
---  
X1*LTO  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
0.014  
[5.29]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
-0.012  
[-2.592]  
(.010)  
N  1214  1214  1214  1214  1214  1214  
Intercept-Sig  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2  0.467  0.513  0.477  0.301  0.488  0.369  
Adj R2  0.463  0.501  0.473  0.298  0.484  0.366  
F-STAT  108.54  129.68  113.92  112.24  143.53  144.037  
Sig- F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
Dependent Variable: DPO; Parentheses contain [t-statistic] and (P-Value); Managerial Ownership (MNG);  
Institutional Ownership (INST); Legal Rights Protection (LGL), Investors right protection (INVST); Long 
term orientation (LTO). Estimation Techniques is OLS. N represents number of firm-year observations. This 
might be due to the reason that institutions are more efficient in managing the affairs of 
employees and creditors and if institutional ownership is high employees and creditors feel 
secure therefore, institutional ownership substitute the legal protection laws. Equation 5.2d 
estimates the role of investors’ protection in determining payout policy and the estimate 
results show that if investors protection is high shareholders will exercise their power to 
receive cash dividend as a result the managers pay more dividends. Regarding long term 
orientation, estimated results of equation 5.2 shows that as the long term orientation 
increased the investors start demanding high dividends but if the company is owned by 
institutional investors in majority they are in better position to reduced dividends to save 
funds for the future needs of the corporation. Therefore, LTO has a negative moderating 
role is a situation where majority of shares are held by institutional investors.  
Equation 5.2a hypothesized that if legal rights protection level is high (which means that 
rights of employees and creditors are duly protected) then employees and creditors will not 
enforce managers to reduce dividends to safeguard their interest. In this scenario, if legal 
rights protection level is high for employees and creditors, this will further enhance 
managerial tendency to pay more dividends.  
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Figure 7.1: Impact of Legal Rights’ Protection on Relationship between Managerial  
Ownership and Dividend Payouts  
The moderating role of legal rights protection is depicted in figure 7.1. On Y axis the 
dependent variable (dividend payout) is plotted and managerial ownership is plotted on X 
axis, while 3rd dimension i.e. legal rights protection level is plotted on Z axis. It is evident 
that the slope of managerial ownership is increasing with the increase in legal rights 
protection level. Intuitively, if employees and creditors are well protected by country law 
i.e. employees are getting fair salary and they enjoy medical and other employment related 
benefits and creditors know that they can suit management for non-fulfillment of credit 
obligations and as a consequence both believe that managers cannot expropriate their rights 
then they do not bother that how much income is distributed among owners in the form of 
dividends and they do not enforce management to reduce dividend payouts. This sentiment 
of employees and creditors has a positive impact on payout.  
Similarly, the investors’ rights protection law also enforces management to pay high 
dividends. It is argued that in countries where investors’ rights are highly protected, 
shareholders are in better position to stop managers from expropriating cash for their 
private benefits. However, in countries with poor investors’ protection, excess free cash 
flow can be easily appropriated by controlling shareholders for their own benefits (La Porta 
et al., 2000) and thus investors prefer to receive high dividends and assign high value to 
dividend paying stocks which is in line with the argument of Pinkowits et al. (2006) and 
Kalcheva & Lins (2000).   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 7.2: Impact of Investor Rights’ Protection on Relationship between 
Managerial Ownership and Dividend Payouts  
According to dividend outcome model in high protection regime investors have more 
power to enforce management to pay dividends but if investors’ protection level is weak 
then managers pay less dividend. However, dividend substitution model argues that if 
investors’ protection is high investors demand less dividend as they believe that their rights 
are strongly protected and managers are bound to work in their best interests and their 
activities are regulated and strongly monitored by corporate law authorities. Figure 7.2 
represents that the increase in investor’s right protection level moderates the relationship 
between managerial ownership and dividend policy. Therefore, it evident that investor’s 
protection laws positively moderate the relationship between managerial ownership and 
dividend policy in South Asia.  
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Among cultural variables, the existing literature supports the relationship between long 
term orientation and dividend policy (Kang et al., 2010). Present study has defined long 
term orientation in accordance with Hofstede (1980 & 1991). Long-Term Orientation 
(LTO) is defined as the nurturing of desires directed toward future benefits.  It is argued 
that countries with high degree of long term orientation pay fewer dividends because 
managers prefer to secure funds for the future and therefore they reduce current dividend 
payouts. Table 7.2 show the estimated result of equation 5.2f which measures the 
relationship between managerial ownership and dividend policy at the given level of long 
term orientation in culture. The results showed that in high level of LTO managers pay 
high dividend. This result is in line with the argument of Fidrmuc and Jackob (2010). A 
possible justification of this relationship is, if both LTO and investors protection is high 
then investors’ demand for dividend will outweigh the managers’ desire to retain cash but 
if LTO is high but investors’ protection is low then managers desire to retain cash will 
supersede investors’ desire to get cash dividends (Kang et al. 2010)  
Number of studies (see for example, Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Brickley et al., 1985; Graves 
& Waddock, 1990) have supported the argument of superior management by institutional 
investors due to the reason that institutional owners have professional decision making 
power and they are more vigilant in controlling the affairs of the company. Another reason 
behind the superiority of information acquired by the institutional investors is that they 
enjoy the economy of scales in information gathering techniques. It is generally argued that 
institutions have better control over the affairs of management that is why; companies with 
greater level of institutional ownership are less concerned about agency problem. Existing 
literature shows that corporate investors are attracted towards the companies whose 
dividend payout is high (Han et al., 1999; Dhaliwal et al., 1999; Short et al., 2002; Allen et 
al., 2000). The main reason for preference of high dividend paying companies by 
institutional investor could be the prudent man rule discussed in chapter 6.   
Estimated result of equation 5.2b shows that institutional ownership is positively related 
with dividend payout but it is evident from the results that if intuitional ownership is high 
then legal right protection of creditors and employees do not significantly moderate the 
relationship between institutional ownership and payouts. It means that legal rights 
although increases the probability of dividend payment but in case of high institutional 
ownership, the moderating role of legal rights is not proved from the results.   
Figure  7 .3: Impact of Long Term Orientation on Relationship between Managerial  
Ownership and Dividend Payouts  
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Figure 7.4 Impact of Legal Right Protection on Relationship between Institutional 
Ownership and Dividend Payouts  
Intuitively, institutions are better monitors and they are also well equipped with 
information management techniques based on which they take care of all aspects of 
business operations, therefore, increase in legal right protection level in the country do not 
influence institutional managers to change their existing dividend policy or in other words 
creditors and employees do not enforce institutional owners to review their dividend 
policy. The dotted line in figure 7.4 represents the relationship between institutional 
ownership and dividend policy at the level where level of legal rights protection index is 
greater than 1. However, there is no change in the slope of line, which shows that legal 
rights protection does not moderate the relationship between institutional ownership and 
payout.  
However, investors’ right protection significantly moderates the institutional owner’s 
relationship with dividend payout. The estimated result of equation 5.2d in Table 7.2 shows 
that increase in investors’ rights protection also increases the institutional potential to pay 
dividend. This is in line with the hypothesis that in companies where majority of shares are 
held by institutional investors are more likely to pay dividend due to prudent man rule. But 
increase in long term orientation significantly reduces the institutional propensity to pay 
dividend.   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure  7 . 5 : Impact of Long Term Orientation on Relationship between Institutional  
Ownership and Dividend Payouts  
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This negative moderation is in line with the argument that institutions are more informed 
and they design policies for long term. Therefore, if long term orientation is high in society 
then investor would become extremely conscious before using free cash flow for dividend 
distribution because institutions themselves are the majority owner that is why reduction in 
dividends does not significantly jeopardize their financial status. This is also evident from 
Figure 7.5 which shows that increase in long term orientations reduced the slope of 
institutional ownership.   
Table 7.3 presents the estimated results cash flow model. This study has considered cash 
flow from operations and cash flow sensitivity as determinants of payouts. The detailed 
hypotheses are discussed in chapter 5    
Table 7.3: Cash Flow Model (Moderated Multiple Regressions)  
Equation  5.2h  5.2h  5.2h  5.2k  5.2k  5.2k  5.2i  5.2l  5.2m  
X1=(?)  (CFO)  (CFO)  
Pre Crisis  
(CFO)  
Post Crisis  
(CFO)  (CFO)  
Pre Crisis  
(CFO)  
Post Crisis  
(CFS)  (CFS)  (CFS)  
X1  
13.451  
[4.156]  
(0.000)  
4.305  
[0.324]  
(0.746)  
24.503  
[5.878]  
(0.000)  
14.800  
[5.338]  
(.000)  
9.423  
[2.223]  
(0.000)  
17.294  
[4.594]  
(0.000)  
3.184  
[0.933]  
(0.351)  
2.732  
[0.797]  
(0.426)  
2.747  
[0.821]  
(.412)  
GDP  
2.923  
[13.213]  
(.000)  
8.230  
[7.287]  
(.000)  
2.844  
[9.796]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
2.791  
[12.796]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
UNCER  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
-69.352  
[-23.052]  
(.000)  
-73.056  
[17.540]  
(.000)  
-66.731  
[-14.310]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-67.706  
[-22.049]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
CRDIT  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
-64.892  
[-21.969]  
(.000)  
X1*GDP  
6.516  
[4.773]  
(.000)  
-0.159  
[-0.038]  
(.970)  
6.937  
[4.299]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
2.449  
[1.152]  
(.250)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
X1*UNCER  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
-12.453  
[-5.591]  
(.001)  
-60.270  
[2.102]  
(0.036)  
-52.423  
[-5.190]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
-18.083  
[-0.750]  
(0.453)  
---  
---  
---  
X1*CREDIT  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
-14.532  
[-.736]  
(.462)  
N  1242  557  683  1242  557  683  1242  1241  1241  
Control   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2  0.217  0.358  0.297  0.419  0.436  0.412  0.179  0.376  0.226  
Adj R2  0.212  0.336  0.289  0.415  0.429  0.405  0.174  0.372  0.223  
F-STAT  47.268  15.620  37.450  123.724  62.871  62.620  37.575  30.777  86.008  
Sig- F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
                    
Dependent Variable: DPO; Parentheses contain [t-statistic] and (P-Value): Cash flow from operations (CFO),  
Cash flow sensitivity (CFS), Economic development (GDP), Uncertainty Avoidance (UNCER); Access to 
credit (CREIT)/ Estimation Techniques is OLS. N represents number of firm year observations.  
Cash flow plays an important role in determining dividend payout and it is argued that, if 
GDP growth is high in the country, the companies have growth opportunities and free cash 
flows are available because of lesser financial distress and less chances of default, 
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therefore, in high economic growth, companies do not feel need to reduce dividend 
payouts. Based on this intuition the present study proposed the moderating role of GDP 
growth of country in relationship between free cash flow and dividend policy. Table 7.3 
shows the result of cash flow regressions, the estimated results depict the positive 
relationship of operating cash flow and payout; similarly, increase in GDP also increases 
the payout ratio in companies of South Asia. The interaction term is significantly positive 
which means that with the increase in GDP growth of the country the relationship between 
operating cash flow and payout becomes more positive. Figure 7.6 depicts that same 
phenomenon, therefore, it is concluded that GDP plays a significant role in moderating the 
relationship between operating cash and dividend.  
  
Figure 7.6: Impact of GDP growth on Relationship between Operating Cash Flow and  
Dividend Payouts  
  
Regarding cultural aspect, if the company has free cash flow but uncertainty avoidance is 
high then it is expected that management feel reluctant to pay high dividends. Based on this 
hypothesis the present study has established a negative relationship of uncertainty 
avoidance and dividend payouts. The results for equation 5.2k also presents that 
uncertainty avoidance significantly and negatively moderate the relationship between 
operating cash flow and dividend policy of companies in South Asia. The model is also 
estimated for pre and post financial crisis period and found no significant change in the 
direction of relationship of variables. However, the moderating role of economic growth in 
pre-crisis period is insignificant. The possible reason could be that before financial crisis 
the economy already attained its peak and further economic growth has a little marginal 
effect on payout policy as compared to post crisis period. The moderating role of economic 
growth is therefore, more important in post crisis period which is depicted in the results.   
It is argued that in a scenario where uncertainty avoidance is high the corporate managers 
pay low dividends. Present study has used uncertainty avoidance as moderator between 
operating cash and payout and found a significantly negative moderation of uncertainty 
avoidance. Figure 7.7 above also depicts that with the increase in uncertainty avoidance the 
impact of increase in operating cash flow on payouts gets negative. Therefore, based on 
estimated results it is argued that cultural values play significant role in determining 
dividend policy of companies. The countries in which uncertainty avoidance is high the 
companies pay less dividends as compared to countries where uncertainty avoidance in 
low.   
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Figure 7.7: Impact of Uncertainty Avoidance on Relationship between Operating 
Cash Flow and Dividend Payouts  
Regarding sensitivity of cash, the estimated results from equation 5.2 i, l and m showed 
that cash flow sensitivity does not affect corporate dividend policy in South Asia. The 
insignificant coefficient of CFS shows that it is statistically not different from zero and the 
present study does not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between sensitivity of cash and dividend payouts. However, country level 
moderating factors i.e. GDP, UNCER and CREDIT are significantly determine the payout 
policy. In line with the theory, increase in gross domestic product increases the probability 
of company to pay dividend because increase in gross domestic product is a sign of 
economic prosperity.   
  
Table 7.4: Growth and Ownership Dispersion Models (Moderated Multiple 
Regressions)  
Equation  5.2j  5.2j  5.2j  5.2n  5.2o  
X1=(?)  (GRTH)  (GRTH)  
Pre Crisis  
(GRTH)  
Post Crisis  
(GRTH)  (ODIS)  
X1  
-0.010  
[-14.688]  
-0.010  
[-5.926]  
-0.012  
[-14.174]  
-0.004  
[-0.126]  
.491  
[2.694]  
 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.900)  (.007)  
GDP  
0.007  
[3.796]  
(.000)  
-0.007  
[-1.006]  
(0.315)  
0.009  
[4.269]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
CRPDIS  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
12.511  
[7.825]  
(.000)  
CRDIT  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
73.430  
[24.394]  
(.000)  
---  
---  
---  
X1*GDP  
0.002  
[5.647]  
(0.000)  
-0.002  
[-1.378]  
(0.169)  
0.003  
[7.082]  
(0.000)  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
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X1*CRPDIS  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
.558  
[1.476]  
(.140)  
X1*CRDIT  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
---  
0.063  
[0.390]  
(0.696)  
  
N  1242  557  683  1242  1214  
Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2  0.205  0.108  0.163  0.272  0.332  
Adj R2  0.201  0.095  0.160  0.270  0.330  
F-STAT  51.198  36.580  65.580  125.973  118.846  
Sig- F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
            
 
Dependent Variable: Dividend payout (DPO): Independent Variables: Growth Opportunities (GRTH), 
Ownership dispersion (ODIS), Economic development (GDP), Corporate disclosure (CRPDIS), Access to 
credit (CRDIT). Estimation Techniques is OLS. N represents the number of firm year observations.  
Table 7.4 presents the results of growth and ownership dispersion models. The estimated 
results, of equation 5.2 j and n, show that growth opportunities significantly determine the 
dividend payout of companies in South Asia. If economic growth in high in the country this 
will positively moderate the negative impact of growth opportunities on dividend payouts. 
This relationship is more pronounced in post crisis period because after the crisis economy 
again moves towards a new growth phase which creates new opportunities for companies 
to make profitable investments.  
From the estimated results discussed above, it is evident that role played by country 
specific economic, legal and cultural factors in influencing managements’ decision to pay 
dividend. The estimated result from investors right protection level supports dividend 
outcome model while the results from legal right protection advocate the dividend 
substitute model in South  
Asia which simply means that high investors’ rights empowers the shareholders to demand 
high dividends but high legal right protection of employees substitutes the high demand of 
salaries and undue pressure from employees and outsiders to reduce dividends. Among 
economic variables is the GDP growth rate of country. The GDP model supports the 
positive relationship between economic growth and dividend payouts of companies  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
  
    
Dividend policy is among the important and interesting puzzles in finance. Existing 
literature reveals that corporate dividend policy is not only affected by firm specific 
attributes but also by country specific factors. Companies design their payout policy in 
accordance with diverse institutional and legal environment of country. That is why cross 
country variations in determinant of dividend policy exists between companies working in 
different economic and legal setups. Most of the studies conducted in this area mainly 
focused developed economies with very little focus on determinants of payout policy in 
developing economies. Cross country investigation in emerging economies are also very 
limited. During the last decade the impact of country specific legal, economic and cultural 
factors on payout policy caught the attention of researchers but the emerging economies 
remained neglected in this research focus. This motivated the author to conduct research in 
South Asia, a region perhaps ignored previously. Present study analyzed the impact of 
country specific legal, economic and cultural factors on payout decision in South Asia. 
Moreover, this study also investigated cross country differences in firm level determinant 
of payout policy. The data for this study is collected from annual reports of listed non-
financial companies for the period from 2006 to 2010. Financial data of listed companies of 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) Pakistan, Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) India, Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) Bangladesh and Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) Sri Lanka are 
selected. Primarily, ordinary least square regression technique is used for estimation of 
results, secondly censored regression model (Tobit) and binary logistic regression (Logit) 
models are applied for result estimation. Firm level factors including ownership structure, 
cash flows, growth opportunities and dividend smoothing are considered for analysis, while 
the impact of country level factors like investors protection level, creditors protection level, 
disclosure level, economic development and related cultural factors on corporate payout is 
also investigated.   
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8.1. Conclusion  
Based on cross country analysis of firm level determinants of payout policy, the estimated 
results showed that in South Asia the most influential variable which affects corporate 
dividend policy is the ownership structure. The ownership structure represents the 
proportion of shares held by different categories of investors. The present study analyzed 
managerial and institutional ownership. The estimated results indicated that in India and 
Bangladesh companies expect to pay more dividends as a result of increase in managerial 
ownership but in Pakistan and Sri Lanka the increase in managerial ownership is negatively 
related with dividend policy. This suggests that in Pakistani and Sri Lankan managers have 
tendency to expropriate the rights of minority shareholders by paying lesser dividend, 
which is mainly due to the weak corporate governance structure in these countries as 
compared to India and Bangladesh. The comparison of corporate governance frame works 
implemented in the countries shows that in Pakistan and Sri Lanka the representation of 
minorities in the board is not enforced by corporate governance framework. Majority of 
companies in Pakistan and Sri Lanka are family owned with lesser proportion of shares 
held by independent institutional investor (non-business group affiliates). Based on this 
argument the study concluded that in companies where managerial ownership is high and 
corporate governance is weak, the corporate managers, who the majority shareholders, 
expropriate the rights of minority shareholders. Regarding institutional shareholders, it is 
argued that institutions are better monitors and manage the affairs of companies in efficient 
manner. That is why, the companies where majority of shares are held by institutional 
investors are well managed and pay more dividends. The estimated results showed that the 
institutional ownership plays an important role in determining payout in Bangladesh and 
India but not in case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The main difference in institutional 
ownership of India/Bangladesh and Pakistan/Sri Lanka is that in former, the financial 
institutions has high ownership in companies while in latter the shares are mostly held by 
diverse institutions mainly business groups affiliates, mutual fund, modarbah and Insurance 
etc. The study concluded that ownership by financial institutions is more important in 
determining payout policy. Therefore, the companies in which majority of shares are held 
by financial institutions pay high dividend.  
The study also analyzed the role of cash flow from operations and cash flow sensitivity in 
determining payout policy. It is argued that if the company is available with free cash flow 
it pays more dividend. Based on the estimated results it is concluded that cash flow from 
operations is the important determinants of payout in all South Asian countries. Therefore, 
the companies in which cash flow from operations is high are expected to pay high 
dividend. However, the dividend policy of Pakistani and Bangladeshi companies are 
adversely affected by cash flow sensitivity. The reason might be the financial constraints 
faced by companies of these countries in accessing the credit from external market.  
Pakistan and Bangladesh are bank centered economies where banks are the major source of 
finance for companies.  Accessing credit from a bank on affordable terms and conditions is 
a difficult task and only large companies with valuable assets can afford bank credit in 
these emerging economies therefore, most of the companies do not expect to get credit in 
time as a result financially constrained company becomes cash flow sensitive and reduce 
dividend payout.   
Furthermore, growth opportunities also affect payout policy of company. It is found that 
companies reduce their dividends when they face growth opportunities, therefore, a 
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growing company with positive NPV projects pay less dividend in order to save funds for 
future profitable investments. The study also analyzed the agency problem and consequent 
payout policy of the company. The estimated results showed that the companies with large 
number of shareholders pay high dividend as compared to companies with small number of 
concentrated shareholders. The reason is high agency problem due to large number of 
shareholders. The companies in which number of shareholders is large face more agency 
problem therefore, dividend payout as a tool to reduce agency problems has an important 
role to play in these emerging economies. High dividend curtails funds under management 
control as a result managers are left with lesser cash to be utilized for their personal 
benefits. The present study has investigated the smoothing effect of dividend in South Asia. 
Based on the estimated results it is evident that last year dividend is among the most 
important determinants of current dividends in South Asian economies. The estimated 
results are in line with existing empirical evidences.   
Based on country level analysis the study identified the investors’ right protection level as 
one of the important factors. It is argued that if investors’ protection level is high the 
companies with high managerial and institutional ownership, pay high dividend. This 
argument is in line with “dividend outcome model” which states that investors right 
protection does not substitute dividend therefore, the countries in which investors; right are 
strongly protected the companies pay high dividend. Similarly, if creditor and employees 
rights (legal rights) are strongly protected they do not enforce management to reduce 
dividends. Legal right protection means that creditors and employees can access the court 
of law to get justice, if their rights are expropriated by managers i.e. for employees, right to 
get bonus or salary increments and for creditors, the right to get interest and security of 
principal money. Therefore, creditors and employees do not enforce managers to reduce 
dividend if there rights are strongly protected by law. The study also analyzed the impact of 
economic development of country in determining payout policy and found that high 
economic growth positively affect the relationship of operating cash flow and growth 
opportunities with dividend payout. The findings suggest that the companies generally 
decrease dividends due to growth opportunities however, if economic indicators start 
improving the companies increase the dividend payout. The study argues that, in economic 
boom the access to funds increases and companies are available with excess cash to invest 
therefore, companies do not feel need to reduce dividend payouts. Among cultural factors 
the study found the uncertainty avoidance and long term orientation as the important 
country level attributes. It is found that long term orientation enforces managers to pay 
high dividend due to demand of investors but if institutional ownership is high the 
company pays less dividend. Shareholders with long term orientation exercise their legal 
right to receive dividends if majority of share are held by individual managers or families 
but if management is in the hand of institutions the shareholders feel secure regarding long 
term policies of companies and therefore do not try to reduce cash under the control of 
institutional owners. The institutions on the other hand reduce dividend to save funds for 
future investment needs because institutions are more vigilant and efficient in management 
of funds as compared to individuals. Similarly, in high uncertainty avoidance the positive 
impact of operational cash flow is minimized because if future is uncertain the companies 
reduced dividend even if they are available with free cash flow. The results and conclusion 
drawn in the study are in line with existing literature and on the basis of conclusion the 
study suggest several policy implications for both policy makers and investors.  
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8.2. Policy Recommendations  
Corporate dividend is the main source of income for the investors however, due to 
disappearing dividend phenomena investment markets in developing economies, especially 
in South Asia, are becoming more attractive for speculators rather than long term investors. 
The analysis and results presented in the study have several implications for both the policy 
makers and investors. The policy makers and corporate law authorities are suggested to 
discourage highly concentrated family ownership especially in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 
which seems to be the main reason behind disappearing dividend phenomenon in these 
countries. It is suggested that measures should be taken to encourage institutional investors, 
especially financial institutions; this will not only enhance investors’ confidence on 
management of company but also positively affect dividend payout of companies.  It is 
recommended that in order to provide minority shareholders with an effective control on 
affairs of business while minimizing interference in management, an internal complaint and 
right protection mechanism should be developed for companies. The results of investors’ 
protection and legal right protection suggest that strong shareholders’ right protection 
reduces managers powers to expropriated the dividend rights of minority shareholders, 
therefore, investors’ right to receive dividend should be strongly enforced. Creditors and 
employees usually compel management to reduce dividend in order to protect their stakes 
in the business. However, the results suggest that if creditors’ and employees’ rights are 
protected they feel secure and do not enforce management to enforce managers.   
The study suggests the prospective long term investors to select companies where majority 
shares are held by institutions. The companies with high institutional ownership are most 
likely to pay dividends. Moreover, operating cash flow is an important indicator of 
company’s likelihood of dividend payment. Before, making investment decision investor 
should consider the operating cash flow because companies with positive cash flow from 
operations pay high dividends. It is suggested that long term investors should select stock 
of companies with low market to book ratio because high market to book ratio represents 
that companies having future investment opportunities due to which companies pay less 
dividend. The study observed that profitability is not the prime determinant of dividend 
payout; however leverage is an important factor which negatively affects the dividends. 
Therefore, investors must consider the capital structure of company before making 
investment decision. Finally, it is important to consider historical dividend payouts of 
companies before making investment policy. The companies which increased the dividends 
in recent years are most likely to pay high dividends in the future.    
8.3. Limitations of the Study  
The present study although, attempts to address the determinants of dividend policy in a 
comprehensive manner by considering various firm and country level factors however, 
there are certain limitations of the study. First, the data is collected from four South Asian 
countries  
i.e. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which limits the generalizability of 
estimated results, especially in case of developed countries. Second, the sample consists 
only of nonfinancial listed companies therefore; the estimated results have lesser 
application in case of unlisted and financial companies. Third, non-availability of annual 
reports of most of the companies, for the full sample period, restricts the sample size (in 
terms of firm-year observations) and consequently weakens the explanatory power of some 
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models. Fourth, other variables, not considered in this study due to data limitations, may 
have important role in determining dividend payout policy in South Asia. For instance 
ownership of associated companies, group affiliates, foreign investors and CEO duality etc.  
8.4. Directions for Future Researchers  
Future researchers can investigate several important dimensions of dividend policy and its 
determining factors. Most importantly, the role of ownership of associated companies and 
group affiliates in determining payout policy, which can have important implications for 
policy makers. Ownership structure has several dimensions, like foreign ownership may 
have significant relationship with payouts. Other board characteristics like CEO duality or 
board composition can also be an important determinant of payout. While analyzing 
investors’ protection and cultural variables, it is important that the proposed relationship 
between country level factors is estimated by including firms from developed countries. As 
regional countries normally share similar culture and legal frameworks due to which the 
results cannot be generalized, future researchers can take a diverse global sample so that 
results can be generalized.   
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Appendix A: Literature Review Chart  
  
A1: Relationship between Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy.  
     
Evidence from Developed Economies      
Author (s)     Topic   Key Determinants/ 
Research Questions  
Sample  Methodology  Findings  
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Bradford et 
al. (2013)  
Ownership Structure, 
Control Chains, and Cash 
Dividend Policy:  
Evidence from China.   
Research Question:   
How the state ownership 
and the ownership 
through corporate 
pyramid structures affect 
the dividend policies of 
publicly listed firms in 
China.  
Data period  
1999 through 
2010 collected 
from annual 
financial 
reports of 
Chinese listed 
firms.  
OLS and 
Logit 
regressions 
are used for 
analysis.  
The authors reported that the in 
China the firms with 
stateownership pay more 
dividend (by dividend policy they 
mean dividend yield and the 
dividend payout ratio) as 
compared to the privately owned 
firms.   
Another attribute of listed firms 
of China is the presence of 
pyramid ownership which is very 
common.  
These pyramids allow firms to 
use of the internal fund markets 
and reallocating the funds across 
firms using such longer 
controlling chains of corporate 
pyramids. Their estimated results 
showed that, the longer the 
control chain,  
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     lesser would be the intensity of 
dividend payout, measured by 
both the dividend payout ratio 
and the dividend yield. These 
results also show the exploitation 
of the internal fund markets by 
the Chines firms with corporate 
pyramids type of ownership 
structure.  
Dhanani 
(2005)  
Corporate Dividend 
Policy: The Views of 
British Financial  
Managers.  
 Research Question: 
How managers view the 
role of signaling, 
ownership structure and 
agency issues in 
determining dividend.  
Data  is 
collected using 
questionnaires. 
Questionnaires 
are sent out in 
winter 2000 to 
the company 
secretaries of 
the top 800 
LSE firms and 
the top 200 
AIM  
Companies, by 
turnover, as 
recorded on 
FAME.  
Primary data 
methodology 
is used for 
analysis.  
In general, the results support 
more the dividend hypotheses 
relating to structure of ownership 
and signaling effect as compared 
to capital structure, agency 
problem and corporate decision 
regarding investments.  
In short, the estimated results 
based on cross sectional analysis 
show that an important difference 
exist between the relationship of 
ownership structure, size, 
industry, information asymmetry 
and growth opportunities and 
dividend policy.  
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Elston et al. 
(2002)  
 Institutional  Ownership,  
 Agency  Costs  and  
Dividend Policy  
Research Question:   
How Institutional 
shareholdings affect 
dividend.  
Data of 100 
largest firms 
across 28  
industrial  
branches  is 
collected from 
1970-1986 
through Bonn 
Database.  
Propensity 
score 
matching 
(PSM) 
method 
compare 
means 
employed.  
to 
is  
The estimated results show in 
determining the dividend payout 
of a company neither the bank 
ownership nor the ownership by 
other institutions plays any 
significant role.   
The estimated results show that 
several factors like absence of 
long term tax incentives, 
extracting profit from dividends 
or increased share prices helps in 
reducing the agency problem that 
arise due to conflict of interest 
between various categories of 
investors and shareholders. This 
however, helps in aligning the 
institutions with minority 
shareholders.  
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Grinstein  
 and  Roni  
(2005)  
Institutional Holdings and 
Payout Policy.  
Main objective is to 
examine the relation 
between institutional 
holdings and payout 
policy in U.S. public 
firms.  
Data consisted 
of end-of-year 
total 
institutional 
stock holdings 
for  every 
publicly traded  
 U.S.  firm  
Panel  
Regression  
method is 
used for 
analysis.  
Estimated results suggest that 
institutions avoid firms that do 
not pay dividends. However, 
among dividend-paying firms like 
the companies that pays lesser 
dividends.   
 
   between 1980 
and 1996 from 
Thomson  
Financials.  
 
Their estimated results indicate 
that institutions like companies 
that repurchase their shares, and 
among repurchase the institutions 
like those who regularly 
repurchase shares as compare to 
irregular repurchases.   
The results further suggest that 
increased institutional 
shareholdings or concentrated 
ownership neither enforce 
companies to increase their 
dividends nor their repurchases, 
or dividend payout in total.  
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Gugler 
(2003)  
Corporate Governance, 
Dividend Payout Policy.  
Main determinants in 
this study are R&D, 
ownership structure and 
investment.  
A sample of  
214  non- 
financial firms 
over the period  
1991–99 is 
drawn from 
the 600 largest  
non-financial  
firms  in  
Austria on the  
OLS  and  
3SLS  
regression  
model  are 
used.  
Based on the results, it is argued 
that companies with state 
ownership are more involved in 
dividend smoothing as compared 
to companies with family 
ownership. The companies with 
family ownership usually prefer 
to pay lower target dividend 
payout as compared to state 
owned companies.  
 
   basis of data 
availability.  
 
The results consistently show that 
companies with state ownership 
are more reluctant to reduce or 
cut dividend and family 
controlled firms are least hesitant 
in this respect.  
As compared to family owned 
and state owned companies, the 
behavior of bank and foreign 
controlled companies lie between 
the two extreems.  
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Han et al. 
(1999)  
Institutional Shareholders 
and Dividends  
Main objective is to 
examine the relationship 
between institutional 
ownership and corporate 
dividend policy.  
Compustat data 
of 5500 
companies for 
1988-1992 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
OLS  
regression 
 is used 
 for 
estimation.  
Results show that dividend 
payout is positively related to 
institutional ownership, thus 
supporting the tax based 
hypothesis.   
Their findings suggest a definite 
type of “dividend clientele,” that 
institutional investors prefer 
dividends.  
Jensen et al. 
(1992)  
Simultaneous  
Determination of Insider 
Ownership, Debt, and  
Dividend Policies.  
 Insiders’ ownership, 
debt and control 
variables are used for 
analysis.  
 A  cross- 
sectional firm 
data at two 
points in time  
System 
 of 
equations 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.   
The empirical results support the 
hypothesis that levels of insider 
ownership differ systematically 
across firms.   
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   i.e. 1982 and  
1987  is 
collected. Each 
firm included 
in the analysis 
had  the  
requisite  
financial data 
on  the  
Compustat date 
file.  
 
Moreover, companies with high 
level of ownership by insiders 
prefer low level of dividend 
payout and debt level.  
It is also reported that impact of 
earnings and profitability, growth 
opportunities and investment 
spending on payout of dividend 
and debt structure is an indication 
and confirmation of "pecking 
order" hypothesis.  
Khan (2006)  Company Dividend and 
Ownership Structure: 
Evidence form UK Panel 
Data.  
Main determinants 
include: Institutional 
ownership, pension 
funds ownership, 
insurance ownership.  
A panel of 330 
large quoted 
UK firms is 
used for 
analysis.  
Least  square 
regression 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
Controlling for unobserved 
firmspecific effects, results 
indicate a negative relationship 
between dividends and ownership 
concentration.   
The ownership structure is an 
important determinant dividend 
payout. The author reported a 
significantly positive relationship 
between dividend payout and 
ownership by insurance 
companies while the relationship  
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     of individuals ownership with 
dividend policy was found to be 
negative.  
Mancinelli  
and  Ozkan  
(2006)  
Ownership Structure and  
Dividend  Policy:  
Evidence from Italian 
Firms. The European 
Journal of Finance Vol. 
12, No. 3, 265–282, April  
2006  
Main objective is to test 
the rent extraction 
hypothesis by relating 
the firm’s dividend 
payout ratio to various 
ownership variables.  
A sample of 
139 listed  
Italian  
companies 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
Tobit 
regression 
model.  
The estimated results show that 
as the voting rights of the largest 
shareholders increase the firms 
starts paying lower dividends.  
It is also reported that if there is 
any agreement among large 
shareholders then this will limit 
the monitoring authority of 
various strong but non-
controlling owners of the 
company.  
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Smit  and  
Henk (2009)  
Ownership and Dividend 
Policy: New Evidence 
from Germany.  
The main objective of 
this study is to test if the 
voting power of large 
shareholders influences 
the decision on paying 
dividends.   
Second, it investigates if 
the voting power 
influences the amount of 
dividends paid.   
German 
companies that 
are listed on the 
 major 
indices DAX,  
MDAX,  
SDAX,  
TecDax, and 
GEX for the 
years 2005 till  
2008  and  
3  SLS 
regression 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
The study finds no evidence of 
the impact of the holdings of the 
largest shareholders: neither on 
the decision to pay cash 
dividends nor on the amounts of 
dividends paid.   
Banks and families (including 
private block holders) pay fewer 
dividends. When voting power is  
 
   
Third, it investigates if 
different shareholder 
types influence the 
amount of dividends  
differently, and   
Fourth, whether 
shareholder types in 
interaction with their 
voting power influence 
the amount of dividends  
included in the 
sample.  
  included, state authorities increase 
dividends.   
Finally, the results have 
indications that families use the 
recently instituted instrument of 
“Beteiligungsgesellschaften” to 
receive more dividends than they 
do without this tax vehicle.  
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Stacescu 
(2006)  
 Dividend  policy  
Switzerland.  
in  Key  determinants 
explored in the study are 
profitability,  growth 
opportunities,  and 
riskiness.  
The data on 
175 listed  
Swiss 
companies  
over  1974– 
2004  is 
collected 
 and 
analyzed.  
OLS  
regression 
used 
analysis.  
is 
for  As per estimated results price 
volatility seems to stand out as 
the most significant factor.   
The results suggest a significant 
relationship dividend omissions 
and heavy corporate losses.   
The study suggests that it is the 
managers’ hesitance to omit 
dividends that gives 
informational content to the 
changes in dividend policy.  
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Thanatawee  
Yordying  
(2014)  
Ownership Structure and 
Dividend Policy:  
Evidence from China.  
Key  
include: 
Shareholdings, 
shareholders, 
holders.  
determinants  
Institutional  
Large 
Block  
 The  data  of  
3500 firm year 
observations  
from listed 
companies in 
the Shanghai  
Stock  
Exchange over 
the  period 
2007–2011 is 
collected 
 and 
analyzed.  
OLS  
regression 
used 
analysis.  
is 
for  
The results show that firms 
with higher ownership by the 
largest shareholder, 
concentrated ownership and 
ownership by government 
prefer to pay high dividend.  
In case the institutional 
ownership is high, the 
profitability of dividend payout 
significantly reduced.  
The study reported that the 
intensity of dividend payout 
keeps a positive relationship 
with large shareholdings, 
concentration of ownership and 
ownership by state/government 
but negative in case of shares 
held by foreign investors or 
institutional investors.  
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 Wen  and  
Jingyi (2010)  
Institutional Ownership, 
Managerial Ownership 
and Dividend Policy in  
Bank Holding 
Companies.  
Key determinants include: 
Institutional shareholdings, 
CEO shareholdings, size of 
firm, market to book, 
leverage, and stock 
turnover.  
Data of 137 
Bank Holding 
companies  
(BHCs) from 
1993 to 2008 
from 
Compustat  
 Linear  and  
nonlinear  
regressions 
are used for 
estimation.  
The results show that dividend 
is a counter measure against 
agency problems in the banking 
industry.   
BHCs have higher dividend 
yield if the agency cost is high.  
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  data base is 
collected.  
 
It is reported that dividend has a 
negative relationship with 
dispersed ownership which 
indicate that if the ownership is 
highly dispersed the dividend is 
used as a tool to reduce agency 
problem which is the results of 
lack of consensus among 
shareholders.   
It is also found that dividend has 
negative relationship with 
ownership of CEO, CEO 
incentives, pay and ownership by 
institutions which proves that 
dividend works as an alternative 
to the corporate governance 
mechanism in controlling agency 
conflict.  
Evidence from Developing Economies      
 Author (s)     Topic  Key Determinants/ 
Research Questions  
Sample  Methodology  Findings  
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Abdelsalam 
et al. (2008)  
 Board  Composition,  
Ownership Structure and 
Dividend Policies in an  
Key determinants 
include board size, block 
holders, institutional  
Pooled 
crosssectional 
data from the 
top 50 listed 
Egyptian  
OLS 
regression 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
It is found that there is a 
significant positive association 
between shares held by 
institution and performance of a 
firm along with dividend payout 
ratio.   
 
 Emerging Market Further 
evidence from CASE 50.  
shareholding, and CEO 
duality.  
firms between 
2003 and 2005 
is collected 
and analyzed.  
 
These results show that if 
institutional ownership is high 
and return on equity is also high 
the firm is expected to pay high 
dividend.  
However, the study did not find 
any association between dividend 
payout ratio and composition of 
board of directors.  
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Ahmed and  
Attiya  
(2009)  
Dynamics  and 
Determinants of Dividend 
Policy.  
Key  Determinants 
include:  
Profitablity, Market ot 
Book Ratio, Leverage,  
Size, Liquidity.   
Data of 320  
non-financial 
firms listed in 
Karachi Stock 
Exchange 
during the 
period of 2001 
to 2006 is 
collected and 
analyzed.  
GMM  and  
OLS (Fixed 
effect Model) 
are used for 
estimation.  
The results show that Pakistani 
listed non financial firms trust on 
both the change in dividends and 
change in net earnings.   
It is found that if the firm is 
available with high investment 
opportunities the firm has to 
decide the dividend policy very 
carefully. This means that growth 
opportunities is the important 
determinant of dividend policy.   
The study reported that firms 
with high insider ownership pay 
high dividend to investors. This 
shows  
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     that firms attempt to reduce cost 
associated with agency problem 
of insiders ownership by paying 
high dividends.  
Further, it is also found that 
growing firms do not need to put 
much emphasis on dividend 
payout which is in contradiction 
with the information content 
hypothesis.  
Other factors like firm size, 
market capitalization have a 
negative effect on corporate 
dividend payout.  
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Ahmed and  
Attiya  
(2010)  
The Ownership Structure 
and Dividend Payout 
Policy in Pakistan 
(Evidence from Karachi 
stock Exchange 100  
Index).  
Ownership Structure is 
the main variable of 
interest.  
The data of all 
listed firms of 
Karachi Stock 
Exchange 100 
index (non- 
financial  
sector) is 
collected and 
used for 
analysis.  
Full 
adjustment 
model, 
earning trend 
model are 
employed for 
analysis.  
The authors reported an 
empirical evidence which is in 
line with the idea of negative 
relationship between dividend 
payout and earning trend.  
The relationship of debt equity 
ratio is found to be significantly 
negative.  
Ownership by financial 
institutions along with ownership  
 
     by directors do not seem to have 
any impact of dividend payout.  
Study reported that ownership by 
corporations has a significantly 
positive relationship with growth 
in dividend payout.  
The study did not find any proof 
that ownership by foreign 
investors has an impact of 
corporate dividend policy.  
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Ariyoto and  
Triasesiarta  
(2013)  
 Searching  for  
Determinants of Pay or 
Not to Pay Cash Dividend 
in Indonesia.  
Size, return of equity, 
growth, GDP, debt and 
cash flow are the main 
suggested determinants.  
The sample of 
2239 firm year 
observations is 
drawn from  
Indonesian  
Capital Market 
Directory. The 
period of the 
study is nine 
years from  
2002 to 2010.  
Regression 
analysis 
 is used.  
The estimated findings based on 
panel logistic regression indicate 
that earnings, profitability, 
growth opportunities, firm size 
and other macroeconomic factors 
determine the dividend policy of 
a company.   
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Ayub (2005)  Corporate Governance and 
Dividend Policy.  
  Key  determinants 
include:   
Total amount of dividend 
declared for the year   
Net current assets (or  
Working Capital)   
Net profit after tax   
Number of shares held 
by the management  
(Board of Directors)   
Amount of corporate tax 
shown in the Profit and 
Loss Appropriation  
Accounts.   
Amount of Bonus 
Shares issued by the 
company during the 
year.   
The data of 180 
listed  
companies of 
the Karachi  
Stock  
Exchange  
1981-2002 is 
collected and 
analyzed.  
OLS  
Regression is 
used  for 
analysis.  
The author finds that the 
companies start to pay dividends 
after a certain level of growth.   
At the prior stage firms focus 
more on retained earnings 
therefore, pay less dividends.  
The study finds an important role 
of profitability and ownership 
structure in determining dividend 
policy of Pakistani firms.  
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Dummy variable equal 
to one if a company 
belongs to the Chemical  
188  
  
 
  /Pharmaceutical 
industry.  
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 Dzidic 
(2014)  
Dividend Policy of Public 
Companies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
  
Main determinants: 
Capital Market  
Development,  Investor  
Protection  and  
Ownership  
Concentration.  
The data of 35 
companies 
listed on two 
stock 
exchanges in 
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina  
(Sarajevo  
Stock  
Exchange and 
Banja Luka  
Stock  
Exchange). is 
collected and 
analyzed for 
the period of 6 
years (i.e. 
2007–2012)  
OLS 
regression is 
used for 
estimation.  
The results show increase in 
portion of dividend paying 
companies over time while 
dividend smoothing phenomenon 
is virtually non-existent.   
On the other hand, when 
companies decide to pay 
dividends they, on average, 
distribute high portion of profit 
to shareholders.   
The paper also provides 
discussion about capital market 
development, investor protection 
and ownership concentration as 
potential factors affecting 
importance of dividend payouts.   
Research results indicate that 
insufficiently developed capital 
market characterized with low 
investor protection and 
concentrated ownership structure  
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     undermine the importance of 
dividend smoothing practices.  
Huda  and  
Mohammad  
(2014)  
Relationship between 
Ownership Structure and  
Dividend  Policy:  
Empirical Evidence from 
Chittagong Stock  
Exchange.  
Key  determinants 
include:  Directors 
Ownership, Institutional 
Ownership.  
Crosssectional 
time series 
data of 
companies 
listed on the 
CSE-30 index 
over the period 
2006-2010 is 
collected and 
analyzed.  
OLS 
regression is 
employed for 
analysis.  
The dividend per share of the 
firms for the various years was 
studied in relation to director’s 
ownership and institutional 
ownership, while controlling for 
leverage, return on equity (ROE) 
and firm size.   
A hierarchical multiple 
regression and correlation 
analysis were conducted to arrive 
at the results.   
It is found that director’s 
ownership has a significant 
positive effect whereas, 
institutional ownership showed a 
significant negative effect on the 
dividend per share.   
Furthermore, ROE showed a 
significant positive effect and 
leverage had a significant 
negative effect on the dividend 
policy of a firm.  
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Kumar 
(2006)  
Corporate Governance 
and Dividends Payout in 
India.  
Key determinants 
include: Directors 
ownership, institutional 
ownership, insurance 
ownership, foreign 
ownership.  
Panel of Indian 
firms over the 
period 
19942000 
obtained from 
the  
corporate  
database  
(PROWESS)  
maintained by 
Center for  
Monitoring the  
Indian  
Economy  
(CMIE) end up 
with  2575 
firms.  
Full  
Adjustment  
Model (FAM)  
Partial  
Adjustment  
Model (PAM) 
Waud Model 
(WM)   
Earning Trend 
Models are 
used for 
analysis of 
collected data.  
The author finds a positive 
association of dividends with 
earnings trend and investments 
opportunities.   
Debt equity ratio is found to be 
negatively associated, whereas 
past investment opportunities 
exert a positive impact on 
dividends.   
The study reported that corporate 
ownership and ownership by 
directors has a positive impact on 
dividend policy in linearity while 
ownership by companies shows a 
negative relationship in square 
also.   
This shows a nonlinear 
relationship of corporate 
ownership and dividend policy. 
The study reported no results in 
favor of relationship between 
dividend growth and shares held 
by foreign investors.   
193  
  
 
Malkawi 
(2007)  
Determinants  of  
Corporate  Dividend 
Policy  in  Jordan: 
 An Application of 
the Tobit Model.  
Key determinants 
include: Ownership 
structure, size, 
profitability.  
Firm-level 
panel data set 
of all publicly 
traded firms on 
the  Amman  
Stock 
Exchange 
between 1989 
and 2000 is 
collected for 
analysis  
OLS and Logit 
regression are 
used  for 
analysis.  
The results suggest that the 
proportion of stocks held by 
insiders and state ownership 
significantly affect the amount of 
dividends paid.   
The study reported that firm age, 
earning and profit, size are the 
important determinants of 
dividend policy in Jordan.  
The estimated results strongly 
support the agency cost 
hypothesis and are mainly in line 
with pecking order theory as 
well.  
However, the results do not 
support signaling hypothesis.  
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Manoos 
(2002)  
Dividend Policy and 
Agency Theory: Evidence 
on Indian Firms.  
  
Key Determinants 
include: Growth, risk, 
liquidity, Foreign 
ownership Institutional 
ownership Directors 
ownership Public 
ownership.  
Crosssectional 
data of 661 
non- 
financial 
companies 
listed on the 
Bombay Stock  
Rozeff’s cost 
minimization 
model, which 
predicts that 
the target 
payout ratio is 
at the level 
that  
The results suggest that group 
affiliation has an important 
impact on the transaction cost 
structure as well as agency 
conflicts faced by Indian 
companies.   
 
   Exchange 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
minimizes the 
sum  of  
transaction 
costs  
associated 
with  raising 
external 
finance on the 
one hand and 
agency 
 costs 
on the other, is 
used  for 
analysis.  
In general, the findings support 
the cost minimization model and 
the agency theory rationale for 
dividend policy.   
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Sharma and  
Ritu (2013)  
Ownership Structures and 
Dividend Policy - A 
Study of Bombay Stock  
Exchange-500.  
Key  determinants 
include 
 Institutional 
shareholdings 
controlling for debt, size 
and profitability.  
The  data 
 is 
sourced 
 from 
Prowess 
database of the  
Centre  for  
Monitoring  
Indian  
Economy  
(CMIE). The 
data of the 
study consists 
of all the  
OLS 
regression 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
The estimated results reveals that 
shareholding pattern has a 
relationship with corporate 
dividend payout.  
Institutional shareholding has a 
positive relationship with payout.  
 
   companies 
listed in BSE 
500 over the 
period of 
20032012.  
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Thanatawee 
(2013)  
Ownership Structure and 
Dividend Policy:  
Evidence from Thailand.  
Main determinants 
include: Large  
shareholders, 
institutional 
shareholders.  
A sample 
consisting of  
1,927 
observations 
over the period 
2002-2010  is 
used  for 
analysis.  
OLS  
regression 
used 
analysis.  
is 
for  
It is observed that in Thailand the 
companies with high 
concentrated ownership pay more 
dividends. Similarly companies 
with high ownership by 
institutions also pay high 
dividends.  
The study also reported that 
increase in institutional 
shareholding increase the chance 
of payout of high dividends. In 
Thailand the dividend is mostly 
driven by ownership of domestic 
intuitional investors.  
Trang (2012)  Determinants of Dividend 
Policy: The case of 
Vietnam.  
  
Key determinants 
include: profitability, 
firm size, debt level, 
asset structure, growth, 
risk, ownership  
A sample of 
116 companies 
listed on the  
Hochiminh  
Stock  
Exchange  
OLS  
regression 
used 
analysis  
is 
for  
It is found that in Vietnam, 
profitability influences positively 
and business risk impacts 
negatively on dividend 
disbursement.   
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  concentration and 
managerial ownership.  
(HOSE) 
 and 
Hanoi 
 Stock 
Exchange  
(HNX) for the 
year of 2009 in  
Viet Nam is 
used for  
analysis  
  
The study also found a 
relationship between dividend 
payout, audit quality and the type 
of industry.   
In context of Vietnamese 
literature the study contribute by 
providing evidence on the 
relationship between profitability 
and dividend payout. The study 
is helpful for the investors who 
wish to select a company for 
investment in shares. It is 
suggested by the study that in 
Vietnam the firms with high 
profitability are expected to pay a 
high dividend.  
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Vol & Van  
(2014)  
Managerial Ownership, 
Leverage and Dividend 
Policies: Empirical 
Evidence from Vietnam’s  
Listed Firms  
Main determinants 
include: Managerial 
ownership, leverage.  
A sample of 81 
listed firms on  
 HCM  City  
Stock  
Exchange  
(HOSE) 
during the 
period 2007–
2012 is  
3SLS  
regression 
used 
analysis  
is 
for  The empirical results indicate 
that ownership by managers 
keeps a negative relation with 
corporate leverage.  
The study reported evidence in 
line with agency hypothesis. The 
estimated results confirm the  
 
    used  for  
analysis  
 pecking order which shows that 
leverage negatively affect the 
corporate dividend payout.  
In contrast, the study found that 
managerial ownership as 
negative determinants of divided 
payout.   
This shows that firms with high 
ownership by managers are 
expected to pay a high dividend.  
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Warrad et al. 
(2012)  
The Effect of Ownership 
Structure on Dividend 
Payout Policy: Evidence 
from Jordanian Context  
Private ownership, 
government ownership, 
and foreign ownership 
are among the key 
determinants under 
investigation.  
The data of all  
industrial 
companies 
listed on the 
Amman Stock 
Exchange  
(ASE) during 
the period 
from 2005 to 
2007 is used. 
The total 
number of  
industrial 
companies  
OLS  
regression  
The authors reported a consistent 
support to the positive 
relationship between ownership 
by foreign investors, 
performance measured by Tobins 
Q and corporate dividend payout.  
The study also reported a 
significant relationship between 
size of the company, debt ratio, 
foreign ownership and 
performance measure by return 
of assets.  
   listed in ASE 
in 2007 is 77 
companies.  
  
  
  
A2: Relationship between Cash Flow, Growth Opportunities and Dividend Policy  
     
Evidence from Developed Economies     
Author (s)     Topic  Key Determinants/ 
Research Questions  
Sample  Methodology  Findings  
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Bradley 
(1998)  
Dividend Policy and Cash- 
Flow Uncertainty   
  
Key Determinants 
include: cash-flow 
volatility, leverage, size 
and property-level 
diversification.  
Sample of the 
study consists 
of 75 RElT  
companies 
from 1985 to 
1992.  
OLS  
regression 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
The estimated results suggest 
that given the level of cash 
flow, firms with more volatile 
earnings promise lower 
dividends.  
Kato et al. 
(2002)  
Dividend Policy, Cash 
Flow, and Investment in 
Japan.  
Main determinants 
include: Tobins Q, cash 
flow, size of firm.  
Sample of this 
study includes  
2356 
newspaper 
announcements 
of dividends by 
the companies 
listed in the 
first section of  
Regression  
method is 
used for 
analysis.  
The results show that although 
the free cash flow hypothesis 
is in line with evidence that 
Japanese firms do not use 
dividend policy while deciding 
investments.  
In addition, the dividend 
clientele effect does not appear  
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     the  Tokyo  
Stock  
Exchange  
(TSE). This 
sample extends 
from January 
1982 to April 
1991.  
 significant around dividend 
announcements in Japan.   
Given the explicit institutional 
structure of the Japanese 
equity market, the authors find 
that corporate investing is very 
sensitive to liquidity 
constraints especially in case 
of a non-keiretsu firm. 
However, this is not the case 
for keiretsu firms  
Mayers and  
Frank  
(2004)  
The Determinants of 
Corporate Dividend  
Policy.  
Main  
include: 
growth, 
turnover, 
structure.  
determinants 
cash flow, 
debt, share 
ownership  
The sample of 
this study 
includes 483 
firms from the  
Multex  
Investor  
Database.  
OLS  
regression is 
employed for 
analysis.  
The findings suggest that 
management in the firms 
examined have an incentive to 
decrease payout so that 
expected value of stock option 
which they receive as an 
executive compensation can be 
increased.  
The study reported that sample 
firms also attempts to ensure 
access to capital so that growth 
could be enhanced as a result 
good reputation among 
shareholders could be build  
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     using  such  high  dividend 
payout.  
Cash dividend is also an 
important signaling device to 
shareholders and it was also 
observed that companies 
attempt to increase dividends 
even at the cost of high debt 
level.   
  
Pappadopou 
los  and  
Dimitrio  
(2007)  
  
Focus on Present Status 
and Determinants of 
Dividend Payout Policy: 
Athens Stock Exchange in 
Perspective.  
Journal  of  Financial  
Management  and  
Analysis, 20(2):2007:2437  
Key determinants 
include: size capital 
structure financial 
leverage profitability 
liquidity cash flow.  
A sample of 72 
companies 
from the below 
industries  
(number 
 of 
observations in 
parentheses): 
Informatics 
(7), Wholesale 
trade  (23),  
Retail trade 
(6), Food 
products (12), 
Textile  
(9), Publishing  
(5), and 
Mining (10) 
OLS  
regression 
 is used 
 of 
estimation.  
The results show that cash 
flow from operations is among 
the important determinants of 
dividend policy. Operating 
cash flow showed a positive 
relationship with dividend.  
203  
  
included for 
analysis  
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Rozef 
(1982)  
 Growth, Beta and Agency 
Cost as Determinants of 
Dividend Payout Ratio.  
Beta, growth and agency 
cost are the main 
determinants.  
The sample 
size is 1,000 
and spans 64  
different 
industries 
during 1981.  
Variable 
regression 
model.  
A cross-sectional test of the 
model relates dividend payout 
to the proportion of insiders 
equity, the future and existing 
earning growth of the 
company and also with the 
beta and number of 
shareholders.  
The study reported all 
significant relationship 
through its model estimation 
and rejected its all null 
hypothesis.   
The study argued that 
corporate investment decision 
also influence the dividend 
payout of the company.  
  
Zhou  and  
William  
(2006)  
Dividend  Payout  and  
Future Earnings Growth.  
Payout, ROA, leverage, 
earning per share, 
annual growth in total 
assets.  
Compustat data 
base is used for 
sample 
selection. The 
sample period  
Multivariate 
regression  
models 
 are 
used  for 
analysis.  
Estimated results show that 
high-dividend-payout 
companies tend to experience 
strong, not weak, future 
earnings growth.   
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  is 1950 
through 2003.  
  
The estimated results seem to 
be robust by using different 
proxies and measures of 
dividend and earnings, 
composition of sample, 
controlling effect of industries, 
mean reversion and share 
repurchase.  
Evidence from Developing Economies       
Author (s)    Topic  Key Determinants/ 
Research Questions  
Sample   Methodology  Findings  
Anil  and  
Sujjata  
(2008)  
Determinants of Dividend 
Payout Ratios-A Study of 
Indian Information  
Technology Sector.  
Main determinants 
include: cash flows, 
corporate tax, sales 
growth and market to 
book value ratio.  
Sample consists 
 of  
listed  
companies in 
CNXIT Index 
of India. 
Pooled data for 
seven years i.e.  
2000 to 2006.  
OLS  
regression 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
Only liquidity and beta (year 
to year variability in earnings) 
is found to be an important 
determinant of dividend 
policy.  
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Khosroshahi 
et al. (2013)  
 Stock Market Liquidity,  
Firm Characteristics and 
Dividend Payout.  
 Determinants under 
investigation include: 
turnover, considering 
free float as liquidity  
Spatial domain 
of research  
(statistical  
population) is  
OLS  
regression 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
 The results of the linear 
regression model show that the 
investors in Tehran Stock 
Exchange (TSE) do not  
 
  criterion,  size, 
profitability and growth 
opportunities.  
used in the 
research from 
which all  
Tehran Stock 
Exchange 
listed firms 
data  is 
collected from 
2005 to 2011.  
  consider stock turnover rate as 
a variable which explains the 
amount of payout.   
Further, the effect of growth 
opportunity and firm size with 
payout remained insignificant. 
However, the profitability has 
a significant positive 
relationship with dividend 
policy.  
The study argued that in TSE, 
investors use profitability as an 
indication of firm willingness 
to pay diviend.  
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Mitton 
(2004)  
Corporate Governance and 
Dividend Policy in  
Emerging Markets.  
Main  determinants 
include  growth 
opportunities, corporate 
governance.  
A sample of  
365 firms from 
19 countries is 
used for 
analysis.  
OLS  
regression 
used 
analysis.  
is 
for  
As per the estimated results the 
negative relationship between 
dividend policy and 
opportunities of growth 
remained strong in firms 
having good mechanism of 
corporate governance.  
The author argued that firm’s 
with high level of corporate 
governance has high earning 
quality. However, high profit 
could represent only a small  
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      portion  of  high 
 dividend payments.  
The relationship between 
corporate governance and 
dividend policy is perceived to 
be limited to those countries 
with have strong level of 
investor’s protection. This 
shows that the relationship 
between country level 
investor’s right protection and 
corporate governance at firm 
level are not substitute rather 
they are complements.  
  
 Zaman 
(2013)  
Determinants of Dividend 
Policy of A Private 
Commercial Bank in  
Bangladesh: Which is The 
Strongest: Profitability, 
Growth or Size?  
 Bank profitability, 
growth, and size are 
measured as potential 
determinants.  
 All 30 Dhaka  
Stock 
Exchange 
listed  private 
commercial  
 banks  in  
Bangladesh 
over a period of 
seven  years: 
January 2006 - 
December  
OLS  
regression 
used 
analysis.  
is 
for  
The study shows that while 
profitability appears to be a 
better determinant of bank 
dividend policy than a bank’s 
growth and size, yet it may not 
be decided that revenue alone 
is a strong pointer of bank 
dividend payout over time in 
the Bangladesh  
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   2012  are    
   selected 
analysis  
for    
  
  
  
A3: Dividend Smoothing  
      
Evidence from Developed Economies      
Author (s)    Topic  Key Determinants/ 
Research Questions  
Sample  Methodology  Findings  
Benzinho 
(2004)  
The dividend policy of the 
Portuguese  
Corporations:  Evidence 
from Euronext Lisbon.  
Key determinants under 
consideration include: 
lagged dividend and 
profitability.  
In  order 
 to 
constitute 
 the 
sample the data 
of 
 Euronex
t Lisboa 
 listed 
companies 
1990-2002 are 
selected.  
Lintner model 
by using panel 
data along 
with pooled 
ordinary least 
squares are 
used. 
Additionally  
the fixed 
effects model 
and random 
effects model 
are also 
employed.  
The empirical results show 
that the Euronext Lisbon 
corporations follow a 
relatively stable cash dividend 
policies and the main factors 
that determines the dividends 
is the earnings of the firm in 
that year and the lagged 
dividends.  
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Eriotis 
(2011)  
The Effect of Distributed 
Earnings and Size of the 
Firm to its Dividend 
Policy: Some Greek Data.  
Important determinants 
under investigation 
included Past dividend  
A sample of  
149 firms 
listed on the 
Athens Stock  
Exchange 
 for the 
period 1996 – 
2001 is used for 
analysis  
OLS  
regression  
The estimated findings 
confirm the proposition that in 
Greek firms prefer to pay a 
constant dividend. This 
dividend however, is adjusted 
from year to year in 
accordance with their earnings.  
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Jeong (2008)   Dynamics  of  Dividend  
Policy in Korea  
Important determinants 
include past dividend, 
size, leverage 
profitability and slack.  
A sample of  
299 firms 
listed on Korea 
Stock 
Exchange over 
a twenty 
sixyear period 
from 1981 to 
2006 is used 
for analysis.  
Multivariate 
regression  
OLS  is 
employed for 
estimation.  
The estimated results reveals 
that in Korea, the companies 
make decision to pay dividend 
on the basis of face value of 
stock which is a close 
approximation to the average 
rate of interest.  
The deviation in rate of 
dividend payout is less likely 
to be a reflection of change in 
any fundamental corporate 
factors.  
It is observed that change in 
rate of dividend is very much 
related with changes in interest 
rate of short term deposits.  
 
    The sample reveals that most 
of the Korean companies 
prefer to pay a smooth 
dividend over a long period of 
time.  
  
212  
  
Evidence from Developing Economies      
Author (s)    Topic  Key Determinants/ 
Research Questions  
Sample  Methodology  Findings  
Appannan  
and  Lee  
(2011)  
A  Study  on  Leading  
Determinants of Dividend 
Policy in Malaysia Listed 
Companies.  
  
Debt to equity ratio and 
past dividends are the 
main determinants under 
investigation.  
Only 5 sample 
companies that 
declared cash 
dividend from 
year 2004 until  
2008 are 
studies in the 
study.  
The 
relationship 
between 
independent  
variables with 
the current 
dividend per 
share as  
dependent 
variable 
 is  
empirically 
analyzed 
through 
 the 
Pearson  
correlation 
analysis 
 and  
The findings show that 
variables having high 
relationship with dependent 
variable are not necessary are 
the determinants of dividend 
payment decision such as 
“profit after tax that has the 
strongest relation with 
dividend per share but being 
excluded from the regression 
model.   
Lastly, the study sanctions the 
fact that ratio of debt to equity 
and historical payout per share 
were the important  
 
Regression 
model.  
determinants  of  dividend 
payment”.  
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Gunathil and 
Aka (2013)  
What Drives the Payout 
Policy? Evidence from Sri 
Lanka: A Dynamic Panel 
Data Analysis.  
Managerial ownership, 
level of earnings, debt 
and leverage are the 
potential determinants.  
Firms listed in 
the Colombo  
Stock  
Exchange 
 are 
included 
 in 
sample. 
Balanced panel 
data of 82 firms 
for years are 
used,  from  
2006 to 2010.  
OLS  
regression 
 is 
employed.  
 The results indicate a 
significant negative influence 
of lagged dividend on the 
payout behavior of firms.   
The study reported that the 
companies which do not pay 
dividend in accordance with 
the targeted dividend policy 
use dividend to signal 
information to stakeholders.  
The estimated results show 
that earnings are negative 
determinant of dividend and 
dividend payout is less likely 
to be affected by earning 
volatility.  
No significant relationship of 
corporate leverage is observed 
in the sample and similarly 
corporate size seems to have a  
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     limited role in defining 
corporate payout.  
Ownership by institutional 
investors is a main 
determinants with positive 
relationship.  
However,  managerial 
ownership showed a negative 
relationship  with  dividend 
payout.  
Naceur et al. 
(2006)  
On the Determinants and 
Dynamics of Dividend  
Policy.  
Research question is 
whether or not managers 
of Tunisian listed firms 
smooth their dividends.  
A sample of 48 
firms listed on 
the Tunisian 
Stock  
Exchange  
during the 
period 1996– 
2002 is used in 
the study.  
Fixed  and 
Random  
effect model 
along with 
GMM  
estimation  
method 
 are 
used.  
The results clearly demonstrate 
that Tunisian firms rely on 
both current earnings and past 
dividends to fix their dividend 
payment.   
The estimate results indicate 
that dividend is more sensitive 
to the current earnings of the 
company rather than historical 
dividend.  
The used panel regression to 
estimate the relationship  
215  
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A4: Miscellaneous Determinants of Dividend Policy  
      
Evidence from Developed Economies      
Author (s)    Topic  Key Determinants/ 
Research Questions  
Sample  Methodology  Findings  
 
between several variables and 
dividend policy.  
Firm’s profitability with a less 
volatile earnings can support 
the high volume of free cash 
and therefore, such companies 
are in a position  to pay high 
dividend.  
Such companies are more 
capable of enhancing dividend 
at the time of growth.  
However, the results do not 
indicate any effect of 
concentrated ownership and 
leverage on dividend payout in 
Tunisian companies.  
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 Baker et al. 
(2005)  
 How  
Policy.  
Managers View Dividend  Norwegian  Questionnaire composed 
of ideas regarding 
dividend is circulated 
among managers.  
Survey 
 from 
managers  of 
dividendpaying 
Norwegian 
firms listed on 
the Oslo Stock 
Exchange  is 
conducted  
Primary data 
methodology is 
used analysis.  
for  The results show that the most 
important determinants of 
corporate payout policy include 
current and future level of 
earnings and its stability, 
financial leverage and 
constraints with respect to 
liquidity.  
The correlations analysis shows 
that overall ranking of 
determining factors of dividend 
payout policy are not 
significantly correlated in US 
and Norway.  
However, the respondents 
highlighted the possible 
signaling impact of dividend 
payouts in Norway.  
No significant support to the tax 
preference hypothesis of 
dividend policy was found.  
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Blankley et 
al. (2007)  
Dividend Taxes versus 
Dividend Payouts: New 
Evidence.  
Age, taxation, size are 
among the potential 
determinants.  
Data of 23,912 
firms from  
Compustat  
Partial  
Adjustment  
 Model  and  
Impulse  
The authors find that some 
mature firms reduce dividends in 
response to dividend taxes.   
 
   data base is 
collected.  
response 
function 
used 
analysis.  
are 
for  Majority of mature firms that 
appeared to target a specific 
dividend ratio.  
Study also pointed towards the 
negative effect of taxes which 
results in reduction in dividends 
of companies.  
Size of tax effect reported to 
have a little effect as compared to 
previously published literature in 
this context.  
Impuse Response Function 
shows that a time duration of 3 
years would be needed by 
dividend to achieve long run 
value after change in tax.  
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Baker et al. 
(1985)  
A survey of management 
views on dividend policy.   
Level of future earnings, 
pattern of past dividend, 
and availability of cash, 
is studied.  
562 NYSE 
firms were 
selected from 
three industry 
groups: utility  
(150),  
A  mail  
questionnaire  
is  used  to  
obtain 
information 
about  
First, the results show that the 
major determinants of dividend 
payments today appear strikingly 
similar to Lintner's behavioral 
model developed during the 
mid1950.   
 
   manufacturing  
 (309),  and  
wholesale/  
retail (103) and 
survey is  
conducted 
from  finance 
managers.  
corporate 
dividend 
policy.  
In particular, respondents were 
highly concerned with dividend 
continuity.   
Moreover, it is believed that 
payout policy has an impact of 
share prices. The results confirm 
the attachment of dividend 
payout with share value.  
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Desai et al. 
(2007)  
Dividend Policy Inside the  
Multinational  Firm.  
Financial Management •  
Spring 2007 • pages 5 - 2 6  
Capital expenditure 
affiliates ownership local 
debt, lagged dividend are 
studied as potential 
determinants.  
Data  of  US  
corporations  
 listed  in  
Compustat is 
used for  
analysis  
Panel 
regression 
model is used 
for analysis.  
The results show that the tax 
considerations influence dividend 
repatriations, but not decisively, 
as differentially taxed entities 
features similar strategies and 
many companies try to avoid tax 
related panalties.  
The study argued that parent 
companies needs funds for 
domestic investments or 
alternatively to pay cash 
dividends to its shareholders.  
Incompletely controlled affiliates 
are expected to pay more regular 
dividends and also to trigger cost 
for avoidance of tax through 
repatriations.  
 
     The findings of the study also 
shows that traditional corporate 
financial concerns like tax, 
external financing and agency 
issues, are very important to the 
internal market of multinational 
companies.  
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Elston et al. 
(2011)  
 Dividend  Policy  and  
 Institutional  Ownership:  
Empirical Evidence Using 
a Propensity Score  
Matching Estimator.  
Institutional ownership 
is the main variable of 
interest.  
Sample  
consisted of 
all listed 
German firms 
from  
1970-1986 
years.  
Propensity  
Score 
Matching 
technique 
used 
analysis.  
is 
for  Evidence suggests that neither 
institutional ownership nor bank 
control is significant in 
determining dividend payouts.   
Findings are consistent with the 
earlier findings related with 
nature of German institutional 
environment which decrease the 
cost associated with agency 
problem between managers and 
owners.  
Esteban 
(2001)  
 Dividend  Policy  of  
European Banks.  
Profitability is used as 
potential determinant.  
Data from the 
period 
19911998, 
supplied by 
the data base 
Bank Scope 
for  
OLS  
regression 
used 
estimation.  
is 
for  The author argued that financial 
decision is a relevant decision 
which contains information in 
itself and not only reflects 
information already transmitted 
by profits and that European  
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   which the 
study selects a 
sample of  
European 
financial 
entities.  
 financial entities seek to achieve a 
target payout ratio.  
The most likely companies for 
payment of dividend are those 
which earn high profits while 
companies with high leverage are 
less likely to pay high dividends.  
Ferris et al. 
(2006)  
God Save the Queen and 
Her Dividends: Corporate 
Payouts in the United 
Kingdom.  
This study examines 
whether the decline in 
the number of dividend 
payers is purely a U.S. 
phenomenon or is part of 
a global trend.  
Time series 
data of 21,000 
firms by  
Thompson  
Financial from 
1988-2002 is 
collected and 
analyzed.  
Trend analysis 
is conducted.  After controlling for firm size 
and profitability, the authors find 
a declining propensity to pay 
dividends over the 1998–2002 
sub periods.   
The study concludes that a 
change in catering benefits 
appears more suitable in 
explaining changes in dividend 
policies of UK companies.  
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Floyd et al. 
(2014)  
Payout policy through the 
financial crisis: The 
growth of repurchases and 
the resilience of 
dividends.  
Historical dividends are 
used to analyze the trend 
before and after crisis.  
Sample is 
based on  
Compustat  
North America 
annual data 
from 1980 to  
Descriptive  
and  trend 
analysis.  
Banks have a higher and more 
stable propensity to pay 
dividends and resist cutting 
dividends as the crisis begins. 
Before the crisis, increases in 
repurchases push total payouts to 
historic levels.   
 
   2012, available 
through  
WRDS.  
Sample  of  
160,827 
firm/years for 
industrials and  
11,999 
firm/years for 
commercial 
banks is used.  
 These findings are broadly inline 
with the concept that dividends 
are used as signaling device in 
banking companies.  
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Kowalewski 
(2012)  
 Does  Corporate  
Governance Determine 
Corporate Performance 
and Dividends during 
crisis.  
Main variables of the 
study include ROA and  
Tobins Q  
A sample of  
298  non- 
financial  
companies  
 listed  on  
Warsaw Stock 
Exchange in  
the years 
20062010 is 
used.  
OLS  
regression 
 is used 
 for 
estimation.  
The results show a positive 
association between corporate 
governance  and 
 performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q.   
Moreover, the study finds 
evidence or relationship between 
higher corporate governance and 
cash dividends.   
Finally, the results present that 
during the recent financial crisis 
corporate  governance  is 
positively associated with return 
on assets.   
 
       
However, during the time of 
financial crisis good corporate 
governance ensures that 
companies are more likely to pay 
a generous dividend as compared 
to companies with low quality of 
governance.  
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Liu  
Liwei  
(2007)  
and   What  is  
Premium?  
Dividend  The study addresses the 
question what dividend 
premium is, by 
examining two 
explanations, agency 
explanation and 
signaling explanation.  
U.S. industrial 
firms  from 
1962 to 2004 
are  used 
 as 
sample  
OLS  
regression 
 is used 
 for 
estimation of 
results.  
Authors find evidence consistent 
with the agency theory that 
dividend premium is higher when 
the need to mitigate the agency 
problem is greater.   
Specifically, cash holding 
volatility is positively related 
with dividend premium in the 
start of year. While dividend 
premium is negatively related to 
the changes in future profitability 
between non payers and payers 
of dividend.  
In short, investors put high 
premium on dividend payers 
because such companies are  
 
     perceived to have more cash, 
investment opportunities and 
projects as compared to non 
payers.  
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Redding 
(1995)  
Firm Size and Dividend 
Payouts.  
Size and liquidity are the 
suggested determinants.  
A sample of  
1958 
companies 
from 1992 and 
1993 financial 
data for U.S. 
corporations is 
taken from the 
Compustat.  
Probit model 
is used for  
analysis  
The results show that firm size 
and liquidity explain the decision 
of whether to pay dividends well, 
whereas existing informational 
explanations.  
Smits (2012)  Effect of a Financial Crisis 
on the Dividend Payout  
Policy of a Firm  
Financial crisis and its 
impact of dividend 
policy is the target 
research question.  
Compustat  
North America 
database 
 is used 
for data 
collection, 
which contains 
mainly 
American and 
Canadian 
firms. Only US 
firms are used 
in the analysis  
Regression 
analysis is 
used for  
estimation  
The study did not find any impact 
of financial crisis  
It is noted that dividend increase 
during crisis only in firms with 
high institutional owners pay 
high dividends.  
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  process. total 
size of the 
sample is  
65.697 firms  
  
Evidence from Developing Economies     
Author (s)    Topic   Key Determinants/  Sample  
Research Questions  
Methodology  Findings  
Alagathurai 
(2013)  
The Relationship Between 
Dividend Payout and Firm  
Profitability: A Study of  
 Listed  Hotels  and  
Restaurant Companies in  
Sri Lanka  
Net profit, total assets are 
the  suggested 
determinants of dividend 
policy.  
A sample of 
16 hotels and 
restaurant 
companies 
listed in the  
Colombo  
Stock  
Exchange 
(CSE) is used 
for analysis  
OLS  
regression is 
used for  
estimation  
The findings indicated that 
dividend payout is an important 
variable which affect 
performance of companies.  
The relationship between 
dividend and firm performance is 
significantly positive which show 
that dividend payout is value 
relevant.  
The study argued that dividend 
policy is an important factors 
affecting the price of the share of 
company and managers 
therefore, pay special attention 
while deciding the divided policy 
of any listed company.  
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Kamat 
(2008)  
The Ownership and 
Industry Effects of  
Corporate Dividend Policy 
in India, 1961-2007  
Total Rupee value of 
cash equity dividend, 
preference dividend, 
“equity return (dividends 
by the book value of the 
respective share capital), 
preference return, size of 
earnings (net profit after 
taxes after accounting for 
preference dividends) as 
the earnings measure for 
equity dividend 
payments, net profit after 
taxes as the earnings 
measure for preference 
dividend payments, 
equity dividend payout 
ratio (dividend by 
respective measure of 
earnings) and preference 
dividend payout ratio are 
among the suggested 
determinants”.  
The data of 20 
industries  
from 
 196020
07  is 
collected.  
OLS  
regression 
 is used 
 for 
analysis.  
Indian corporate sector pays 
relatively more equity dividends 
than preference dividends.   
“Other things being equal, the 
probability of paying cash 
dividends decreases with 
shareholder concentration and 
the regulated companies pay 
relatively larger dividends.   
Dividend payouts for all type of 
firms decline, and such tendency 
is more pronounced after 
liberalization periods indicating a 
greater choice of internal 
financing through retained 
earnings.   
The analysis of inter-corporate 
and inter-industry variations 
reveals that dividends interplays 
differently with exogenous 
factors”.  
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 Parua  and  
Arindam  
(2009)  
Dividend History and 
Determinants in Selected 
Indian companies: a 
Study  
During 1993-'94 to  
2004-'05  
Historical dividend data 
is used.  
The sample is 
exclusive of  
607 companies 
in banking and 
insurance 
sectors, the 
private limited 
companies  
and the 
companies the 
age of which is 
below 5 years at 
the 
commenceme 
nt of the study 
period.19942005.  
Trend analysis 
is performed.  
The study reported average 
dividend as the most significant 
and consistent determinants of 
dividend policy during last 3 
years.  
Profitability in present and past 
and also in expected future is 
reported to be a significant and 
positive determinant of dividend 
rate.  
Second most important 
determinant of dividend policy 
is cash position and operating 
cash flow, having a significant 
relationship with dividend rate.  
Further, interest, tax, capital 
spending and share prices have 
no significant role in 
determining dividend payment.  
The primary concern of a 
corporate is to pay stable 
dividend and managers must 
take care of  
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     this aspect of payout while 
defining the corporate dividend 
payout policy.  
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 Reddy  and  
Rath (2005)  
Disappearing Dividends in  
 Emerging  Markets  
 Emerging  Markets  
Finance and Trade, vol. 41,  
 no.  6,  November– 
December 2005, pp. 58– 
82.  
Historical dividend is the 
main variable in trend 
analysis.  
 Data  of  
dividend  
 payers  and  
nonpayers 
from 1991 to 
2001 in Indian 
listed 
companies are 
collected.  
Trend analysis 
is used  Results indicate that the 
percentage of companies paying 
dividends declined; from over 57 
percent in 1991 to 32 percent in 
2001, and that only a few firms 
paid regular dividends.   
The study argued that regular 
dividend payers consistently pay 
higher dividends as compare to 
non-payers, on average.  
However, it is found that Indian 
companies are less likely to pay 
high dividend in the recent 
century.  
It is argued that dividend payers 
are generally large size companies 
and more profitable than non-
payers. Although growth 
opportunities are not significantly 
related with dividend payout in 
India but large size companies are 
expected to pay high dividends.  
Cross Country Evidence       
Author (s)    Topic   Key Determinants/ 
Research Questions  
Sample  Methodology  Findings  
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Eije  and  
Megginson  
(2008)  
Dividend  and  
Repurchase  in  
European Union.  
  
Share 
the  
Size and asset growth, 
leverage, liquidity, 
taxation and equity are 
the key determinants.  
A unique 
database of 
over 3400  
listed  
industrial 
companies, 
1989-2003 in 
EU.  
Panel logistic 
regression  The authors stated “older 
companies and those 
headquartered in a common law 
country are more likely to pay 
dividends, while higher leverage 
and more liquid company stocks 
condense the tendency to pay.   
On the other side, firms with 
high liquid stocks pay high 
dividends and higher dividend 
are paid when these are expected 
to be favorable affected by tax 
treatment”.   
Fraction of retained earnings in a  
European firm’s total equity is 
not significantly correlated with 
dividend payout.  
             
  
A5: Impact of Country Level Factors on Dividend Policy  
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 Author (s)    Topic  Key Determinants/  Sample  Methodology  Findings  
Research Questions  
            
Aivazian et 
al. (1999)  
Signaling Dividends and 
Financial Structure: 
Implications from Cross 
Country Comparison.  
  
Dividend stability, 
dividend volatility, 
firm’s growth 
opportunities and firm 
size are the main 
variables of interest.  
Sample  
contain 
companies 
 in  
eight 
developing 
countries over 
the 1980-1991 
period  and 
comparing the 
results to those 
of  99 
 US  
companies 
over the same 
period.  
OLS  
regression 
 is the 
estimation 
technique  
used  by 
authors.  
The study argues that companies 
in sample of developing 
countries are less reluctant to 
both increase and decrease 
payouts as compared to their 
counterparts in US sample and 
that is often most difficult to 
forecast future dividends.  
Moreover, the estimated results 
from regression analysis shows 
that recent dividends are less 
sensitive as compared to past 
dividends and are more sensitive 
to current profitability and 
earnings.  
The study argued that 
institutional structures of 
developing economies makes the 
payout of lesser utility as a 
signaling device then in case of 
US or other companies operating 
in developed countries.  
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Bancel et al. 
(2005)  
Cross-Country  
Determinants of Payout 
Policy: A Survey of  
European Firms  
A survey questionnaire is 
sent to manager to seek 
their opinion on various 
factors determining 
dividend policy.  
 A  survey  
questionnaire 
is sent to 1131 
firm 
mentioned on 
Financial Time  
European  
Stock 
Exchange 
pages.  
Primary data 
methodology 
is adopted for 
estimation  
The authors strongly agree with  
Lintner’s findings that dividends 
are smoothed out and are 
difficult to cut, although they 
follow different dividend targets 
than a fixed payout ratio.   
The study argued that share 
repurchase is considered as a 
tool of flexibility rather than a 
dividend substitute by most of 
managers in European firms.  
However, the cross country 
investigation does not support 
the finding s of LLSV (2000) 
that dividend policy is primarily 
affected by quality of legal 
system of the country.  
On the contrary, the study finds 
that the main determinant of 
corporate dividend policy is the 
complex interaction of 
ownership structure and legal 
and  
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     institutional setup of the home 
country.  
It is also argued that share 
repurchase policy is primarily 
influence by the tax system and 
institutional ownership.  
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Brockman 
and  Unlu  
(2009)  
Dividend Policy, Creditor 
Rights, and the Agency 
Costs of Debt.  
Country-level creditor 
rights are the key 
determinants of dividend 
policy.  
Sample  of  
120,507 
firmyears from 
52 countries is 
selected for 
analysis.  
Tobit  
Regression is 
employed for 
estimation.  
The results show that both the 
probability and amount of 
dividend payouts are 
significantly lower in countries 
with poor creditor rights.   
Study stated “A reduction in the 
creditor rights index from its 
highest value to its lowest value 
implies a 41% reduction in the 
probability of paying a dividend, 
and a 60% reduction in dividend 
payout ratios.   
These results are robust to 
numerous control variables, 
sample variations, model 
specifications, and alternative 
hypotheses.   
 
239  
  
     
The authors also show that the 
agency costs of debt play a more 
decisive role in determining 
dividend policies than the 
previously documented agency 
costs of equity.   
Overall, study findings 
contribute to the growing 
literature arguing that creditors 
exert significant influence over 
corporate decision-making 
outside of bankruptcy”.  
Denis  and  
Osobov  
(2008)  
Why do firms pay 
dividends? International 
evidence on the 
determinants of dividend 
policy.  
Research Question: What 
determine decision to pay 
or not to pay dividend.  
Listed 
companies  
data from US, 
Canada, UK,  
Germany,  
France, and 
Japan, is 
collected and 
analyzed from 
1994-2002.  
Logit 
regression is 
used for 
estimation of 
results.  
Dividend abandonment and the 
failure to initiate by existing 
nonpayers are economically 
unimportant except in Japan.   
In addition to this, the aggregate 
dividend in each country is not 
decreased and it rather 
concentrated among large and 
high profitable companies.  
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It is reported that the evidence of 
a systematic positive relation 
between relative price of 
dividend paying and nonpaying 
firms in non US context is very 
limited.  
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Farinha and  
Foronda  
(2005)  
The Relation between 
Dividends and Insider 
Ownership in Different 
Legal Systems:  
International Evidence.  
Insider ownership in 
Anglo-Saxon tradition 
vs. Civil Law legal 
systems are the main 
variables.  
The  
Compustat  
Database is 
used to obtain 
firm financial 
data.  
Information on 
civil and 
common law 
countries from 
1996-2000 is 
collected and 
analyzed.  
Tobit 
regression 
model is used 
for analysis.  
The stated that “in firms from 
Anglo-Saxon tradition the 
relation between dividends and 
insider ownership follows the 
pattern negative-positive- 
negative, in Civil Law countries 
the relation is positive-
negativepositive.   
These findings are stable with 
the hypotheses and gives new 
insights into the role played by 
dividend payout as a disciplining 
mechanism especially in 
countries where legal set up is 
different and companies face 
distinct agency issues”.  
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Ferris et al. 
(2008)  
International Differences 
in Dividend Policy: 
Catering, Legal, and 
Cultural Effects.  
Growth opportunities, 
anti-directors rights, 
ownership concentration 
are the suggested 
determinants of payout.  
25000 firm 
year 
observations 
are used.  
Regression 
analysis is 
performed.  
The study determines that large 
size companies and companies 
with high earnings, and also the 
companies with lesser 
opportunities to grow have a 
higher capacity to pay dividends.   
Moreover, the study documents 
imperative cross-sectional 
differences in the existence of 
catering hypothesis drove by 
legal framework, the magnitude 
of right to sue directors, and 
concentration of ownership.   
Authors also find indication that 
catering effects continue even 
after controlling life cycle theory 
which is outcome of agency 
model.   
Overall, the study concludes that 
catering remains an important 
factor in determining corporate 
payout policy in international 
context.  
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Fidrmuc and   
Marcus  
(2010)  
Culture, Agency 
and Dividends.  
Costs,  Cultural variables are the 
potential determinants 
suggested by the study 
including uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, 
and power distance.  
5797 firms in 
41 countries.  
OLS  
regression  is 
used  for 
estimation.  
The analysis shows that high 
individualism, low power 
distance, and low uncertainty 
avoidance are significantly 
related to dividend policy.  
An inclusive set of robustness 
tests where the study controled 
for legal frame work, share 
repurchases, leverage of 
corporation and ownership 
structures confirms that culture 
is a relevant factor when 
analyzing dividend distributions.   
The results further show that 
legal institutions and culture as a 
social institution have 
complementary effects on 
dividend payouts.   
The study concluded that in 
context of agency theory, culture 
is an important factors which 
has an impact of corporate 
dividend decision.  
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Halim et al. 
(2013)  
 Corporate  
and Dividend 
When Investor 
is Weak.  
Governance  
Policy 
protection  
 Block holders’ 
ownership and investors’ 
protection level.  
All  non- 
financial 
publicly traded 
corporations  
listed  on 
Amman Stock 
Exchange 
(ASE) over the 
period  2004- 
2008 
constitute the 
sample.  
Regression 
analysis 
 is 
performed.  
The study finds a significant 
negative relationship between 
firm’s dividend payout ratio and 
its percentage of capital owned 
by block holders.   
This result implies that large 
shareholders are either 
expropriating the rights of 
minority shareholders or that 
firm’s earnings are being used 
to finance its future 
investments.   
The results support the first 
implication as the study finds 
that the negative impact of large 
shareholders‟ capital stake on 
dividend payments is robust and 
unchanged when firm’s sales 
growth is controlled for.  
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Ho (2002)  Dividend  Policies  in  
Australia and Japan.  
External Finance, Legal 
System, Political and 
Economic Ties, 
Taxation,  
 Individualism  and   
 Uncertainty  Avoidance  
Panel data from 
the  
constituent 
stocks of the  
ASX  200  
Panel  
regression  
models 
 are 
used  for 
analysis.  
As per the estimated results 
Australia, with an imputation 
tax system which favors 
dividends over rise in the share 
price, the listed company’s 
higher dividend  
 
  are  the 
interest.  
variables  of  Index of the  
Australian 
stock market 
and the Nikkei 
225 Index of 
the Japanese 
stock market 
is collected.  
  as compared to Japan. However, 
in Japan more emphasis is on 
corporate environment when 
designing dividend policy.  
There are several financial 
factors which affect dividend 
policy in Australia and Japan.  
The study employed a fixed 
effect model which indicated 
that size of the firm is an 
important determinant of 
dividend policy in Australia, 
while in Japan liquidity is more 
important.  
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Kang (2008)  Country Influences on 
Corporate Dividend 
Policy: Evidence from 
Australia, France, the 
U.K., and the U.S.  
Agency problem, 
dividend smoothing, tax 
clientele, debt 
constraints, growth 
opportunity, risk, stock 
repurchase, industry 
effect are studied.  
Australia,  
France, 
 UK and 
USA listed 
companies are 
included in the 
sample.  
OLS  
regression 
used 
analysis.  
is 
for  
The results of the paper indicate 
that an explanation of different 
dividend policies across 
countries requires not only 
consideration of various 
dividend determinants but also 
their joint impacts.   
The study argued that companies 
belong to different countries 
have different dividend payout 
ratios  
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     due to the fact that each country 
is unique in its legal, cultural 
and governance attributes like 
investors preference and 
economic conditions.  
The difference also exist in 
institutional factors, taxation and 
other firm related attributes like 
size of firm, risk and growth 
opportunities.  
Therefore, every country has 
different determinants of 
dividend payout policy and the 
effect of these determinants is 
also different in different 
countries.  
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Kinkki 
(2008)  
Minority Protection and 
Dividend Policy in  
Finland  
Legal rights protection 
and minority 
shareholders rights are 
the main key variables.  
Sample  of  
Finnish listed 
companies on 
the Helsinki  
Stock 
Exchange 
between 1985 
and 1999 are  
Logistic  
Regression is 
employed for 
estimation.  
The results show that minority 
protection is a better influence 
over managerial control than 
controlling shareholders having 
absolute voting power.   
In the absence of controlling 
shareholders when cost of  
 
   used  in 
 the 
analysis.  
 coalition is low, Finland is a 
country where minority 
protection is high as compared 
to other mandatory dividend 
paying countries.  
Like in US where shareholders 
rights are strongly protected, the 
minority dividend can reduce 
agency cost and both horizontal 
and vertical direction.  
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LaPorta  et  
al. (2000)  
Agency Problems and 
Dividend Policies around 
the World.  
Legal protection level, 
dividend payouts and 
other dividend related 
ratios are analyzed.  
Research question is to 
investigate the difference 
between two competing 
theories of dividend i.e. 
outcome and substitute 
model.  
  
Sample 
consists 
 of  
4103 
companies’ 
comprehensive 
data from 33 
countries.  
Regression 
analysis 
 is 
performed.  
The study stated that “stronger 
minority shareholder rights 
should be associated with higher 
dividend payouts; the second 
model predicts the opposite.   
Tests on a cross section of 4,000 
companies from 33 countries 
with different levels of minority 
shareholder rights support the 
outcome agency model of 
dividends”.  
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Liu (2002)  Do Dividends Substitute 
for the External Corporate  
Governance?  A  Cross- 
Country Dynamic View  
This study tests the 
implications of two 
extant static agency 
models making opposite 
predictions. The outcome 
model predicts an 
increase in dividends 
when the external 
corporate governance 
improves. In contrast, the 
substitute model suggests 
that an improvement in 
the external corporate 
governance reduces the 
role of dividends in 
controlling agency costs, 
leading to a decrease in 
dividends.  
A sample of  
2,300 firms in 
22 economies 
from 1980 to 
1998 is used 
for analysis.  
OLS  is  the  
estimation 
technique.  
The estimated results show that 
if information is properly 
disclosed, insider’s laws are 
strong with lesser margin of 
insiders trading and equity 
market is well disciplined the 
association of dividend policy 
with these factors are very 
strong.  
  
Renneboog, 
(2006)  
How Relevant is Dividend  
 Policy  under  Low  
Shareholder Protection  
Shareholders protection 
is the main determinant 
of payout.  
Sample covers  
150  Dutch 
firms listed on 
Euronext 
Amsterdam 
and the new 
market NMAX  
Panel Probit 
regression is 
used for  
estimation  
Author finds that dividend 
payouts are generally low, 
unresponsive to earnings 
changes and show little 
relationship with size, leverage, 
and investment opportunities.   
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   over the period 
between 1996 
and 2004.  
 
It is stated that shareholder 
power restrictions affect 
dividend payment tendency to 
erratic degrees, but those that 
use the huge majority of Dutch 
listed companies.   
Authors find no support to the 
notion that strong shareholders 
allow firms to lessen their 
dividend payout, as has been 
proposed in the already 
published research.  
As shareholder managers and 
institutional investors actually 
force large amount of dividend 
payouts. Therefore it can be 
concluded that  dividends are 
complement rather than 
substitute shareholders’ efforts 
to reduce agency cost.   
The finding of the study is less 
likely to be exact to the 
Netherlands, and could possibly  
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     be extended to other countries 
with diverse corporate structure 
and legal frameworks.  
Shao et al. 
(2008)  
Is  National 
 Culture  a 
Missing  Piece  of 
 the Dividend Puzzle?  
Schwartz’s  (1994) 
cultural dimensions are 
studied in dividend policy 
perspective.  
Schwartz’s  
(1994) culture 
values data 
covering 22  
countries  
(from 
19941996 with 
2639 firms 
data) and  
Worldscope, 
which we use  
to collect 
firmlevel 
financial 
information, 
including 
dividends is 
used.  
Regression 
techniques are 
used analysis.  
for  The study argues that culture 
may influence corporate 
dividend policies through 
agency and signaling 
considerations.  
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 Thomas 
(2013)   Dividend Payout, 
Corporate Governance, 
and the Enforcement of 
Creditor Rights in  
Emerging Markets.  
Legal right protection 
and its impact on payout 
are studied.  
Sample of 281 
emerging 
market 
 firms are 
used for 
analysis.  
OLS  
regression 
used 
estimation of 
results.  
is 
for  
It is reported that, where legal 
enforcement is weak, the 
shareholders of better-governed 
firms are not able to use their  
 
     legal rights to extract large 
dividends from firms.   
The shareholders of companies 
with good governance are 
unable to extract high dividends 
from companies regardless of 
the strength of creditor rights.   
The study argued that 
differences in creditor rights are 
not systematically allied to 
payout policy in the way 
expected by the equity and 
agency costs of debt version of 
the dividend outcome models.   
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Appendix B: Disappearing Dividend Phenomenon   
The phenomenon of disappearing dividend is a striking empirical reality that needs explanation. 
For more than a decade the financial researchers have been trying to investigate the reason of 
disappearing dividends not only from developed economies but from developing world as well. 
For this purpose a pilot study was conducted in order to analyze a comprehensive view of trends 
and dynamics of dividend payouts in emerging economy of Pakistan. The balanced panel data of 
361 non-financial companies for the period of 1988 to 2008 has been analyzed to determine the 
dividend payout patterns. The results from descriptive analysis show that number of dividend 
payers has been substantially reduced during the last 21 years. However, the payer group as a 
whole has maintained the average payout ratio, with minor volatility, between ranges of 30% to 
50% payouts. The stable average payout ratio of payers group during the whole study period 
represents the concentration of dividends among the payers group. The analysis supports the 
notion of disappearing dividends in emerging economy of Pakistan.  
Table: Classification of Dividend Payers and Non payers  
Dividend Payer Group  
   Total Payers  regular payer  Initiators  Irregular payer  
 Years  N  %age  N  %age  N  %age  N  %age  
1988 108  29.9  96  26.6  12  3.3  0  .0  
1989 120  33.2  97  26.9  20  5.5  3  .8  
1990 132  36.6  91  25.2  21  5.8  20  5.5  
1991 123  34.1  74  20.5  17  4.7  32  8.9  
1992 110  30.5  61  16.9  20  5.5  29  8.0  
1993 111  30.7  53  14.7  14  3.9  44  12.2  
1994 102 28.3 44 12.2 14 3.9 44 12.2 1995 83 23.0 36 10.0 10 2.8 37 10.2  
1996 132  36.6  33  9.1  25  6.9  74  20.5  
1997 132 36.6 29 8.0 12 3.3 91 25.2 1998 112 31.0 25 6.9 9 2.5 78 21.6 1999 173 
47.9 25 6.9 10 2.8 138 38.2  
2000 199  55.1  25  6.9  26  7.2  148  41.0  
2001 167 46.4 23 6.4 14 3.9 130 36.1 2002 161 44.6 22 6.1 6 1.7 133 36.8 2003 149 
41.3 21 5.8 3 .8 125 34.6 2004 129 35.7 19 5.3 4 1.1 106 29.4 2005 130 36.0 18 
5.0 3 .8 109 30.2 2006 122 33.8 18 5.0 4 1.1 100 27.7 2007 98 27.1 17 4.7 2 .6 
79 21.8  
 2008  101  28.0  16  4.4  2  .6  83  23.0  
 
Dividend Non Payer Group  
  Total Non payers  Never paid  1st time missed  Current non payers Years  N 
 %age  N  %age  N  %age  N  %age 1988  253  70.1 
 252  69.8  0  .0  1  .3  
1989 241  66.8  229  63.4  11  3.0  1  .3  
1990 229  63.4  210  58.2  8  2.2  11  3.0  
1991 238  65.9  196  54.3  25  6.9  17  4.7  
1992 251  69.5  178  49.3  42  11.6  31  8.6  
1993 250  69.3  167  46.3  20  5.5  63  17.5  
1994 259  71.7  155  42.9  28  7.8  76  21.1  
1995 278  77.0  147  40.7  38  10.5  93  25.8  
1996 229  63.4  124  34.3  14  3.9  91  25.2  
1997 229  63.4  114  31.6  29  8.0  86  23.8  
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1998 249  69.0  107  29.6  43  11.9  99  27.4  
1999 188  52.1  99  27.4  9  2.5  80  22.2  
2000 162  44.9  76  21.1  19  5.3  67  18.6  
2001 193  53.6  62  17.2  65  18.1  66  18.3  
2002 200  55.4  58  16.1  34  9.4  108  29.9  
2003 212  58.7  56  15.5  30  8.3  126  34.9  
2004 232  64.3  53  14.7  36  10.0  143  39.6  
2005 231  64.0  52  14.4  19  5.3  160  44.3  
2006 239  66.2  50  13.9  40  11.1  149  41.3  
2007 264 72.9 50 13.8 45 12.4 169 46.7 2008 260 72.0 49 13.6 22 6.1 189 52.4  
 
Data collected and compiled by Author  
During the 1980s and mid 1990s Pakistan suffered from serious setbacks both in terms of social 
and economic indicators. The economic growth rates slowed, inflation has risen to its peak, debt 
burden increased and poverty almost became double. Most importantly the confidence of local 
and foreign investors was eroded, when government ordered to freeze the hard earned foreign 
currency deposits of resident and non-resident Pakistanis. The economic growth rate was 6.3% 
in 1980s which reduced to 4.9 % in mid 1990s. These might be the factors forcing companies not 
to distribute earnings in the form of dividends but to build up their reserves to meet the future 
investment needs.  
 
  
  
  
  
  
[End of Thesis]  
  
  
  
 
